Risk Arbitrage in Takeovers

This article studies the role of risk arbitrageurs in takeoversand the source of their advantage. We show how the presenceof arbitrageurs affects the value of the target shares, sincearbitrageurs are more likely to tender. Therefore an arbitrageurhas the informational advantage of knowing he bought shares.In equilibrium, the number of arbitrageurs buying shares andthe price they pay are determined endogenously. We also presentseveral empirical implications, including the relationship amongtrading volume, takeover premium, liquidity of the shares, andthe number of risk arbitrageurs investing in one particulardeal.     

Does Gibrat's Law hold among young,small firms?

According to Gibrat's Law of Proportionate Effect, the growth rate of a given firm is independent of its size at the beginning of the examined period. Aimed at extending this line of investigation, the present paper uses quantile regression techniques to test whether Gibrat's Law holds for new entrants in a given industry: that is for new small firms in the early stage of their life cycle. The main finding is that for some selected industries in Italian manufacturing Gibrat's Law fails to hold in the years immediately following start-up, when smaller firms have to rush in order to achieve a size large enough to enhance their likelihood of survival. Conversely, in subsequent years the patterns of growth of new smaller firms do not differ significantly from those of larger entrants, and the Law therefore cannot be rejected.JEL Classification: L11, L60Previous versions of this paper were presented at the 27th Annual EARIE Conference (Lausanne, 7-10 September 2000) and at seminars held between 2000 and 2003 at the Economics Department of Harvard University, the Catholic University of Milan, the University of Ferrara, the University of Bologna, the Bank of Italy, and Athens University of Economics & Business. We would like to thank Carlo Bianchi, Giuseppe Colangelo, Giovanni Dosi, Steven Klepper (Editor), Stephen Martin, Ariel Pakes, Aman Ullah and, in particular, Helen Louri and two anonymous referees for their valuable comments on earlier drafts. Financial support from MIUR (Year 2000; protocol #MM13038538_001; project leader: E. Santarelli) is gratefully acknowledged.Correspondence to: E. Santarelly     

Perpetual youth and endogenous labor supply: A problem and a possible solution

In the “perpetual youth” overlapping-generations model of Blanchard and Yaari, if leisure is a “normal” good then some agents will have negative labor supply. We suggest a solution to this problem by using a modified version of Greenwood, Hercowitz and Huffman’s utility function. The modification incorporates real money balances, so that the model may be used to analyze monetary as well as fiscal policy. In a Walrasian version of the economy, we show that increased government debt and increased government spending raise the interest rate and lower output, while an open-market operation to increase the money supply lowers the interest rate and raises output.     

The refoundation of the symmetric equilibrium in Schumpeterian growth models

We provide a refoundation of the symmetric growth equilibrium characterizing the research sector of vertical R&D-driven growth models. We argue that the usual assumptions made in this class of models leave the agents indifferent as to where targeting research: hence, the problem of the allocation of R&D investment across sectors is indeterminate. By introducing an “?-contamination of confidence” in the expected distribution of R&D investment, we prove that the symmetric structure of R&D investment is the unique rational expectations equilibrium compatible with ambiguity-averse agents adopting a maxmin strategy.     

Interindustry Linkages: Virtuous and Vicious?

Although overall linkages are steadily increasing in growth processes, em-pirical data supply strong evidence of large intercountry and intertemporal fluctuations of the domestic-to-overall linkages ratio. This paper tries to explain this phenomenon by modelling a producers' behaviour which appears more realistic than that usually assumed in interindustry or computable general equilibrium models. The main novelty of the results is that the same causes that generate interindustry multipliers can also ‘trap’ domestic linkages into reinforcing (‘virtuous’) or weakening (‘vicious’) circles, depending on whether the price competitiveness of domestic activities is above or below a threshold related to the non-price competitiveness of those activities. These results can help to explain the fluctuations of domestic linkages with respect to overall linkages by spatial and temporal shifts of the threshold between the vicious and the virtuous ‘areas’. Moreover, they emphasize the importance of supply policies-mainly R&D policies—because of their ‘pushing down’ effect on this threshold.     

Mean-variance hedging for interest rate models¶with stochastic volatility

The mean-variance hedging approach for pricing and hedging claims in incomplete markets was originally introduced for risky assets. The aim of this paper is to apply this approach to interest rate models in the presence of stochastic volatility, seen as a consequence of incomplete information. We fix a finite number of bonds such that the volatility matrix is invertible and provide an explicit formula for the density of the variance-optimal measure which is independent of the chosen times of maturity. Finally, we compute the mean-variance hedging strategy for a caplet and compare it with the optimal stategy according to the local risk minimizing approach. Received: 14 July 2000 / Accepted: 10 April 2001     

Rat race, redistribution, and growth

Introducing locally negatively interdependent preferences into a simple AK growth model easily explains the often observed insignificant or positive correlation between distortionary redistribution and growth rates. Positive capital income taxes and lump sum transfers are harmful for growth, but people rationally vote for them in order to reduce “rat race” overaccumulation. A “neutrality proposition” holds if the pivotal voter is the mean voter, as in a representative agent case, but it fails if the pivotal voter is poorer than the average citizen.     

Setting consolidated reporting standards for local government

Under a corporatization trend, traditional financial reporting is generally considered unable to offer a complete view of the economic and financial activities of a group of public entities. Consequently, several reforms and standards have been introduced related to consolidated financial reports. Through interviews with key actors, the authors analysed the normativity process for issuing consolidated reporting standards for local governments in three European countries: Italy, Spain, and Sweden.