Banks’ deferred tax assets during the financial crisis

Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting - Prior studies have demonstrated that the net deferred tax liabilities of industrial firms are valued by market participants in a manner consistent...     

Economic Comparison of Alternative Tillage Systems under Risk.

Stochastic dominance efficiency criteria are used to rank the net farm return distributions for four different tillage systems under six different farm scenarios. Pairwise comparisons of tillage systems are carried over incremental upper and lower risk-aversion coefficient (RAC) bounds identified for each farm scenario, based on the size and spread of the outcome distributions to identify regions where dominance may switch between tillage systems. Ridge-till systems are generally the dominant tillage system for all farm scenarios considered. No-till systems on clay loam soils are more dominant in the risk-preferring range and less dominant in the risk-averse range, which relates to the relatively larger range of net return values and smaller mean net return values generated by this tillage system. Conversely, the moldboard plow and chisel plow systems are more dominant in risk-aversion intervals and less dominant in the risk-preferring intervals for clay loam soils. In sandy soil scenarios, the ridge-till and no-till systems are dominant over the two fall tillage systems for all farm sizes, indicating that these tillage systems are more competitive with conventional tillage systems in lighter soil type situations. A sensitivity analysis between moldboard plow and no-till systems indicates that no-till would dominate in risk-preferring intervals, and an increase in no-till net farm returns of 16 per acre would change dominance in favor of no-till in risk-averse interval space. On a utilisé les critères d'efficacitéà dominance stochastique pour classer les divers niveaux de recettes agricoles nettes dans quatre systèmes différents de travail du sol, selon six scénarios d'exploitation. Des comparaisons en paires des systèmes de travail ont été faites en regard de tranches croissantes des limites supérieures et inférieures du coefficient d'aversion du risque (CER), établies pour chaque scénario d'après l'importance et l'étendue des distributions du rendement, dans le but d'identifier les régions où la dominance serait susceptible de passer d'un système de travail à l'autre. Le système de travail sur billons était en général le système dominant dans tous les scénarios d'exploitation examinés. La culture sans travail du sol sur loam argileux était plus dominante dans les intervalles d'acceptation du resque et moins dominante dans les intervalles d'aversion du resque, cequi s'explique au fait que ce système de travail donne lieu à une fourchette relativement plus large, mais aussi à une moyenne plus faible du revenu net. À l'inverse, le labour à la charrue classique et au chisel dominait davantage dans les intervalles d'aversion du risque. Dans les sols sableux, le travail sur billons et la culture sans labour l'emportaient sur les deux autres régimes dans toutes les tailles d'exploitation, ce qui porte à croire que, dans les sols plus légers, ces régimes sont plus concurrentiels avec les systèmes classiques. L'analyse de sensibilité entre le labour à la charrue et les systèmes sans travail du sol montre que ces derniers dominent dans les intervalles d'acceptation du risque et qu'un accroissement du revenu agricole net de 16 /acre ferait glisser la dominance vers les intervalles d'aversion du risque.     

A reply to Thomas Mulligan's “critique of Milton Friedman's essay ‘The Social Responsibility of Business to Increase Its Profits’”

Professor Thomas Mulligan undertakes to discredit Milton Friedman's thesis that The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits. He attempts to do this by moving from Friedman's paradigm characterizing a socially responsible executive as willful and disloyal to a different paradigm, i.e., one emphasizing the consultative and consensus-building role of a socially responsible executive. Mulligan's critique misses the point, first, because even consensus-building executives act contrary to the will of minority shareholders, but even more importantly, because he assumes that the mandate of a shareholder majority brings legitimacy to efforts of corporate managers to utilize corporate wealth in solving social problems. It is the role of our democratic institutions to deal with national agenda issues such as inflation, unemployment, and pollution, not that of the private sector. Corporations and private individuals do have a role to play in enhancing the quality of the human environment, however, and the author suggests a coherent means of developing that role in an effort rescue corporate social responsibility from Mulligan no less than from Friedman. Bill Shaw, Lynette S. Autrey Visiting Professor of Business Ethics at the Jesse H. School of Administration, Rice University, is Professor of Business Law at the University of Texas at Austin. He is staff editor of the American Business Law Journal and the Midwest Law Review. Among his most recent publications are The Structure of the Legal Environment (with Art Wolfe), Environmental Law: Text and Cases, The Global Environment: A Proposal to Eliminate Marine Oil Pollution (With Frank Cross and Brenda Winslett, The Natural Resources Journal), and Comparable Worth and Its Prospects (The Labor Law Journal).     

Income Distribution, Taxation, and the Private Provision of Public Goods

This article investigates the role of taxation when public goods are privately provided. Externalities between consumers via the public good are shown to cause kinks in social indifference curves. As a result, a government restricted to income taxation should engineer enough inequality to ensure there are some non-contributors to the public good. Whether commodity taxation changes this conclusion depends on the extent to which consumers "see through" the government budget constraint. If they can, inequality should still be sought. When they cannot, in contrast to the case of an economy with only private goods, commodity taxation can be used in conjunction with income transfers to achieve the first-best.     

Late entry,market shares and competitive survival: The case of synthetic fibers

This paper examines product policy in relation to the experience curve and product life cycle concepts in the context of the experience of the thirteen major firms in the Western European synthetic fibers industry. It examines the hypothesis based on Boston Consulting Group and the Profit Impact of Market Share (PIMS) evidence that late entrants to a market will be at a competitive disadvantage because they lack the accumulated experience of the pioneering firms. For each of the three main synthetic fibres, acrylic, nylon and polyester, it was found that the early entrants who established major market shares early in the growth phase of the product life cycle were able to maintain that leadership nearly twenty years later. In contrast not only did almost all the late entrants fail to achieve significant market shares but in the difficult market conditions between 1974 and 1981 they provided seven out of nine market withdrawals.     

Revenue Sharing versus Expenditure Sharing in a Federal System

Problems of intergovernmental policy coordination can take many forms and are becoming increasingly important with continuing economic integration. In this paper we focus on the fiscal competition problem where the non-cooperative choice of taxes and transfers among governments typically leads to a suboptimal outcome. We look at the effect of two widely used corrective policies: revenue sharing and expenditure sharing (or intergovernmental matching grants). Our main result is that these two corrective policies have opposite effects depending on the form of competition between governments, namely whether governments compete in taxes or expenditures. More precisely, for any form of competition, revenue sharing is desirable exactly when expenditure sharing is not and vice versa. The implication is that the choice of the optimal corrective policy requires a complete understanding of the underlying non-cooperative behavior among governments. Our second main result is that neither revenue sharing or expenditure sharing can be sustained as a Nash equilibrium among governments, although all governments would benefit from one of these two corrective policies. Central intervention is therefore inevitable unless governments can pre-commit to the optimal corrective policy before setting their fiscal policies.     

Differences in the Cost of Trade Execution Services on Floor-Based and Electronic Futures Markets

This paper provides new evidence on the impact of electronic trading on brokerage commissions by investigating a sample period that covers the period of transition from floor to electronic trading on the Sydney Futures Exchange. After controlling for liquidity, volatility and broker identity, the introduction of electronic trading remains to be associated with lower brokerage commissions relative to floor markets. The study also provides new evidence on brokerage commissions in futures markets finding that commission fees charged on futures trades average 0.002% of transaction value. This is up to 120 times smaller than the magnitude of brokerage fees charged in stock markets, and considerably lower than the magnitude of brokerage fees assumed for futures markets in previous research. Consistent with existing studies based on stock markets, commissions charged per contract decrease with order size reflecting economies of scale in the provision of brokerage services in futures markets. Commission rates are positively related to bid-ask spreads and price volatility, which proxy for the probability of execution error costs and execution difficulty, respectively. Finally, the identity of the broker is found to be a significant determinant of commissions reflecting different pricing schedules across brokers.     

Employment Protection,Threat and Incentive Effects on Worker Absence

This article provides new evidence on the effect of changes in employment protection on worker absence. We use novel multi‐organization data to examine changes in worker absence as workers move from temporary to permanent employment contracts. We demonstrate a robust positive effect of employment protection on sickness absence. It has also been suggested that the impact of employment protection on absence and effort is due to a fear of dismissal. We also provide evidence that suggests that temporary workers' absence is influenced by incentives to attain jobs with protection that is unrelated to threat of dismissal. This has not been considered in earlier research. This channel of employment protection effects has important policy implications.