Empirical Implications of Equilibrium Bidding in First-Price, Symmetric, Common Value Auctions

This paper studies federal auctions for wildcat leases on the Outer Continental Shelf from 1954 to 1970. These are leases where bidders privately acquire (at some cost) noisy, but equally informative, signals about the amount of oil and gas that may be present. We develop tests of rational and equilibrium bidding in a common values model that are implemented using data on bids and ex post values. We also use data on tract location and ex post values to test the comparative static prediction that bidders may bid less aggressively in common value auctions when they expect more competition. We find that bidders are aware of the "winner's curse" and their bidding is largely consistent with equilibrium.     

Making competition in health care work

Health care reform in the United States is on a collision course with economic reality. Most proposals focus on measures that will produce one-time cost savings by eliminating waste and inefficiency. But the right question to ask is how to achieve dramatic and sustained cost reductions over time. What will it take to foster entirely new approaches to disease prevention and treatment, whole new ways to deliver services, and more cost-effective facilities? The answer lies in the powerful lessons business has learned over the past two decades about the imperatives of competition. In industry after industry, the underlying dynamic is the same: competition compels companies to deliver constantly increasing value to customers. The fundamental driver of this continuous quality improvement and cost reduction is innovation. Without incentives to sustain innovation in health care, short-term cost savings will soon be overwhelmed by the desire to widen access, the growing health needs of an aging population, and the unwillingness of Americans to settle for anything less than the best treatments available. The misguided assumption underlying much of the debate about health care is that technology is the enemy. By assuming that technology drives up costs, reformers neglect the central importance of innovation or, worse yet, attempt to slow its pace. In fact, innovation, driven by rigorous competition, is the key to successful reform.     

Effect of the Actual Size Rule Under Market Stress

We examine the introduction of the Actual Size Rule (ASR) on Nasdaq during a control period and a period of market stress. We find that market makers in both ASR and Non-ASR stocks reduce quotation sizes and widen spreads when under stress but the reduction of quotation size and increase in spread width are significantly larger for ASR stocks. We also examine October 27, when the market was under the most severe stress. We find ASR and Non-ASR stocks have similar reductions in time-weighted quotation ask size when compared with the control sample but ASR bid sizes are about 10% smaller than Non-ASR bid sizes. Our findings imply that the ASR rule may significantly reduce market quality under times of market stress. JEL Classification: 14, G15, G18     

The Impact of Capital Requirements and Managerial Compensation on Bank Charter Value

This paper examines the joint impact of capital requirements and managerial incentive compensation on bank charter value and bank risk. Most of the previous literature in the area of banking and agency theory has focused on asymmetric information between either banks and regulators, (and therefore on the role of bank capital), or between bank shareholders and bank managers, (and therefore on the role of managerial ownership). In this paper we unify these issues and present empirical results from the regression of capital requirements jointly with measures of incentive compensation on Tobin's Q, our proxy for bank charter value, and on the standard deviation of total return, our proxy for bank risk. In a sample of 102 bank holding companies we find that capital levels are consistently a significant positive factor in determining bank charter value and a significant negative factor in determining risk. On the other hand, we find our six measures of incentive compensation to be generally insignificant relative to charter value but do provide some evidence consistent with a theory relating types of incentive compensation with risk.     

Consumer value and self-image congruency at different stages of timeshare ownership

An understanding of customers’ perceptions of value is fundamental to the competitive nature of all industries. Using the timeshare resort sector as a context for our studies, we explore the ways in which consumers, grouped according to their timeshare ownership stage, perceive value. Data were collected from three samples: non-owners of timeshare, recent purchasers of timeshare, and longer-term timeshare owners. Value was shown to be multi-dimensional, with a stable pattern of eleven correlated value factors evident in all three samples. The groups differed in their assessments of the different dimensions of value. In all groups, however, value was positively correlated with attitudes and future intentions regarding timeshare. Self-image congruency explained additional criterion variance. The findings demonstrate that, even among consumers who have never used timeshare, value and self-image congruency are substantial and unique predictors of attitudes and intentions regarding this tourism product.     

Any complaints? A review of the framework of self-regulation in the Australian advertising industry

Prior to 1996, the Australian system of advertising self-regulation was regarded as a world model and many Asia-Pacific systems included components adapted from the Australian system. The recent changes to this system, encouraged by the abolition of the media accreditation system, consumer association pressure, criticism from the national advertisers association and the lack of a strong advertising agency presence, present an interesting framework in which to review the foundation concepts of self-regulation in advertising. This paper compares the new code of ethics with its predecessor and an international standard. It examines the performance of the code in terms of the number of complaints upheld and complaint by medium and product type and the voluntary response of advertisers. The findings suggest a weakening in the standard of advertising self-regulation in Australia, with fewer provisions in the Code of Ethics, a significantly fewer number of complaints upheld and no real power of enforcement. Although the case is Australian, it raises universal questions such as the vested interest of advertisers in controlling the process and roles of the consumer association, the media and the advertising agencies in guaranteeing the privilege of self-regulation.     

University – industry collaboration in R&D: the role of labor market rigidity

We investigate how R&D university – industry collaboration (R&D UIC) is influenced by labor market rigidity. While it is well-established that an educated and skilled workforce will facilitate R&D UIC, another aspect of these alliances has been under-researched: the role of labor market rigidity, in particular the difficulties employers face in hiring and firing workers. We hypothesize that the size of the R&D labor pool in a country will encourage R&D UIC, and that the ease with which employers are legally allowed to hire and fire will directly and indirectly influence R&D UIC. Integrating data from various sources, we test our model on a sample of 73 countries for which information on the size of the R&D labor pool and labor market regulations are available. We also conduct a robustness test using a different proxy for R&D labor pool on a larger sample of 109 countries. Results confirm the strong link between a country's R&D labor pool and R&D UIC, as well as direct negative impacts of hiring and firing rigidity and an indirect negative impact of hiring rigidity. The findings have implications for managers, policy makers, and researchers of R&D collaboration between universities and industry.