Career Concerns and Resource Allocation in Conglomerates

We investigate resource allocation decisions in conglomerateswhen managers are motivated by career concerns. When divisionalcash flows are differentially informative about managerial ability,we show that it is in the managers' interest to overallocateunobservable intangible resources to the more informative divisions.Anticipating this bias, it is optimal for the firm's ownersto also overallocate observable capital to the more informativedivisions. The model provides rationale for corporate socialismand corporate hedging. It also highlights a cost of segmentreporting and tracking stocks, namely, that they allow managersto distort their perceived ability at the expense of investors.     

Market exit of firms: Does corruption act as grease or sand?

This paper examines whether corruption acts to “grease” or “sand” firms' exit. Corruption could facilitate exit when it is a tax that distorts markets, or it might retard exit when it empowers firms to obtain undue favors. Results, using panel data across US states and considering market exit and firms' death rates as dependent variables, show that greater corruption acts as grease rather than sand in that it facilitates firms' exit/death. In other findings, larger states, greater regulations, and more unemployment contributed to exit, as did some demographic aspects. Higher state minimum wages resulted in firms' death but not exit.     

Contagious diseases and tourism: a systematic review based on bibliometric and content analysis methods

Quality & Quantity - The present study examines the existing knowledge and intellectual structure on contagious diseases and tourism to map the development of the concept through collaborative...     

Determinants of process innovation introductions: Evidence from 115 developing countries

This paper examines determinants of process innovation introductions across 115 (mostly) developing countries. Empirical research on process innovations lags behind product innovations. Accounting for firm characteristics, R&D, regulations and taxes, and corruption, results show that sole proprietors and R&D‐performing firms were more likely to introduce innovations, whereas greater prosperity made them less likely to do so. Corruption had a greasing effect, whereas firms in island nations were less likely to introduce, ceteris paribus. Effects of regulations and taxes and other firm characteristics were largely insignificant. Finally, some differences existed across manufacturing and service industries and across prevalence of innovation introductions.     

Academic leadership and commercial activities at research institutes: German evidence

This paper focuses on entrepreneurship by academic leaders. With the use of patents, inventions, and spin‐offs to measure commercialization, and directors, research group leaders, and business owners as academic leaders, results, using a sample of more than 2,500 German researchers, show differences across academic leaders and commercialization. Findings for spin‐offs are different from those for patents and inventions. Academic leaders in sciences were more likely to commercialize. Doctoral degrees helped patents by business owners and spin‐offs by group leaders, whereas female business owners and female group leaders faced challenges patenting and inventing, respectively. For business owners, age increased the likelihood of patenting but lowered spin‐offs.     

Fair welfare maximization

We consider the general problem of finding fair constrained resource allocations. As a criterion for fairness we propose an inequality index, termed “fairness ratio,” the maximization of which produces Lorenz-undominated, Pareto-optimal allocations. The fairness ratio does not depend on the choice of any particular social welfare function, and hence it can be used for an a priori evaluation of any given feasible resource allocation. The fairness ratio for an allocation provides a bound on the discrepancy between this allocation and any other feasible allocation with respect to a large class of social welfare functions. We provide a simple representation of the fairness ratio as well as a general method that can be used to directly determine optimal fair allocations. For general convex environments, we provide a fundamental lower bound for the optimal fairness ratio and show that as the population size increases, the optimal fairness ratio decreases at most logarithmically in what we call the “inhomogeneity” of the problem. Our method yields a unique and “balanced” fair optimum for an important class of problems with linear budget constraints.     

A note on the consistency of maximum likelihood estimators

Abstract

A sequence of maximum likelihood estimators based on a sequence of independent but not necessarily identically distributed random variables is shown to be consistent under certain assumptions. Some examples are given to show that these assumptions are easy to verify and not very restrictive.     

R&D Strategy in International Mixed Duopoly with Research Spillovers

This paper examines the international mixed duopoly behaviour with research spillovers. Using a two‐stage game with Research and Development (R&D) and output, we investigate the effects of imperfectly appropriable R&D on optimal R&D strategies of a domestic public firm and a foreign private firm across different market interactions: (i) international R&D competition, (ii) only the foreign firm conducts R&D, (iii) only the domestic public firm conducts R&D, (iv) no firm conducts R&D, and (v) research joint venture. The results show that firms' research performances are determined by the degree of spillovers and the optimal R&D strategies involve R&D competition. Spillovers are shown to be socially beneficial and their absence can prove to be a strategic deterrent, with the public firm monopolising the market. Some of these findings contrast with the traditional models of oligopoly (with or without R&D) and mixed oligopoly (without R&D).