The type-agent core for exchange economies with asymmetric information

The type-agent core is a new solution concept for exchange economies with asymmetric information. It coincides with the set of subgame-perfect equilibrium outcomes of a simple competitive screening game. Uninformed intermediaries help the agents to cooperate in an attempt to make some profit. The paper extends the work of Perez-Castrillo [Cooperative outcomes through non-cooperative games, Games Econ. Behav. 7 (1994) 428-440] to exchange economies with non-transferable utility and asymmetric information. The type-agent core is a subset of Wilson's coarse core [Wilson, Information, efficiency, and the core of an economy, Econometrica 46 (1978) 807-816]. It is never empty, even though it may be a strict subset of Wilson's fine core. In addition, it converges towards the set of constrained market equilibria as the economy is replicated.     

An axiomatization of the inner core using appropriate reduced games

I adapt a reduction process introduced by Serrano and Volij [Serrano, R., Volij, O., 1998. Axiomatization of neoclassical concepts for Economies. Journal of Mathematical Economics 30, 87–108] so that the reduced games of convex-valued games are convex-valued. I use the corresponding consistency property and its converse to axiomatize the inner core for games that are convex-valued, non-level and smooth.     

Does the Commercialization of Voluntary Organizations ‘Crowd out’ Voluntary Work?

This article examines the relationship among voluntary labour supply and commercial income for Norwegian sport voluntary organizations. Empirical results using cross–sectional data on voluntary sport organizations in Norway and on their members show a decrease in voluntary work from an increase in commercial income. Voluntary work and commercial income appear as substitutable resources. Nevertheless, the results have to be differentiated according to the professional situation of the volunteers.
A crowding out effect between voluntary work and commercial resources is at play for non–professionally active individuals whereas professionally active individuals seem to be indifferent to the level of commercial resources in deciding whether to volunteer or not.     

Two remarks on the inner core

For the case of smooth concave exchange economies, we provide a characterization of the inner core as the set of feasible allocations such that no coalition can improve on it, even if coalitions are allowed to use some random plans. For the case of compactly generated games, we discuss Myerson's definition of the inner core, and we characterize it using lexicographic utility weight systems.     

Who Owns Guaraná? Legal Strategies,Development Policies and Agricultural Practices in Brazilian Amazonia

This paper offers a historical perspective on the interactions between legal standards and agricultural practices relating to guaraná, an energy‐inducing Amazonian plant that is in increasing demand. Guaraná is managed in a number of socio‐technical contexts, ranging from the fizzy drink industry to alternative agro‐ecological farming systems, and is subject to a great many legal rules that determine the conditions for its use and appropriation. The paper shows how, in guaraná's native region of Maués, Brazilian Amazonia, various stakeholders including the indigenous population, associations of smallholdings and multinationals use legal standards in order to gain prerogatives over the plant and/or win a share of a growing market. In spite of the fact that the plant has been domesticated by the Sateré‐Mawé and that traditional knowledge has been recognized in Brazil, to a certain extent history has dispossessed them of their rights to guaraná. New political and economic circumstances have favoured those actors committed to strategies of agricultural modernization and industrial processing. On the other hand, the ecologization of agriculture and the increasing numbers of instruments for differentiating production (such as fair trade, organic farming and geographical indications) seem to be favouring diversification in the methods of managing guaraná, as well as a certain re‐appropriation of the plant by local communities.     

Crop insurance policies and purchases in France

While many crop insurance systems have been reformed around the world, few academic researches have addressed the determinants of the decision on crop insurance at the farm's micro level. In this article, both the financial and the agricultural literature lead to the identification of many rationales for the crop insurance decision. Using data from the period 2003–2006 on a representative survey of French farms (FADN‐RICA), we investigate the different factors that incite farmers to insure against crop risk. We emphasize that the highest risk farms are more likely to have insurance and this decision is positively related to the past amount of claims. Insurance is subscribed by larger farms because insurance appears too expensive for smaller farms, which are indeed naturally less diversified. Interestingly, financial variables (such as capital structure or return on investment) do not significantly determine the insurance decision.     

Formes institutionnelles, rationalité axiologique et conventions

Resume Pour la théorie des coûts de transaction la firme est préférée au marché lorsque les coûts de transaction sont élevés. Si de ce point de vue le marché et la hiérarchie constituent deux formes institutionnelles alternatives de coordination des activités, il reste à expliquer pourquoi certaines organisations prennent la forme lucrative tandis que d'autres prennent la forme non lucrative ou publique. Les explications en termes de coûts de transaction et d'échecs du marché ont en commun de reposer sur une hypothèse de comportement, celle de l'acteur rationnel et égoïste. Or le comportement des acteurs ne peut se réduire à la rationalité instrumentale. L'objectif de cet article n'est pas de dénier la pertinence des approches traditionnelles en termes d'échecs du marché mais d'en limiter le champ d'application. La thèse qui est développée ici est qu'il existe un certain nombre d'activités qui n'ont pas une finalité instrumentale ou économique mais axiologique, bien que comportant une dimension économique, dont la mise en oeuvre requiert des formes institutionnelles et des structures de gouvernance qui sont adaptées à leurs finalités. Pour ces activités, le marché est en échec parce que la rationalité de ces activités lui est étrangère. Les formes non lucratives et publiques offrent une structure de gouvernance adaptée à l'exercice de la rationalité axiologique .     

How Norway’s sovereign wealth fund negative screening affects firms’ value and behaviour

This paper examines the impact of negative screening by responsible sovereign wealth funds on the value of excluded firms. We focus on the main sovereign wealth fund, the Government Pension Fund Global of Norway, which excluded 149 firms from its portfolio during the period 2006–2018. Using an event study methodology, we document a significant decrease in excluded firms’ stock prices. Moreover, we find that the nature of screening matters: norm‐based exclusions suffer from a significant and permanent decrease in their stock value, suggesting that market participants reacted to the Government Pension Fund Global of Norway exclusions. Overall, it can be asserted that the Norwegian fund has a strong signalling effect on financial markets, in terms of social and environmental information. We conclude that sovereign wealth funds could be used by governments as investment vehicles in order to promote responsible investments on a large scale.     

No profitable decompositions in quasi-linear allocation problems

We study the problem of allocating a bundle of perfectly divisible private goods from an axiomatic point of view, in situations where compensations can be made through monetary transfers. The key property we impose on the allocation rule requires that no agent should be able to gain by decomposing the problem into sequences of subproblems. Combined with additional standard properties, it leads to a characterization of the rule that shares the total surplus equally. Hence a traditional welfarist rule emerges as the unique consequence of our axioms phrased in a natural economic environment.     

Coordination failure, property rights and non-profit organizations

This paper advances a socio-economic theory of nonprofit organizations aiming at conceiving this organizational form in its complexity and at analysing it from both the viewpoints of its economical and political (democratic) dimensions. This theoretical approach accounts for the existence of nonprofit organizations and the reasons why nonprofit organizations are relatively more efficient when compared with for-profit and government organizations in particular circumstances. The various current explanations of the existence of nonprofit organizations (contract failure, government failure, philanthropic failure) are regrouped around the concept of coordination failure. The paper then examines how nonprofit organizations are able to mitigate these coordination failures. The central thesis is that the specific distribution of property rights characterizing nonprofit organizations results in a particular type of governance structure which allows them to mitigate coordination failures. In turn, the ability of the organization to mitigate coordination failures and therefore its efficiency is conditioned on its democratic functioning.