Information, Knowledge and Belief

The paper models information as possibilities consistent with signals received from the environment. Knowledge is obtained by reasoning about the signals received as well as those that might have been received but were not. The term 'knowledge' is used to refer to those beliefs that are obtained by reasoning about the available information, and nothing else . That is, one ought to be able to fully justify what one knows by means of the information that is available. The term 'belief' is used to refer to those beliefs that are based on information but not necessarily only on information. The author investigates the relationship between information, knowledge and belief, as well as the issue of updating knowledge and belief in response to changes in information.     

Monopoly with resale

We examine the intricacies associated with the design of revenue‐maximizing mechanisms for a monopolist who expects her buyers to resell. We consider two cases: resale to a third party who does not participate in the primary market and interbidder resale, where the winner resells to the losers. To influence the resale outcome, the monopolist must design an allocation rule and a disclosure policy that optimally fashion the beliefs of the participants in the secondary market. Our results show that the revenue‐maximizing mechanism may require a stochastic selling procedure and a disclosure policy richer than the simple announcement of the decision to sell to a particular buyer.     

Commitment and choice of partner in a negotiation with a deadline

This paper analyses the effects of partially revocable endogenous commitments of a seller in a negotiation with a deadline. In particular, we examine when commitment is a source of strength, a source of inefficiency and when it does not affect the bargaining outcome at all. We show that when commitment possesses a minimum amount of irrevocability this crucially determines the bargaining outcome. In the bilateral bargaining case, commitment becomes a source of inefficiency since it causes a deadline effect. In the choice of partner framework, however, the deadline effect disappears and there is an immediate agreement and, moreover, commitment becomes a source of strength since it increases the seller's equilibrium payoff by triggering off competition between the buyers.     

Trade policy and specialization in developing countries

This paper examines the impact of trade policy on specialization patterns in ten Latin American countries over the period 1985–1998. These countries are natural case studies because in the last decades they implemented comprehensive trade liberalization programs, both generally and preferentially, starting from relatively high tariff protection levels. Our econometric results suggest that reducing own most favored nation tariffs is associated with increasing manufacturing production specialization. Furthermore, we find that preferential trade liberalization and differences in the degree of unilateral openness have resulted in increased dissimilarities in manufacturing production structures across countries. These results are robust across specialization measures and estimation methods.

Attending to inattention: Identification of deadweight loss under nonsalient taxes

Recent developments in behavioral public economics have shown that heterogeneous biases prevent point identification of deadweight loss. We replicate this result for an arbitrary (closed) consumption set, whereas previous results on heterogeneous attention focused on binary choice. We find that one can bound the efficiency costs of taxation based on aggregate features of demand. When individuals have linear demand functions, the bounds for deadweight loss are easy to calculate from linear regressions.     

A general framework for the analysis of fiscal equalisation systems

This paper shows that, despite the existing diversity of models of fiscal equalisation, there is a common underlying structure that links all of them. To this end, a framework of analysis sufficiently general so as to encompass the main schemes present in the literature is developed. This allows to uncover the common features of these schemes and to identify more readily the origin and nature of their differences. The formal approach is complemented with a numerical simulation of the models considered. The paper also shows the usefulness of the approach for reform policy and suggests two new models.JEL Classification: H2, H7I would like to thank three anonymous referees for their helpful comments and suggestions to a previous draft of this article.     

Experiment-inspired comments on John Roemer’s theory of cooperation

Abstract

We report on a nonsocial experiment where we find that all participants choose the dominant strategy in the experimental payoff, and compare it with the payoff-isomorphic, but social, Prisoner’s Dilemma treatment presented in a recent paper by Bosch-Domènech and Silvestre where 28% choose cooperation instead of the dominant strategy. The contrast reinforces Roemer’s emphasis on human cooperation. Next, we argue that Roemer’s Simple Kantian Equilibrium works well as a theory of cooperation under the assumption of monotonicity (positive or negative externalities), but not when efficient cooperation requires the division of labor by coordinating dissimilar tasks.     

Cycles of Aggregate Behavior in Theory and Experiment

We test in the laboratory the potential of evolutionary dynamics as predictor of actual behavior. To this end, we propose an asymmetric game (which we interpret as a borrower–lender relation), we study its evolutionary dynamics in a random matching setup, and we test its predictions. The theoretical model provides conditions for changes in qualitative aggregate behavior in response to variations in structural parameters. While it turns out that Nash equilibrium is not a reliable predictor of average aggregate behavior, the experiment seems to confirm the qualitative predictions of the evolutionary model under structural changes. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C7, C9, E3.     

Family networks and school enrolment: Evidence from a randomized social experiment

We present evidence on whether and how a household's behavior is influenced by the presence and characteristics of its extended family. Using data from the PROGRESA program in Mexico, we exploit information on the paternal and maternal surnames of heads and spouses in conjunction with the Spanish naming convention to identify the inter- and intra-generational family links of each household to others in the same village. We then exploit the randomized research design of the PROGRESA evaluation data to identify whether the treatment effects of PROGRESA transfers on secondary school enrolment vary according to the characteristics of extended family. We find PROGRESA only raises secondary enrolment among households that are embedded in a family network. Eligible but isolated households do not respond. The mechanism through which the extended family influences household schooling choices is the redistribution of resources within the family network from eligibles that receive de facto unconditional cash transfers from PROGRESA, towards eligibles on the margin of enrolling children into secondary school.