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1.
This paper investigates the macroeconomic implications of different regimes of international fiscal coordination and monetary‐fiscal cooperation in a monetary union with independent fiscal authorities, that act strategically vis‐à‐vis a common central bank. In the presence of other policy goals than cyclical stabilization, such as interest rate smoothing and fiscal stability, we show that coordination among national fiscal authorities can reduce output and inflation volatility relative to the non‐cooperative setting in specific circumstances, as in case of demand disturbances, while turning potentially counterproductive otherwise. The adverse effects of union‐wide coordinated fiscal measures can be attenuated in a regime of global coordination, namely, when a centralized fiscal stabilization is coordinated with the common monetary policy as well. 相似文献
2.
Firms specialized in two different sectors lobby to induce the government to subsidize the type of education complementary to their production. Lobbying is endogenous. We show that, if lobbying is not costly, both sectors will lobby in equilibrium and the education policy will induce the same skill composition that would be chosen by the social planner. However, if lobbying is costly and there is sufficient asymmetry between the sectors, only one sector will exert pressure on the policy‐maker in the attempt to direct resources toward the type of education required by its production. Which sector will engage in lobbying depends on relative size, productivity, and price. We also provide some preliminary evidence that lobbying activity by firms may influence the production of skills needed by those firms. 相似文献
3.
Debora Di Gioacchino Sergio Ginebri Laura Sabani 《Review of International Economics》2008,16(4):798-813
This paper proposes a stylized two‐period, two‐country model illustrating the role of distribution of domestic wealth in determining a country's level of access to international lending. We model sovereign debt redemption policy in a common agency framework. Within this framework, policy is the outcome of the interaction between government and local and foreign interest groups with conflicting preferences on debt repayment. Our main result is that in full lobby competition, when all interests are represented, the only equilibrium solution is repudiation and the consequent inability of government to access international capital markets. Conversely, when the ability to lobby depends on wealth, governments can access international credit up to a given maximum external debt capacity, determined by the skew in the distribution of domestic wealth. 相似文献
4.
Gioacchino Fazio 《European Journal of the History of Economic Thought》2013,20(2):251-265
Abstract In this paper, we propose an interpretation of the application of ‘cost of reproduction’ of Francesco Ferrara to the exchange between two agents to highlight its relevance for the theory of bilateral monopoly. In the Teoria delle Mercedi, Ferrara gives a numerical example to explain price determination in the exchange between one buyer and one seller. Here, this example is translated into a mathematical model that reproduces the fundamental issues of the neoclassical debate on the indeterminacy of price in the Cournot model, and anticipates the solutions proposed by Edgeworth at the end of this debate. 相似文献
5.
Regression results show that more unequal societies tend to spend comparatively more on higher levels of education. In a two-period model with heterogeneous agents, this paper investigates the political determinants of this bias. In the first period, public education is financed by the incumbent government by issuing bonds. Investments in basic and higher education have conflicting effects on future labour income distribution and net returns to these investments depend on the tax and transfers system being selected in the following period through the democratic process. Our idea is that public investment in basic education, by decreasing future labour income inequality, may induce future policy-makers to redistribute resources through financial rents taxation, thus making unfeasible the issuing of debt to finance basic education. This will be the more probable the greater wealth inequality is. 相似文献
6.
We study interactions between two policymakers, central bank and government, in managing public debt as the result of a two-stage
game. In the first stage, the institutional regime is established. This determines the equilibrium solution for the second
stage, in which a differential game is played between the two policymakers. It is shown that, if the policymakers can communicate
before the game is played (multiple-equilibrium), coordination problems can be solved by using the concept of correlated equilibrium.
相似文献
Debora Di GioacchinoEmail: |
7.
Gioacchino D'Ippolito 《Metroeconomica》1996,47(1):57-69
The author shows that the effect on the product-capital ratio of an increase in the profit rate from below to above the rate that marks the switching from technique I to technique 11 can be geometrically split up into i) two price effects resulting from price changes within each technique and ii) an intermediate real effect, in general well-behaved, consequent to the switching from the first to the second technique. The product-capital ratios can be correctly determined, and are as such “invariant” with respect to the numéraire chosen, only if derived from wage curves that are constructed by assuming as numéraire a basket whose composition is the same as the net product. This does not invalidate the proposition that the capital-product ratio, conceived as the value of capital per physical basket of product, and its response to a rise in the profit rate vary with the numéraire chosen. 相似文献
8.
9.
Gioacchino Pappalardo Roberta Selvaggi Jayson L. Lusk 《Applied economics letters》2019,26(15):1243-1246
We offer a conceptual explanation for some of the procedural invariance witnessed in experimental studies related to the concept of commitment costs, which is confirmed in a field experiment with Sicilian farmers valuing a renewable soil conditioner. 相似文献
10.
Debora Di Gioacchino 《Empirica》2008,35(2):145-164
This paper presents a simple model of a non-competitive market with demand uncertainty in which firms can choose their technology
of production. Technology is characterised by two parameters: capacity and flexibility. The first has a strong commitment
value while flexibility is needed to face uncertainty. Lack of competition requires active regulation to ensure that the price
is not set at excessive level. When choosing their technology, firms take into account not only the effects of this choice
on the opponent(s) but also the effect on the regulated price. In this framework, and because of regulation, firms have an
incentive to strategically manipulate their cost (cost padding). This causes monopoly regulation aiming at improving allocative
efficiency to be ineffective. In fact, by “tying its hand” to a low level of capacity, the monopolistic firm is able to get
round the constraint imposed by the regulator. Increasing the number of firms in the market may restore regulation effectiveness.
The reason is that if demand is sufficiently volatile, then firms strategically choose flexible techniques and this effect
dominates over the incentive to manipulate costs in order to escape regulation. In this case, regulation is effective precisely
because cost padding is hampered by firms’ non-cooperative behaviour.
相似文献
Debora Di GioacchinoEmail: |