Common Risk Factors Versus a Mispricing Factor of Tokyo Stock Exchange Firms: Inquiries into the Fundamental Value Derived from Analyst Earnings Forecasts*

We search for common factors and/or a mispricing factor for Tokyo Stock Exchange firms. We utilize the Edwards–Bell–Ohlson model to compute the firms' fundamental value and divide this value by the firms' market price to construct a new variable called a ‘value‐to‐price ratio’ (VPR). We find that this VPR variable can generate abnormal returns even after adjusting for the risk factors related to portfolio style differences. To find out whether it is indeed a risk factor or simply a characteristic, we construct return difference portfolios of the high VPR stocks minus the low value‐to‐price stocks and call this portfolio the upward‐forecast minus downward‐forecast (UMD) factor. Fama and MacBeth test indicate that the risk premium for this UMD factor is positive. The best model in terms of the adjusted R² value is the four‐factor model in which the UMD factor is added to the Fama and French three factors. GMM Euler condition tests reveal that the UMD factor helps to price assets and that the four‐factor model is not rejected. We conclude the VPR variable contains new information content that is not contained in the conventional Fama and French's three factors.     

FINITELY REPEATED PRISONERS' DILEMMA WITH SMALL FINES: THE PENANCE CONTRACT*

This paper investigates finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma games with explicit contractual devices. It shows that full collusion can be achieved in a unique manner by incentivizing the players' final‐period play with small fines. The incentivizing modality is the penance contract, by which a player is penalized if and only if he deviates from the penance strategy in the final period. Using this contractual agreement brings the penance strategy profile into unique subgame perfect equilibrium in the entire game and achieves full collusion without being invalidated by renegotiation.     

CAPITAL ADEQUACY REQUIREMENTS AND THE FINANCIAL ACCELERATOR CAUSED BY BANK CAPITAL

This paper develops a computable dynamic general equilibrium model with heterogeneous banks, a portion of which may be constrained by capital adequacy requirements and the remainder of which may not, in order to examine what effects the capital requirements and bank capital induce in the macroeconomy. Applying the parameterized expectations algorithm, the model economy shows that binding bank capital constraints induce the financial accelerator, the hump‐shaped dynamic behaviour of output, and ineffectuality of monetary policy, and that all the results are derived from the individual banks’ cross‐sectional asymmetric responses that are consistent with the empirical evidence.     

ON DETAIL‐FREE MECHANISM DESIGN AND RATIONALITY*

Mechanism design theory has been criticized, because mechanisms depend on the detail of specification and agents’ behaviour relies on strong rationality assumptions. Hence the study of “detail‐free” mechanism design with weak rationality is important as a practical theory. This paper emphasizes that, even if we confine our attention to detail‐free mechanisms with weak rationality, there exists plenty of scope for the development of new and significant ideas. I describe my recent work along these lines, and argue that stochastic decisions work in large double auction environments, and that moral preferences improve the implementability of social choice functions.     

ROLE OF RELATIVE AND ABSOLUTE PERFORMANCE EVALUATIONS IN INTERGROUP COMPETITION

We investigate the moral hazard problem in which a principal delegates multiple tasks to multiple workers. The principal imperfectly monitors their action choices by observing the public signals that are correlated with each other through a macro shock. He divides the workers into two groups and makes them compete with each other. We show that when the number of tasks is sufficiently large, relative performance evaluation between the groups accompanied by absolute performance evaluation results in eliminating unwanted equilibria. In this case, any approximate Nash equilibrium nearly induces the first‐best allocation.