Is the institutionalization of urban movements inevitable? A comparison of the opportunities for sustained squatting in New York City and Amsterdam

In this article the opportunity structures of New York City and Amsterdam for organized squatting are compared. New York City knew two distinct squatting waves, with an intermission of several years. The literature on US urban movements predicts transformation through cooptation and repression. Only the first wave, in which housing activists used squatting as a tactic, fits this prediction. The second wave of squatting in New York City, and squatting in Amsterdam in general, escaped cooptation because they involved a squatters' movement proper, in which squatting was not only a tactic but also central to its existence. Compared to Amsterdam, squatting in New York was hampered by technical difficulties and political isolation. Stricter protection of private property made New York squatters restrict themselves to publicly‐owned abandoned buildings. Turf conflicts tended to develop on the neighbourhood level when these buildings were later claimed for the development of low‐income housing. In Amsterdam this type of conflict was rare because of the broad support for low‐income (re)development. Instead, Amsterdam saw citywide protest directed at the real estate sector and municipal authorities. Cet article compare la structure des opportunités des villes de New York et Amsterdam concernant les squats organisés. New York a connu deux vagues de squattage séparées de plusieurs années. Les textes sur les mouvements urbains aux Etats‐Unis prévoient une mutation par cooptation et répression. Seule la première vague, pour laquelle les militants en faveur du logement ont utilisé le squattage comme tactique, répond à cette prédiction. La seconde vague d'opérations à New York, et celles d'Amsterdam en général, ont échappéà la cooptation, car il s'agissait de mouvements de squatters à proprement parler, où le squat n'était pas seulement une tactique mais surtout un fondement de leur existence. Comparéà Amsterdam, le squattage à New York s'est heurtéà des problèmes techniques et à un isolement politique. La protection plus stricte de la propriété privée a forcé les squatters new‐yorkais à se limiter aux bâtiments publics abandonnés. Des luttes de territoires ont eu tendance à se développer entre voisins lorsque ces bâtiments ont ensuite été réclamés pour aménager des logements à faible loyer. A Amsterdam, rare fut ce genre de conflit grâce au vaste soutien favorable au (ré)aménagement social; au contraire, une protestation générale s'est élevée à l'encontre du secteur immobilier et des autorités municipales.     

Foreign Factor Ownership and Optimal Tariffs

In the presence of foreign factor ownership tariffs change not only the terms of (goods) trade but also income flows between countries. Assume that only the home country owns factors abroad. Then the optimal tariff is negative if and only if foreign factor ownership entails trade-pattern reversals. Trade-pattern reversals are neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for a negative optimal tariff if the foreign country owns factors in the home country. Changes in the home country's tariff shift the foreign country's offer curve. This adds a new dimension to optimal tariff analysis.     

Socially Responsible Investing and Climate Change: Contradictions and Challenges

This article explores the contradiction between the articulated investment policies, screening criteria or ethical charters of socially responsible investment funds and their actions demonstrated by their portfolio selection practice. The paper provides a background to socially responsible investment and Australia's contribution to greenhouse gas emissions. A discussion of renewable energy options lays the foundation for our main assertion: that this set of possible alternatives provides some new and more environmentally robust options that will better complement the underlying philosophy of funds in the socially responsible investment sector.     

Through Trial and Error to Collusion*

In this article we study a very simple trial and error learning process in the context of a Cournot oligopoly. Without any knowledge of the payoff functions players increase, respectively decrease, their quantity as long as this leads to higher profits. We show that despite the absence of any coordination or punishing device this process converges to the joint‐profit‐maximizing outcome.     

On Labour Market Policies and Aggregate Unemployment Outflows

This paper is interested in the modelling of the relationship between active and passive labour market policies and the aggregate unemployment outflow rate. Our model is based on a matching function and includes a simple representation of the competition between various groups of job searchers. The empirical analysis uses Belgian data. Faced with variables that are often integrated of order 1 according to the usual tests but which cannot strictly speaking be integrated, we contribute to an important methodological debate by comparing the conclusions of a classical econometric analysis and a cointegration approach.     

Government Policy and the Evolution of the Market for Dutch Daily Newspapers

This paper investigates whether governments can change market structures through interventions. We study the effects of four political events over the life cycle of the market for daily newspapers in the Netherlands. We find that policy measures meant to lower entry barriers in an expanding industry created new entry and increased survival chances for potential entrants and incumbent newspapers. Exit barrier enhancing policies to reduce concentration tendencies have not been successful.     

Labor income and risky investments: can part-time farmers compete?

In the developed countries, a majority of farm households receive at least as much income from nonfarm sources as from the farm. Such part-time farms have survived inspite of lower returns than full-time farms. This paper considers when lower returns to part-time farming could be compensated by risk-reduction due to diversification of income sources. The paper uses a dynamic portfolio choice model with labor income. The model and results could be applied in other contexts as well.     

Estimating the Size of a Criminal Population from Police Records Using the Truncated Poisson Regression Model

The truncated Poisson regression model is used to arrive at point and interval estimates of the size of two offender populations, i.e. drunk drivers and persons who illegally possess firearms. The dependent capture–recapture variables are constructed from Dutch police records and are counts of individual arrests for both violations. The population size estimates are derived assuming that each count is a realization of a Poisson distribution, and that the Poisson parameters are related to covariates through the truncated Poisson regression model. These assumptions are discussed in detail, and the tenability of the second assumption is assessed by evaluating the marginal residuals and performing tests on overdispersion. For the firearms example, the second assumption seems to hold well, but for the drunk drivers example there is some overdispersion. It is concluded that the method is useful, provided it is used with care.