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Multiple Unit Auctions and Short Squeezes 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
This article develops a theory of multiunit auctions where shortsqueezes can occur in the secondary market. Both uniform anddiscriminatory auctions are studied and bidders can submit multiplebids. We show that bidders with short and long preauction positionshave different valuations in an otherwise common value setting.Discriminatory auctions lead to more short squeezing and higherrevenue than uniform auctions, ceteris paribus. Asymptotically,as the auction size approaches infinity, the two formats leadto equivalent outcomes. Shorts employ more aggressive equilibriumbidding strategies. Most longs strategically choose to be passive.Free riding on a squeeze by small, long players has no impacton these results, but affects revenue in discriminatory auctions. 相似文献
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Ilya V. Surkov Alfons G. J. M. Oude Lansink Olaf van Kooten Wopke van der Werf 《Agricultural Economics》2008,38(3):363-373
Growth and liberalization of world trade have increased the risks of introduction of quarantine plant pests into importing countries. Import inspection of incoming commodities is a major tool for prevention of pest introductions related to world trade, but inspection capacities are limited. This article develops a theoretical and an empirical model for the optimal allocation of inspection effort for phytosanitary inspection of imported commodities when the inspecting agency has a limited capacity. It is shown that the optimal allocation of inspection effort equalizes marginal costs of pest introduction across risky commodity pathways. The numerical illustration finds the optimal allocation of inspection effort of chrysanthemum cuttings imported in the Netherlands. The numerical results suggest that ceteris paribus , greater inspection effort should be allocated to pathways whose inspection yields a greater reduction in the expected costs of pest introduction. The numerical results also suggest that import inspection has a high marginal benefit. In particular, we found that each additional euro of the inspection capacity decreases the expected costs of pest introduction from 18 to 49 euros, depending on the initial inspection capacity. 相似文献
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When the target may know better: Effects of experience and information asymmetries on value from mergers and acquisitions 下载免费PDF全文
Research summary : Extending research on the effect of experience on acquisition outcomes, we examine how the differential in previous M&A experience between the target and the acquirer affects the value they, respectively, obtain when the acquirer takes over the target. Drawing on literature about organizational learning, negotiation, and information economics, we theorize that the party with greater experience will be able to obtain more value. Furthermore, we theorize that the effect of differential M&A experience on value obtained is contingent on the level of information asymmetry the acquirer faces with respect to the target, specifically as a function of the target's product‐market scope and whether the deal is friendly. We test and find support for these predictions in a sample of 1,241 M&As over a 30‐year period. Managerial summary : Corporate strategy is about a firm's scope and development decisions and outcomes, but corporate strategizing is incomplete unless managers anticipate the moves of other economic actors. We demonstrate the importance of these points when it comes to learning to make acquisitions. Using an innovative research design and theory that enables comparison between acquirer and target gains, we show that whatever their firm's acquisition history and capabilities, acquisitive managers should mind the negotiation and other pitfalls that arise when target firms possess ample acquisition experience of their own. We also demonstrate that the effect of experience advantage, whereby the more experienced party benefits, depends on the target firm's scope and whether the deal is friendly—two dimensions that acquirers can and should take into account. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
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A network approach to modeling the multi-echelon spare-part inventory system with backorders and interval-valued demand 总被引:4,自引:0,他引:4
Eugene Levner Yael Perlman T.C.E. Cheng Ilya Levner 《International Journal of Production Economics》2011,132(1):43-51
A multi-echelon inventory system implies the existence of a hierarchy of stocking locations, and the dependence and interaction between them. We consider a multi-echelon, spare-part inventory management problem with outsourcing and backordering. The problem is characterized by deterministic repair time/cost, and supply and demand that lie within prescribed intervals and that vary over time. The objective is to minimize the total inventory and transportation costs. We develop a network model for problem analysis and present a network flow algorithm for solving the problem. We prove that the Wagner-Whitin property, known for the lot-sizing problem, can be extended to the spare-part inventory management problem under study. 相似文献
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This study, based on panel data from 189 industrial enterprises in 1992‐96, shows that privatisation 'on average' produces little improvement in performance of Russian enterprises. However, disaggregating the process, we reveal that methods of privatisation do influence performance but the impact is not always positive. The state seems to be a passive shareholder. At the same time, our results suggest that majority state ownership is preferable to a state minority stockholding, possibly because the absence of a monitoring shareholder in the latter case does not permit managers to achieve their own objectives at the expense of other shareholders. 相似文献
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Finance and Stochastics - Sublinear functionals of random variables are known as sublinear expectations; they are convex homogeneous functionals on infinite-dimensional linear spaces. We extend... 相似文献
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Finance and Stochastics - We present a detailed analysis of observable moment-based parameter estimators for the Heston SDEs jointly driving the rate of returns $(R_{t})$ and the squared... 相似文献
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Ilya Kokorin 《国际破产评论》2020,29(1):32-60
Modern insolvency law instruments recognise the specificity of enterprise group insolvencies, premised on the existence of close operational and financial links between group members. It is widely accepted that maximisation of insolvency estate value and procedural efficiency depend on coordination of insolvency proceedings opened with respect to group entities. Such coordination is prescribed in the European Insolvency Regulation (recast), the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Model Law on Enterprise Group Insolvency and the recently reformed German insolvency law. Yet in insolvency, group members retain their own insolvency estates and pools of creditors. This is based on the traditional company law principle of entity shielding. Active communication and cooperation between insolvency practitioners and courts do not sit well with the separate (atomistic) nature of insolvency proceedings, as well as different and oftentimes conflicting interests of creditors in such proceedings. As a result, communication and cooperation may be restricted in a situation of conflicts of interest. This article explores how in the context of group distress the risks arising from conflicts of interest can be controlled and mitigated, while ensuring efficient cross‐border cooperation and communication to the maximum extent possible. It analyses three cutting‐edge coordination mechanisms, namely (a) cross‐border insolvency agreements or protocols, (b) special (group coordination and planning) proceedings and (c) the appointment of a single insolvency practitioner. It concludes that both the likelihood and significance of conflicts of interest correlate with the degree of procedural coordination. Therefore, conflict mitigation tools and strategies need to be tailor‐made and targeted at a specific level and coordination mechanism. 相似文献