SCREENING ETHICS WHEN HONEST AGENTS CARE ABOUT FAIRNESS*

A principal faces an agent with private information who is either honest or dishonest. Honesty involves revealing private information truthfully if the probability that the equilibrium allocation chosen by an agent who lies is small enough. Even the slightest intolerance for lying prevents full ethics screening whereby the agent is given proper incentives if dishonest and zero rent if honest. Still, some partial ethics screening may allow for taking advantage of the potential honesty of the agent, even if honesty is unlikely. If intolerance for lying is strong, the standard approach that assumes a fully opportunistic agent is robust.     

Revealing demand for an actual public good

In spite of important theoretical advances and a number of laboratory tests in recent years, no practicable mechanism for revealing demand for public goods has yet emerged. A method is presented which seems capable of meeting the political demands of such mechanisms. It was successfully tested on an actual public-good project provided by the Swedish government. The method is evaluated against the background of the results of this nonlaboratory and nonhypothetical test.     

Political Stock Markets and Unreliable Polls

A political stock market (PSM) clearly beat the polls in predicting the outcome of a Swedish referendum on whether or not Sweden should join the European Union. In fact, polls were unable to make such predictions since the number of undecided respondents always far exceeded the observed YES/NO margin. However, an obstacle to PSMs serving as a superior forecasting instrument is that they can be sensitive to price distortions - by interest groups that may wish to effectuate, and pay for, such distortions - or forecast competitions tied to PSM trade gains, the latter of which was tested here.     

Fairness in a tradeable-permit treaty for carbon emissions reductions in Europe and the former Soviet Union

This paper evaluates the distributional implications of alternative permit allocations in a tradeable permit regime for carbon emissions reductions (20% below baseline) in 2010 for a region consisting of Europe and the states of the former Soviet Union (FSU). Participation in such a regime is expected to hinge on the fairness of the distributional consequences. We find that initial permit allocations by populationand/or GDP are unlikely to induce participation by most countries of Eastern Europe and FSU because of the net costs involved. We identify a set of initial allocations that would at least compensate these countries. A fair treatment of the countries in Western Europe (WE) is here one which equalizes net costs perGDP. For a wide set of cost functions for carbon emission reductions, the cost gains that WE would reap from a tradeable permit system relative to unilateral reductions by WE as a group are found to be on the order of 85 percent. This would imply, among other things, a significant increase in WE'scapacity to make further emissions reductions.     

A Cost-effective Approach to Attracting Low-income Countries to International Emissions Trading: Theory and Experiments

The cost-effectiveness of the KyotoProtocol and any similar non-global treatywould be enhanced by attracting additionalcountries to international emissions tradingand achieving this as soon as possible. Incontrast to what is heard in most of thedebate, such an enlargement is here taken to beattained with the new participants, atleast to begin with, being fullycompensated. This paper focuses on twoforms of compensation that can be used toattract poor countries to participate inemissions trading. The theoretical aswell as experimental evidence suggests that, ifpoor countries are more risk averse than richcountries, partial compensation in terms offinancial transfers is more cost-effective thanrelying solely on compensation in kind –emission quotas – as has been the case so far.Using money for partial compensation would alsoreduce the risk for ``hot air' allocations andthe ensuing political obstacles tocost-effectiveness that such allocations tendto create.     

Screening Ethics when Honest Agents Keep their Word

Using a principal-agent setting, we introduce honesty that requires pre-commitment. The principal offers a menu of mechanisms to screen ethics. Agents may misrepresent ethics. Dishonest agents may misrepresent the match with the assigned task (good or bad), while honest agents reveal the match honestly if they have pre-committed. Ethics-screening, that allows for match-screening with dishonest agents while leaving a lower rent to honest agents, is optimal if both honesty and a good match are likely. Otherwise the optimal mechanism is the standard second-best or the first-best (where dishonest agents misrepresent the match), if dishonesty is likely or unlikely respectively.An earlier version of this paper was entitled “Honest Agents and Equilibrium Lies.” We are grateful to seminar participants at MIT, Université de Caen, University of St Andrews, University of Virginia, and ESEM 99, and two anonymous referees for useful comments.     

Competitive Neutrality of the OECD Consensus Myth or Reality

This research paper gives into context ongoing changes in the balance of forces in the international markets caused not only by the crisis and the need to restore market-neutral internationally agreed system for state participation in the support for exports based on real economic criteria. The aim of this research is to demonstrate the changes of the balance of forces in the international markets. This paper presented the statistical data relating to development of GDP, indebtedness or value of exports or imports that the present changes in international markets and open discussion about the topic problem. This article recalled the basic principles of insurance and export financing with state support and also are presented current problems of implementation rules of the CONSENSUS. Due to the fact that state support for exports is an important internationally respected system it is necessary to overcome some doubts and bring to the system real market neutrality. Therefore, we ask whether are respected in practice the agreed principles of international state aid exports and what problems currently international markets and fundamentally different countries are struggling. It can be said that the rules CONSENSUS OECD has contributed to the creation of fair market conditions in international markets, but it can be also monitored over time to some extent being away from the demands of market neutrality. In view of these facts it can be considered as the basis of the current situation primarily to ensure a truly market and competitive neutrality of state support for exports.