Resource allocation in a general equilibrium model of production under uncertainty: The case of variable supply of labor

This paper examines the effects of a marginal change in uncertainty on resource allocation and factor rewards by relaxing the assumption of factor inelasticity. We demonstrate that integrating a variable labor supply into Batra's two-sector uncertainty model can mitigate or reverse many of the earlier results. Specifically, a marginal increase in uncertainty may trigger the resource to move from the certainty sector to the uncertainty sector in the presence of a backward-bending labor supply curve.     

Game-Theoretic Coordination Mechanisms in Distribution Channels: Integration and Extensions for Models Without Competition

A significant game-theoretic literature on the coordination of distribution channels has developed over the past three decades. We provide an extensive analysis of an important subset of this literature, channels without competition. We review four major models that build on the initial work of Jeuland and Shugan (1983) – who developed a quantity-discount schedule that induces channel members to set price and non-price, marketing-mix variables (MM-variables) at channel-coordinating levels. Moorthy (1987) criticized their schedule's complexity, arguing for a simpler wholesale contract that induces coordination by avoiding double marginalization.     

The Effect of Municipal Services and Local Taxes on Housing Values

This paper presents an economic model which casts the "Tiebout Hypothesis" in a Von Thumen type model of spatial equilibrium and considers the effect of differential provision of municipal services on household utility levels and housing prices in a politically fragmented urban area. Also in the context of this model three alternative methods of financing municipal services are examined. The article suggests that different levels of municipal services may cause spatial disequilibrium in an urban area, and as households move within the urban area to maximize their utility, they bid up (or down) the price of housing to the extent that their consumer's surplus is capitalized in housing values. Thus, the resultant urban rent gradient may be "kinked" or discontinuous. This paper also presents empirical findings examining the relationship between housing values and several municipal services.     

Marketing modeling reality and the realities of marketing modeling

This paper shows how analytic modeling research in the Marketing field is focused on answering questions of “How?” and “Why?” It describes the disciplines involved in analytic modeling; examines how the key criteria of parsimony and robustness help to define a good model; and discusses other goodness criteria, including appropriate use of analytic techniques, applicability of the model to institutionally rich, real-world problems, non-obvious results, generalizability, and ability to provide insight where other research techniques do not work. The paper defines and discusses key concepts in analytic models of distribution channels, including double marginalization, coordination, incentive alignment and contract design, strategic substitutability and complementarity, externalities, and principal–agent problems. Next, the paper summarizes research presented in the session on analytic models in channels at the Erin Anderson conference; and finally, the paper suggests avenues for future analytic modeling research.     

The profit equivalence of mill and uniform pricing policies

In this note we point out a simple fact that seems to have been overlooked in the voluminous literature on mill pricing and uniform delivered pricing in location theory — the profit maximization problems involved are mathematically equivalent when the demand functions are linear.     

Bilateral monopoly, identical distributors, and game-theoretic analyses of distribution channels

Game-theoretic analyses of distribution channels have generated six widely held beliefs (we call them Channel Hypotheses) whose universal soundness has not been examined. To assess the validity of these Hypotheses, we develop a general, linear-demand model in which distributors face heterogeneity in demand, heterogeneity in costs, and any degree of intensity of inter-distributor competition. For ease of comparison, we nest the bilateral-monopoly model and the identical-distributors model within our general model. Our analysis reveals that the Channel Hypotheses do not generalize beyond the specific game-theoretic models from which they were derived. This lack of generality is critical, because these beliefs have led to intuitively appealing (but inadvertently misleading) strategic advice for managers and modeling advice for game theorists. From our general, linear-demand model, we derive six Channel Propositions that correct these accumulated errors of conceptualization and that generate a richer, more broadly applicable set of managerial and modeling implications. We also present a Channel-Modeling Proposition that we believe will help modelers avoid the errors of conceptualization described in this paper. Electronic supplementary material  Supplementary material is available for this article at doi: and is accessible to authorized user.