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1.
Against the background of supply-side structural reform and the real estate financialisation in China, this study investigates the impact of real estate holdings on R&D investment using data of enterprises listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges. Our empirical results yield five main findings. First, enterprises holding more real estate assets face more serious financial constraints, thus restraining corporate innovation efficiency. Second, when the profit margin gap between entity enterprises and the real estate industry is larger, enterprises are more inclined to transfer industrial capital into the real estate industry, thus reducing R&D investment. Third, when the degree of marketisation is high, intensified market competition, the optimal allocation of factor and product markets, and stronger patent protection will weaken the restraining effect of corporate real estate holdings on R&D investment. Fourth, monopoly enterprises obtain potential profits more than undertaking risks from the real estate industry, they are more willing to hold real estate, thus strengthening the restraining effect of real estate holdings on innovation. Finally, investors' regional preference intensifies the restraining effect of corporate real estate holdings on R&D investment. Our empirical evidence can guide entity enterprises on how to effectively balance short-term (non-productive) and long-term (productive) capital investment. 相似文献
2.
3.
Learning, Asset-Pricing Tests, and Market Efficiency 总被引:10,自引:2,他引:8
This paper studies the asset-pricing implications of parameter uncertainty. We show that, when investors must learn about expected cash flows, empirical tests can find patterns in the data that differ from those perceived by rational investors. Returns might appear predictable to an econometrician, or appear to deviate from the Capital Asset Pricing Model, but investors can neither perceive nor exploit this predictability. Returns may also appear excessively volatile even though prices react efficiently to cash-flow news. We conclude that parameter uncertainty can be important for characterizing and testing market efficiency. 相似文献
4.
Tatsuya Kubokawa PhD 《Metrika》1989,36(1):7-13
Summary Consider the problem of finding an estimator for a scale parameter such that its risk function is bounded by a preassigned
constant. As a solution of the problem, two-stage estimators based on only the second sample have been proposed. The paper
shows that these estimators can be improved by combining the first and the second sample. 相似文献
5.
Alliance competence, resources, and alliance success: Conceptualization, measurement, and initial test 总被引:7,自引:0,他引:7
C. Jay Lambe Robert E. Spekman Shelby D. Hunt 《Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science》2002,30(2):141-158
This research examines the effect of an alliance competence on resource-based alliance success. The fundamental thesis guiding
this research is that an alliance competence contributes to alliance success, both directly and through the acquisition and
creation of resources. Using survey data gathered from 145 alliances, empirical tests of the hypotheses provide support for
the posited explanation of alliance success. The findings indicate that an alliance competence is not only antecedent to the
resources that are necessary for alliance success but also to alliance success itself.
C. Jay Lambe (Ph.D., The Darden School at University of Virginia) is an assistant professor of marketing in the Pamplin College of Business
at Virginia Tech. For 10 years prior to entering academe, he was engaged in business-to-business marketing for both Xerox
and AT&T. His research interests include business-to-business marketing, relationship marketing, marketing strategy, and sales
management. He has publications in theJournal of the Academy of Marketing Science, theJournal of Product Innovation Management, theEuropean Journal of Marketing, theJournal of Personal Selling and Sales Management, theInternational Journal of Management Reviews, theJournal of Business-to-Business Marketing, and theJournal of Relationship Marketing. He also serves as a reviewer for theJournal of Business-to-Business Marketing. Prior to joining the faculty at Virginia Tech, he was one of five Texas Tech University faculty members chosen in 1999 from
the entire university for the annual Outstanding Faculty Member Award by the Mortar Board and Omicron Delta Kappa (Texas Tech
University student organizations that recognize excellence in teaching).
Robert E. Spekman is the Tayloe Murphy Professor of Business Administration at the Darden School at the University of Virginia. He was formerly
a professor of marketing and associate director of the Center for Telecommunications at the University of Southern California.
He is an internationally recognized authority on business-to-business marketing and strategic alliances. His consulting experiences
range from marketing research and competitive analysis, to strategic market planning, supply chain management, channels of
distribution design and implementation, and strategic partnering. He has taught in a number of executive programs in the United
States, Canada, Latin America, Asia, and Europe. His executive program experience ranges from general marketing strategy,
to sales force management, to channels strategy, to creating strategic alliances, to business-to-business marketing strategy,
to a number of single-company and senior executive management programs. He has edited and/or written seven books and has authored
(coauthored) more than 80 articles and papers. He also serves as a reviewer for a number of marketing and management journals,
as well as for the National Science Foundation. Prior to joining the faculty at the University of Southern California, he
taught in the College of Business at the University of Maryland, College Park. During his tenure at Maryland, he was granted
the Most Distinguished Faculty Award by the MBA students on three separate occasions.
Shelby D. Hunt is the J. B. Hoskins and P. W. Horn Professor of Marketing at Texas Tech University, Lubbock. A past editor of theJournal of Marketing (1985–87), he is the author ofModern Marketing Theory: Critical Issues in the Philosophy of Marketing Science (South-Western, 1991) andA General Theory of Competition: Resources, Competences, Productivity, Economic Growth (Sage, 2000). He has written numerous articles on competitive theory, macromarketing, ethics, channels of distribution, philosophy
of science, and marketing theory. Three of hisJournal of Marketing articles—“The Nature and Scope of Marketing” (1976), “General Theories and Fundamental Explananda of Marketing” (1983), and
“The Comparative Advantage Theory of Competition” (1995) (with Robert M. Morgan)—won the Harold H. Maynard Award for the best
article on marketing theory. His 1985Journal of Business Research article with Lawrence B. Chonko, “Ethics and Marketing Management,” received the 2000 Elsevier Science Exceptional Quality
and High Scholarly Impact award. His 1989 article, ”Reification and Realism in Marketing: in Defense of Reason,” won theJournal of Macromarketing Charles C. Slater Award. For his contributions to theory and science in marketing, he received the 1986 Paul D. Converse
Award from the American Marketing Association, the 1987 Outstanding Marketing Educator Award from the Academy of Marketing
Science, and the 1992 American Marketing Association/Richard D. Irwin Distinguished Marketing Educator Award. 相似文献
6.
Performance lies arise both from individual and from situational causes, but in this article, the attention is on situational causes. These are generally triggered by loyalty to the coalition, which is expressed through the continued use of performance lies. Because performance lies help create a boundary around the coalition that insulates its activities from top management, performance lies enable members of the coalition to exercise a greater degree of internal control. Naturally, such lies are dysfunctional, resulting in the avoidance of difficult issues and problems and compromising the organization's ability to adapt to a changing environment based on accurate information. 相似文献
7.
This paper presents two results about preference domain conditions that deepen our understanding of anonymous and monotonic Arrovian social welfare functions (ASWFs). We characterize the class of anonymous and monotonic ASWFs on domains without Condorcet triples. This extends and generalizes an earlier characterization (as Generalized Majority Rules) by Moulin (Axioms of Cooperative Decision Making, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1988) for single-peaked domains. We also describe a domain where anonymous and monotonic ASWFs exist only when there are an odd number of agents. This is a counter-example to a claim by Muller (Int. Econ. Rev. 23 (1982) 609), who asserted that the existence of 3-person anonymous and monotonic ASWFs guaranteed the existence of n-person anonymous and monotonic ASWFs for any n>3. Both results build upon the integer programming approach to the study of ASWFs introduced in Sethuraman et al. (Math. Oper. Res. 28 (2003) 309). 相似文献
8.
We consider the problem of allocating a set of indivisible objects to agents in a fair and efficient manner. In a recent paper, Bogomolnaia and Moulin consider the case in which all agents have strict preferences, and propose the probabilistic serial (PS) mechanism; they define a new notion of efficiency, called ordinal efficiency, and prove that the probabilistic serial mechanism finds an envy-free ordinally efficient assignment. However, the restrictive assumption of strict preferences is critical to their algorithm. Our main contribution is an analogous algorithm for the full preference domain in which agents are allowed to be indifferent between objects. Our algorithm is based on a reinterpretation of the PS mechanism as an iterative algorithm to compute a “flow” in an associated network. In addition we show that on the full preference domain it is impossible for even a weak strategyproof mechanism to find a random assignment that is both ordinally efficient and envy-free. 相似文献
9.
This study examines the magnitude and determinants of the establishment-size wage premium in five European countries using a unique harmonised matched employer–employee data set (the 1995 European Structure of Earnings Survey). This data set enables to test the validity of various traditional explanations of the size wage gap (i.e. the labour quality hypothesis, the theory of compensating wage differentials, the role of monitoring and institutions) and of more recent hypotheses (i.e. size differences in job stability and in the concentration of skilled workers). We find some support for traditional explanations, but there remains a significant wage premium for workers employed in large establishments. Further results indicate that the magnitude of this premium fluctuates substantially across countries and appears to be negatively correlated with the degree of corporatism. 相似文献
10.
This article examines the critical role that on-boarding processes play in the successful development of executive leadership talent. It is based on an in-depth case analysis of one organization's sophisticated on-boarding intervention. Specifically, we explore the potential of these interventions both to pre-empt leadership failures and to accelerate the knowledge and relationships necessary to step into an executive role. Lessons are provided on designing on-boarding interventions for senior leaders. 相似文献