Exit Options in Corporate Finance: Liquidity versus Incentives

This paper provides a first study of the optimal design of active monitors'exit options in a problem involving a demand for liquidity and costly monitoring of the issuer. Optimal incentives to monitor the issuer may involve restricting the monitor's right to sell her claims on the firm's cash-flow early. But the monitor will then require a liquidity premium for holding such an illiquid claim. In general, therefore, there will be a trade off between incentives and liquidity. The paper highlights a fundamental complementarity between speculative monitoring in financial markets (which increases the informativeness of prices) and active monitoring inside the firm: in financial markets where price discovery is better and securities prices reflect the fundamentals of the issuer better, the incentive cost of greater liquidity may be smaller and active monitoring incentives may be preserved. The paper spells out the conditions under which more or less liquidity is warranted and applies the analysis to shed light on common exit provisions in venture capital financing.     

MODELING THE TERM STRUCTURE FROM THE ON‐THE‐RUN TREASURY YIELD CURVE

We propose a new model to estimate the term structure of interest rates using observed on‐the‐run Treasury yields. The new model is an improvement over models that require a priori knowledge of the shape of the yield curve to estimate the term structure. The general form of the model is an exponential function that depends on the estimation of four parameters fit by nonlinear least squares and has straightforward interpretations. In comparing the proposed model with current yield‐curve‐smoothing models, we find that, for the data used, the proposed model does best overall in terms of pricing accuracy both in sample and out of sample. JEL classification: E43, G12     

Demand fluctuations and capacity utilization under duopoly

Summary.  This paper studies the impact of uncertain demand on firms’ capacity decisions when they operate in an oligopolistic environment. We define a two-stage game where firms choose capacity in the first stage without knowing which state of Nature is going to realize, and output levels in the second, knowing which state is realized. We prove the existence of a symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium at which firms are in excess capacity compared with the capacity they would choose in the Cournot certainty equivalent game. Received: May 17, 1996; revised version July 31, 1996     

Should we let employees contract away their rights against arbitrary discharge?

This article argues that the moral right to be discharged only for good cause and like rights can be contracted away by employees in appropriate circumstances. It maintains that the rights in question are not inalienable, and that there is nothing irrational about an employee's wishing to deal them away. It also maintains that inequalities in bargaining power between employers and employees are insufficiently pervasive to justify a flat ban on the alienation of these rights. For a waiver of such rights to be valid, however, employees must have full knowledge of its terms.The question addressed here bears on several legal and policy issues affecting termination of the employment relation. If employees can contract away their right to a goodcause discharge, the American doctrine of employment at willmight find justification in the face of that right. In addition, the alienability of such discharge rights may be necessary to justify express disclaimers of wrongful discharge liability and the waiver provision of the new U.S. Draft Uniform Employment-Termination Act.Michael J. Phillips is Professor of Business Law and Chairman of the Business Law Department of Indiana University's School of Business. He is a former editor-in-chief of theAmerican Business Law Journal, and has authored numerous law journal articles.     

Price Competition When Consumersare Uncertain About Which Firm Sells Which Quality

In this paper we analyze the properties of price equilibria in a duopoly market where firms sell vertically differentiated products, consumers being uncertain about which firm sells which quality. Both existence and properties of price equilibria are characterized by the beliefs of the consumers' population about the distribution of quality between firms.     

Dynamics of the federal funds target rate: a nonstationary discrete choice approach

We apply a discrete choice approach to model the empirical behaviour of the Federal Reserve in changing the federal funds target rate, the benchmark of short‐term market interest rates in the US. Our methods allow the explanatory variables to be nonstationary as well as stationary. This feature is particularly useful in the present application as many economic fundamentals that are monitored by the Fed and are believed to affect decisions to adjust interest rate targets display some nonstationarity over time. The chosen model successfully predicts the majority of the target rate changes during the time period considered (1994–2001) and helps to explain strings of similar intervention decisions by the Fed. Based on the model‐implied optimal interest rate, our findings suggest that there is a lag in the Fed's reaction to economic shocks during this period. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Discontinuous innovation and supply relationships: strategic dalliances

The authors address the need for supply relationships to generate, support, and respond to discontinuous innovation (DI), noting that established ways of working appear insufficient. The peculiarities of DI are explained and contrasted with well-known concepts within innovation. The need for customer firms to be both closely collaborative with suppliers while also exploring potential, unpredictable DI elsewhere is proposed, by means of strategic dalliances . A model is presented for understanding and exploring this emerging management challenge.     

Assessing Applied Protection across the World*

This paper presents MAcMap–HS‐6, a database providing a consistent, ad valorem equivalent measure of tariff duties and tariff rate quotas for 163 countries and 208 partners, at the six‐digit level of the Harmonized System (5111 products), accounting for all preferential agreements. We describe the methodology used to compute and aggregate an ad valorem equivalent of applied protection. Emphasis is placed on minimizing the endogeneity bias in the aggregation procedure, while acknowledging structural differences in export specialization. The resulting quantitative assessment is illustrated by giving an overview of applied protection across the world in 2001, in terms of average as well as distribution.     

Opportunistic tendencies in IJVS with the Japanese: The effects of culture,shared decision making,and relationship age

This study investigated how partners' self-reported opportunism and shared decision making varied by culture in international joint ventures (IJVs) with the Japanese. Data were gathered by a mail survey of senior officials in IJVs located in 11 host countries. Significant differences were found between partners from Western cultures and the Japanese, but not between other Asians and the Japanese. Indirect effects suggest that shared decision making neutralizes cultural tendencies toward opportunism. Results indicated that opportunistic tendencies did not diminish as the IJV relationship aged, and that shared decision making did diminish as the relationship aged.     

New Evidence on the Performance Advantages of Multihospital Systems

This study analyzes the performance effects of proprietary, multihospital systems. It is shown that the organizational structure of these systems may affect the operating costs of member hospitals. Estimating a cost function for Florida hospitals and controlling for other factors, the average costs of HUMANA hospitals are empirically about 17 percent lower, while the costs of other leading chains are about 12 percent lower than not-for-profit institutions. These results contrast with earlier studies that found no such differences. Furthermore, the cost differential that exists between system and non-system hospitals can be largely attributed to technical efficiencies arising from chain ownership.