Financial Instruments and Promotional Banking in the EU are Growing — But is this Justified?

Institutions and the European Investment Bank are at the forefront of EU investment policy. Their role is expanding and it is now a widely-held position that an improvement in the economy will not eliminate the need for their intervention. The proposals for the 2021–2027 MFF launch more financial instruments and present ‘InvestEU’ as a larger more powerful version of the European Fund for Strategic Investments (EFSI). However, promotional banking is often misunderstood and so is the actual size of promotional banking in Europe in which InvestEU will operate.     

A NOTE ON ARBITRAGE AND CLOSED CONVEX CONES

We give an example of a subspace K of     such that     , where     denotes the closure with respect to convergence in probablity. On the other hand, the cone   C ≔ K − L ^∞₊  is dense in   L ^∞  with respect to the weak-star topology  σ( L ^∞, L ¹)  . This example answers a question raised by I. Evstigneev. The topic is motivated by the relation of the notion of no arbitrage and the existence of martingale measures in Mathematical Finance.     

The Asset Management Industry in Asia: Dynamics of Growth,Structure, and Performance

We examine the industrial organization and institutional development of the asset management industry in Asian developing economies—specifically in China, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, Philippines, and Thailand. We focus on the size and growth of the buy‐side of the respective financial markets, asset allocation, the regulatory environment, and the state of internationalization of the fund management industry in its key components—mutual funds, pension funds, and asset management for high net worth individuals. We link the evolution of professional asset management in these environments to the development of the respective capital markets and to the evolution of corporate governance. We find that the fund management industry occupies a very small niche in domestic financial systems that are dominated by banks. At the same time, we find that its growth has been very rapid in the early 2000s and we suggest that this is likely to persist as the demand for professional management of financial wealth in the region develops and as the pension fund sectors of the respective economies are liberalized to allow larger portions of assets to be invested in collective investment schemes.     

Cardinality-based equality of opportunities

We study possible rankings of opportunity profiles. An opportunity profile is a list of opportunity sets, one for each agent in the society. We compare profiles on the basis of the notion of “equality of opportunities”. Our main results show the necessary and sufficient conditions for this comparison to be made using exclusively the information provided by two cardinal measures: the number of common alternatives in all sets of a given profile and the difference between the number of alternatives in the individual sets. We also show that, under additional axioms, we can combine these criteria only in a weighted procedure or in some lexicographic refinements of a weighted procedure.      

Building Small City and Town Sams and CGE Models

In this paper we attempt to describe both the data sources and organizational methods that allow for effective and easily created SAMs and regional computable general equilibrium (CGE) models. Small cities of around 100,000 people will face very different constraints than a town of 2000 people. Unfortunately, most CGE models typically describe relatively large geographical areas and are therefore not able to capture the uniqueness of individual cities within the region. An illustrative example using these methods demonstrates that the economic impacts vary substantially over different municipalities to the same economic shock.     

Habilitation von Ralf Hohlfeld

Ohne Zusammenfassung     

A Critique of the Legal and Philosophical Case for Rent Control

Rent control is an economic abomination. It diverts investments away from residential rent units, it leads to their deterioration, it is responsible for urban decay such as in the South Bronx, it does not help poor tenants, it is a horrendous means of income redistribution. Yet this economic regulation is beloved of intellectuals (hot beds of pro rent control sentiment are Berkeley, Ann Arbor and Cambridge) particularly in the legal and philosophical communities. The present article is dedicated to an exploration and rejection of the arguments in behalf of rent control which emanate from this source.