The Politics of Inequality as Organised Spectacle: Why the Swiss Do Not Want to Tax the Rich

In 2015, Swiss voters had the opportunity to impose a tax on the super rich in a popular vote and thereby fund a redistributive policy. However, a large majority voted against its seemingly obvious self-interest and rejected the tax. We propose an explanation for this puzzling outcome, bridging the usually separate behavioralist and institutionalist perspectives on the politics of inequality. We start from the observation that political economy tends to neglect processes of preference formation. Theorising preferences as socially constructed, we show that interest groups played a major role in shaping the outcome of the vote. Business frames were multiplied through allied parties and the media and had a major impact on individual voting behaviour. In addition, we demonstrate that interest groups representing business interests derive the content of their communication from business’s structurally privileged position in the capitalist economy. Specifically, creating uncertainty about possible perverse effects of government policies on jobs and growth is a powerful tool to undermine popular support. Frames based on this structural power ultimately explain why the Swiss refrained from ‘soaking the rich.’     

Inflation Risk?

Intereconomics - Inflation is on the rise again in the industrialised world. This has led to fears of a sustained surge in inflation. This article argues that while such fears may make sense in the...     

On the quest for supply chain transparency through Blockchain: Lessons learned from two serialized data projects

The ability to look into the supply chain has long enticed SCM scholars and practitioners. The possibilities created by such visibility are endless—from risk reduction and continuity planning to inventory management and cost reduction, nothing is off the table when end‐to‐end visibility is a possibility. Because of such enticements, there is usually much buzz in the industry every time a new technology that promises visibility and transparency is brought forward. Yet, years later, stories sometimes emerge that said technologies either failed to deliver or were not everything they were made out to be. Blockchain is yet another emerging technology in this space. Some consultants promise that it will be the final answer to the transparency and visibility woes that companies currently face. Yet, there is little empirical investigation regarding how the technology may benefit adopters, what the bottlenecks may be, and to what extent it may be able to deliver on these promises, without massive system‐wide upgrades of extant hardware and computing prowess. The current study takes a step in this direction by investigating a blockchain‐driven proof of concept across an industry consortium to identify promises, possibilities, and challenges of blockchain.     

Gamified interactions: whether,when, and how games facilitate self–brand connections

Firms increasingly use games to interact with their customers. Yet, surprisingly little is known about whether, when, and how such “gamified” interactions engage consumers with a firm’s brand, thereby facilitating self–brand connections. Building on flow theory, we show that gamified interactions that are highly interactive and optimally challenging facilitate self–brand connections, because such games lead to emotional and cognitive brand engagement. A field study and three experiments across various product domains and game designs support our theory. We also identify conditions under which consumers do not become engaged with a brand, namely when firms restrict their decisional control either to voluntarily participate in the game (i.e., compulsory play) or to spend as much time as desired playing the game (i.e., time pressure). Our findings advance existing knowledge about the use of games in marketing and provide important implications for how marketers can harness their potential to build self–brand connections.     

Fixed-Term Contracts and Labor Market Duality in France

The French labor market is segmented between permanent and temporary workers. The second category has difficulty in getting an open-ended contract. This paper aims at depicting workers on short-term contracts and shows the consequences on their professional career are negative and significant. A large part of the wage gap between permanent and temporary workers remains unexplained by observable characteristics. They receive less on-the-job training and their likelihood of obtaining a stable job is lower than 30% after 1 year and a half. They have also a higher probability of being the adjustment variable in case of an economic negative shock. These different findings show the importance of using public policies to encourage transitions from fixed-term to permanent employment and reducing labor-market duality.     

ISO order imbalances and individual stock returns

I examine the relation between intermarket sweep order (ISO) order imbalances and the daily returns of individual stocks. First, I show that ISO order imbalances are positively related to contemporaneous returns. Second, I find that price pressures emanating from ISO imbalances are persistent and predict cumulative abnormal returns up to 2 months. The predictive power of ISO order imbalances on contemporaneous and future abnormal returns is strongest for firms in the smallest firm size quintile. Finally, I analyze herding among ISO order imbalances and find strong commonality. My results indicate that ISOs contribute to both short‐ and long‐term return formation.