The Evolution of the Social Contract

Two transitions in the evolution of the social contract are considered, the first from the dominance hierarchies of the great apes (used as a proxy for our prehuman ancestors) to the egalitarian political structure of non-sedentary hunter-gatherer bands, and the second, to the reintroduction of hierarchical institutions of governance, primarily a result of living in fixed settlements after the inception of agriculture. The first transition was a product of biological and cultural evolution, which brought about big brains, language, higher consciousness, and a lower rate of time preference that enabled early man to sustain an egalitarian social contract and thereby escape the domination that confronted his prehuman ancestors. The second transition was a product of cultural evolution alone. The high costs of enforcing the hunter-gatherer social contract caused it to break down and be replaced by hierarchy when the domestication of plants and animals gave rise to a sedentary existence and increased populations. However, it is shown that the very biological and cultural adaptations that made hunter-gatherer egalitarianism possible were a necessary foundation for the spontaneous creation of complex culture and the evolution of institutions that would once again eventually make freedom possible and economic prosperity possible.     

Heterogeneous ability,career choice and firm size

Entrepreneurial ability is the ability to innovate new products. Managerial ability is the ability to maintain the profitability of current operations. By assuming heterogeneous abilities of acquiring and maintaining an endogenous number of production processes, the model of this paper predicts a distribution of firm sizes, a diversity in the composition of R&D and chosen career. Firms conduct product improvement if and only if managerial ability is high relative to entrepreneurial ability. Individuals choose careers as either innovative entrepreneurs, managerial entrepreneurs or salaried employees depending on their abilities. An individual's entrepreneurial ability may not be high enough to choose a career as an innovative entrepreneur, but if managerial ability is sufficiently high, then a career as a managerial entrepreneur is optimal. Managerial ability has an effect on expected firm size if and only if the individual is a managerial entrepreneur.This material is based upon work supported by the Research Committee of the Rutgers Graduate School of Management. I wish to thank two anonymous referees for helpful suggestions.     

A model of project evaluation with limited attention

Summary This paper characterizes the optimal policy for a model in which manager may adopt an endogenous number of projects but has only limited resources to devote to their evaluation and maintenance. In any period, the manager may discard any subset of existing projects but may evaluate only one existing or one new project which is then either discarded or restored. Both its current return and the probability with which a project may be restored depends only on the number of periods since its last evaluated. For a manager whose objective is to maximize the sum of discounted returns, the optimal policy takes one of two forms. A discard policy specifies that the manager evaluate a new project in each period and discard current projects at some critical age. An age inspection policy specifies that the manager evaluate a new project only if all current projects are sufficiently young.Support from the C. V. Starr Center for Applied Economics and the Research Resource Committee of the Rutgers Graduate School of Management is gratefully acknowledged. We thank Roy Radner for valuable assistance in the early stages of the work.     

Nondiscretionary residential water use: the impact of habits and water‐efficient technologies

Several studies published in the last few decades have demonstrated a low price‐elasticity for residential water use. In particular, it has been shown that there is a quantity of water demanded that remains constant regardless of prices and other economic factors. In this research, we characterise residential water demand based on a Stone‐Geary utility function. This specification is not only theory‐compatible but can also explicitly model a minimum level of consumption not dependent on prices or income. This is described as minimum threshold or nondiscretionary water use. Additionally, the Stone‐Geary framework is used to model the subsistence level of water consumption that is dependent on the temporal evolution of consumer habits and stock of physical capital. The main aim of this study is to analyse the impact of water‐saving habits and water‐efficient technologies on residential water demand, while additionally focusing attention on nondiscretionary uses. This is informed by an empirical application using data from a survey conducted among residents of Brisbane City Council, Australia. The results will be especially useful in the design of water tariffs and other water‐saving policies.     

The effect of information on consumers' willingness to pay for natural and organic chicken

This study examined the effect of definitions for organic and natural on willingness to pay a premium for organic over natural chicken. Data were collected using surveys and experimental auctions that were conducted before and after information was presented. Before information, approximately two‐thirds of participants inaccurately equated the requirements of natural with those for organic. After information, nearly 50% increased their premium, while 30% decreased their premium. Logistic regression results showed that consumers who had overestimated the requirements for natural were most likely to have an increased premium after information, with significantly higher bids for organic. For those who decreased their premium after information, awareness of consuming genetically modified (GM) foods was a key variable. The non‐genetically modified (non‐GM) requirement of organic appears to be of low value to some consumers. Overall, consumer confusion regarding organic and natural standards may be having substantial impacts on the two markets.     

The Bioeconomics of Cooperation

When transactions and information are costly and exchange is non-simultaneous, ‘institutions matter’. They matter because exchange under these circumstances subjects the participants to potentially harmful behaviors by other participants, among which are: opportunistic behavior, agency, the free-rider problem, cheating, moral hazard, and adverse selection. Institutions constrain these behaviors, allowing the participants to take advantage of the gains from trade and specialization, and thereby facilitating cooperation. Individuals adhere to institutional rules because they gain by doing so. Because the individual gains are inseparable from the structure of the institutions, the institutions themselves necessarily become the focus of the analysis—as we see in the new institutional economics (NIE). The new group selection position in biology involves a similar shift in focus from the level of the individual to the group when studying the evolution of altruism. But some of the proponents of group selection go further, arguing that altruism in biology evolves because it is in the interest of the group, but not the individual. In fact, group level analysis is necessary in biology, as in the NIE, because it allows for the discovery of ‘institutions’ that constrain cheating, opportunistic behavior, etc., thereby making participation in the group in the long-run self-interest of the individual. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Environmental scanning the future of event design

This paper used multiple sources of information in order to identify the forces likely to impact event design. Content analysis of key informant interviews and selected trade publication articles identified key forces impacting event design. Technology, the environment and green issues, security and safety, and globalization were forces identified by both the key informants and the trade literature. Neither of the sources gave much attention to political forces. This article contributes to our understanding of the forces impacting event design and suggests some environmental scanning methodologies that can be used with both key informants and the trade publication literature.