Multi‐Market Competition,R&D,and Welfare in Oligopoly

We investigate a multi‐market Cournot model with strategic process research and development (R&D) investments wherein a multi‐market firm meets new competitors that enter one of the markets. We show that entry can enhance the total R&D expenditures of the multi‐market firm. Moreover, the incumbent's profit nonmonotonically changes as the number of entrants increases. Depending on the fixed entry costs and R&D technologies, both insufficient and excess entry can appear. Our results imply that diversification of their products can be a useful strategy for firms.     

国外创业者的10大谎言

下面是一个国外的投资人写的文章,面对创业者,什么样的谎言骗不倒他呢。     

Dynamics,stability, and foresight in the Shapley–Scarf housing market

While most of the literature starting with Shapley and Scarf (1974) have considered a static exchange economy with indivisibilities, this paper studies the dynamics of such an economy. We find that both the dynamics generated by competitive equilibrium and the one generated by the weak dominance relation, converge to a set of allocations we define as strictly stable, which we can show to exist. Moreover, we show that even when only pairwise exchanges between two traders are allowed, the strictly stable allocations are attained eventually if traders are sufficiently farsighted.     

A consistent nonparametric test for nonlinear causality—Specification in time series regression

Since the pioneering work by Granger (1969), many authors have proposed tests of causality between economic time series. Most of them are concerned only with “linear causality in mean”, or if a series linearly affects the (conditional) mean of the other series. It is no doubt of primary interest, but dependence between series may be nonlinear, and/or not only through the conditional mean. Indeed conditional heteroskedastic models are widely studied recently. The purpose of this paper is to propose a nonparametric test for possibly nonlinear causality. Taking into account that dependence in higher order moments are becoming an important issue especially in financial time series, we also consider a test for causality up to the Kth conditional moment. Statistically, we can also view this test as a nonparametric omitted variable test in time series regression. A desirable property of the test is that it has nontrivial power against T^1/2-local alternatives, where T is the sample size. Also, we can form a test statistic accordingly if we have some knowledge on the alternative hypothesis. Furthermore, we show that the test statistic includes most of the omitted variable test statistics as special cases asymptotically. The null asymptotic distribution is not normal, but we can easily calculate the critical regions by simulation. Monte Carlo experiments show that the proposed test has good size and power properties.     

What Should the Weights of the Three Major Currencies be in a Common Currency Basket in East Asia?*

We consider what type of regional common currency should be introduced in East Asia in the future. The common currency basket is, in itself, more desirable as an anchor currency. In this paper we define two types of currency basket and investigate the long‐term sustainability of adopting a common currency basket in East Asia. From our empirical results, a larger weight (but less than 100 percent) for the US dollar in the common currency basket tends to make bilateral exchange rates among East Asian countries stable in the long run.     

PARTIAL PRIVATIZATION UNDER ASYMMETRIC MULTI‐MARKET COMPETITION

Under the assumption that a public firm provides goods or services to two markets and that a private firm provides goods or services to one market only, this study examines whether public firms should be privatized. It also investigates how the production quantity of a private firm changes when its degree of privatization increases. We find that when the market share of a duopoly market is large (small), partial privatization (nationalization) is socially preferable. We also find that the quantity produced by the private firm does not always increase along with the degree of privatization.     

Conservation Auctions and Compliance: Theory and Evidence from Laboratory Experiments

Many agri-environmental conservation programs are faced with the problem of imperfect monitoring. This provides farmers with an incentive for noncompliance, because they can receive subsidies without implementing the conservation scheme. In this paper, bidding behavior and auction performance are compared for discriminatory-price and uniform-price auctions in an imperfect monitoring environment. Our theoretical analysis suggests that auction performances are equalized between the discriminatory-price and uniform-price auctions. However, laboratory experiments reveal that, although the discriminatory-price auction has an advantage in terms of reducing policy costs, it is more likely to cause adverse selection. As a result, the uniform-price auction tends to have higher efficiency and cost-effectiveness when compliance behavior is taken into account.