Stability of stochastic optimal growth models: a new approach

The paper proposes an Euler equation technique for analyzing the stability of differentiable stochastic programs. The main innovation is to use marginal reward directly as a Foster-Lyapunov function. This allows us to extend known stability results for stochastic optimal growth models, both weakening hypotheses and strengthening conclusions.     

Exchange Rate Pass‐through and Currency Invoicing: Implications for Monetary Integration in East Asia

Exporter's price‐setting behaviour and currency invoicing play a key role in the literature on the new open‐economy macroeconomics. This paper estimates exchange rate pass‐through coefficients for the exports of four ASEAN countries: Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand. In addition, previous estimates of pass‐through as well as invoicing behaviour in East Asia are discussed in the context of regional integration. The new pass‐through coefficients are estimated under two alternate specifications for up to 34 goods for each of the four ASEAN countries destined for up to 13 major markets. The results suggest: (a) little pass‐through is occurring in Southeast Asia and (b) this lack of pass‐through is more likely attributable to the fact that they are small countries in a relatively integrated market, rather than evidence of pricing to market. The implications for regional monetary integration of this apparently low degree of pass‐through are detailed.     

Trade and Indeterminacy in a Dynamic General Equilibrium Model

This paper introduces sector-specific externalities in the Heckscher-Ohlin two-country dynamic general equilibrium model to show that indeterminacy of the equilibrium path in the world market can occur. Under certain conditions in terms of factor intensities, there are multiple equilibrium paths from the same initial distribution of capital in the world market, and the distribution of capital in the limit differs among equilibrium paths. One equilibrium path converges to a long-run equilibrium in which the international ranking of factor endowment ratios differs from the initial ranking; another equilibrium path maintains the initial ranking and converges to another long-run equilibrium. Since the path realized is indeterminate, so is the long-run trade pattern. Therefore, the Long-Run Heckscher-Ohlin prediction is vulnerable to the introduction of externality. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: E13, E32, F11, F43.     

Long-Run Effects of Monetary Expansion in a Two-Sector Model of Endogenous Growth

This paper explores the long-run effects of monetary expansion by introducing a cash-in-advance constraint into one of the basic models of endogenous growth. In our model, the real side of the economy consists of two production sectors, one of which produces a final good that can be used either for consumption or for investment and the other produces new human capital. Both sectors use physical and human capital under constant returns to scale technologies. We first characterize the balanced-growth equilibrium and then examine how a rise in money growth affects the relevant variables, such as the long-term growth rate and the relative prices.     

The effect of corruption on the manufacturing sector in India

This article investigates the effects of corruption on the performance of the manufacturing sector at the state level in India. We employ conviction rates of corruption-related cases as an instrument for the extent of corruption, address the underreporting problem, and examine the impact of corruption on the gross value added per worker, total factor productivity, and capital-labor ratio of three-digit manufacturing industries in each state. Our estimation results show that corruption reduces gross value added per worker and total factor productivity. Furthermore, we show that the adverse effects of corruption are more salient in industries with smaller average firm size.     

Does oligopsony power matter in price support policy design? Empirical evidence from the Thai Jasmine rice market

In the oligopsony market, farmers may receive low prices and policy analysis assuming perfect competition can yield serious bias results. In this paper, we estimate oligopsony power between processors and farmers and evaluate the welfare impact of the paddy pledging program (PPP), a generous price support program in the Thai Jasmine rice market, with an imperfect competition model. We develop a model that consists of rice supply equation and derived demand equation. We then simultaneously estimate these equations using system estimation methods to recover oligopsony power parameters. Finally, we use these parameters to assess the welfare impact of the price support program. Using annual panel data running from crop marketing year 2001/2002–2015/2016 and exploiting the institutional feature of the PPP, we find strong evidence of some oligopsony power, a moderate level of oligopsony price distortion, and a negative relationship between price support and oligopsony power. We also find that the PPP is inefficient but effective in income redistribution. Moreover, the program benefits both farmers and consumers. With better policymaking decisions, the PPP can be efficient by setting a suitable support price. Therefore, our results show that in the case of the Thai Jasmine rice market, the generally accepted “wisdom” about agricultural price support policy does not necessarily hold, and price support can be designed to improve the efficiency of the market.     

Favouritism towards the poor and a discontinuous tax structure

This article aims to theoretically clarify two points. First, even though the government shows favouritism to the poor and wants to exempt low-income taxpayers and to secure the necessary income tax revenue by taxing only high-income taxpayers, the government nevertheless ends up taxing the poor. This is in opposition to favouritism and arises because of the government’s inability to observe the individual taxpayer’s income levels. Second, even without observing each taxpayer’s income level, if favouritism is sufficiently strong, then the government can discontinuously resolve such unintentional taxation.