An Evaluation of Japan's First Safeguards Actions

Japan has been one of the major GATT/WTO member countries with relatively little experience in implementing protectionist measures. However, in April 2001, for the first time in its history, Japan invoked provisional safeguard measures against imports of Welsh onions, Shiitake mushrooms and Tatami mats mainly from China. This paper reviews and evaluates the chain of events regarding these safeguard actions, and considers the means by which Japan might be able to deal with its ‘trilemma’ policy problem involving how to coordinate the promotion of trade liberalisation, the administration of WTO‐consistent safeguards and responses to domestic political demands for protection. The paper first attempts to review the theoretical rationale for implementing safeguard measures and counterarguments against these measures. Second, it discusses the economic circumstances in which Japan implemented the safeguard measures and evaluates these measures critically from the standpoint of economic efficiency and the political economy interests involved. Finally, it concludes with a recommendation that the aforementioned ‘trilemma’ policy problem in Japan can be best addressed by means of the introduction of a ‘well‐institutionalised’ domestic programme to provide adjustment assistance to ameliorate the displacement resulting from import surges.     

Integrierte Kommunikation in der öffentlichen Verwaltung

Zusammenfassungen  Die erfolgreiche Integration der Kommunikationsaktivit?ten eines Unternehmens gewinnt auch für die ?ffentliche Verwaltung (?V) an Bedeutung. Jedoch gelingt es vielen Verwaltungsbereichen noch nicht, ihr Image zu steuern. Durch eine strategische Neuorientierung und die Beachtung der Besonderheiten gegenüber der Privatwirtschaft wird interne Kommunikation zu einem erfolgreichen Marketingtool im ?ffentlichen Sektor. Dipl.-Kffr. Stefanie Henkel wissenschaftliche Mitarbeiterin am Institut für ?ffentliche Dienstleistungen und Tourismus der Universit?t St. Gallen Prof. Dr. Kuno Schedler Professor für Betriebswirtschaftslehre mit besonderer Berücksichtigung des Public Management und Direktor am Institut für ?ffentliche Dienstleistungen und Tourismus der Universit?t St. Gallen     

The political economy of preferential trade arrangements: The case of Japan

ABSTRACT

Support for open trade regimes varies. We analyze Japanese survey data on individuals' preferences for TPP, unilateral import liberalization, and East Asian economic integration, and compare factors influencing policy preferences. First, despite the massive negative campaigns against TPP, 42.8% of individuals support Japan’s participation in TPP, vs. 21.1% against. Second, economic factors do matter for an individual in determining his/her policy preference over TPP. Third, noneconomic factors such as gender, age, access to accurate information, and attachment to hometown also feature as determinants. Fourth, although preferences over TPP and other policy options are positively correlated, some factors decrease TPP support but do not undermine support for two other less-politicized policy options: lack of access to accurate information and some industry and regional TPP-specific factors. Criticism impacts negatively on FTA policy preferences. Finally, we discuss economic policy implications for relationships between China, Japan, and Korea.

Abbreviations: FTA: Free trade agreement; JA: Japan agricultural cooperative; TPP: Trans-Pacific partnership agreement.     

Strategic capacity investment under uncertainty

This article considers investment decisions within an uncertain dynamic and duopolistic framework. Each investment decision involves to determine the timing and the capacity level. The simultaneous analysis of timing and capacity decisions extends work on entry deterrence/accommodation to consider a timing/delay element. We find that, when applying an entry deterrence policy, the first investor, or incumbent, overinvests in capacity for two reasons. First, it delays the investment of the second investor, or entrant. Second, the entrant will invest in less capacity. We also find that greater uncertainty makes entry deterrence more likely.     

Finite project life and uncertainty effects on investment

This paper revisits the important result of the real options approach to investment under uncertainty, which states that increased uncertainty raises the value of waiting and thus decelerates investment. Typically in this literature projects are assumed to be perpetual. However, in today's economy firms face a fast-changing technology environment, implying that investment projects are usually considered to have a finite life. The present paper studies investment projects with finite project life, and we find that, in contrast with the existing theory, investments may be accelerated by increased uncertainty. It is shown that this particularly happens at low levels of uncertainty and when project life is short.     

‘… and politics?’

This article illuminates the relationship between the increased importance management has gained in public institutions, and political reality in everyday work lives. It attempts to gauge the rationalities behind the managerial and the political system and derives a heuristic structure from them. On the basis of this discussion, an analysis is conducted of the origins of new public management, using Switzerland as an example. It is concluded that NPM reforms started as managerial reforms of public institutions, but that they developed into de facto political reforms. Thus the managerial background of project managers, consultants and public management scholars is a necessary but not sufficient precondition for a successful implementation of NPM in the politico-administrative system. The contribution which public management is able to make to the governance debate must not be underestimated. Not least, it leads to a clarification of the sources of legitimacy of government action. The rationality model introduced in this article is designed to make systemic differences between management and politics visible – and to improve communication between politicians and public managers.     

The effects of information on strategic investment and welfare

Summary. The paper analyses the influence of uncertainty and competition on the strategic considerations of a firm’s investment decision, where the firm receives imperfect signals about the profitability of an investment project. We find a preemptive or an attrition equilibrium depending on a trade-off between first and second mover advantages. We show that welfare can be negatively affected by decreasing uncertainty, i.e. more and/or better information. Furthermore, simulations indicate that duopoly leads to higher welfare than monopoly if there are few and relatively non-informative signals, whereas the opposite holds if there are many and relatively informative signals.Received: 13 May 2004, Revised: 22 March 2005, JEL Classification Numbers: C61, D43, D81.Jacco J. J. Thijssen: Correspondence toDolf Talman is acknowledged for many inspiring discussions and meticulous proof-reading. Jan Boone, Thomas Sparla, participants in the workshop on “Recent Topics in Real Options Valuation”, July 2002, Krems, Austria, and an anonymous referee are thanked for helpful comments. The usual disclaimer applies.     

Symmetric equilibrium strategies in game theoretic real option models

This paper considers the problem of investment timing under uncertainty in a duopoly framework. When both firms want to be the first investor a coordination problem arises. Here, a method is proposed to deal with this coordination problem, involving the use of symmetric mixed strategies.