Auditors' Fee Premiums and Low‐Quality Internal Controls*

We examine the relation between low‐quality internal controls and audit fee premiums. Using a novel data set of audit hours and audit fees we find, consistent with the audit risk model, that auditors increase their effort (hours) owing to low internal control quality. We find that auditors also charge a significant fee premium to clients with internal control weaknesses. This premium is observed for severe internal control weaknesses and companies with low‐quality alternative governance mechanisms. The results are robust to multiple methods to address endogeneity, including company fixed effects, difference‐in‐differences design, and a propensity score‐matched sample. Taken as a whole, low internal control quality leads to fee premiums, which are a deadweight loss to client companies.     

Employee Movements from Audit Firms to Audit Clients

Regulators have expressed concerns about the “revolving door” between auditors and clients, whereby audit employees move directly from audit firms to audit clients (i.e., “direct alumni hires”). Regulators are concerned that these direct hires could compromise audit quality, partly because these employees could have previously audited their hiring company's financial statements. In contrast, we examine accounting and finance executives who move indirectly from audit firms to audit clients and who could not have previously audited the hiring company's financial statements (i.e., “indirect alumni hires”). We show that indirect hires occur more often than the direct hires that have concerned regulators. We predict and find that both direct and indirect alumni hires are associated with lower rates of executive turnover and audit firm turnover. However, there is no evidence that the reduced rates of executive turnover are explained by managerial entrenchment or that these hires are associated with lower audit quality. Overall, our findings suggest that direct and indirect employee movements from audit firms to audit clients are beneficial to executives, audit clients, and audit firms because they reduce the incidence of costly turnover.     

Audit Regulation and Cost of Equity Capital: Evidence from the PCAOB's International Inspection Regime*

This study investigates the relation between audit regulation and cost of equity capital. There is scant empirical evidence on this relation because changes in audit regulation are frequently accompanied by other major regulatory changes. We exploit variation in the timing of regulatory changes induced by foreign governments' staggered allowance of PCAOB inspections. Using a difference-in-differences design, we find that foreign SEC registrants with auditors from countries that allow PCAOB inspections enjoy a lower cost of capital, relative to foreign SEC registrants with auditors from countries that prohibit inspections. Furthermore, we find that this cost of capital effect is attenuated for companies with higher-quality governance mechanisms. Finally, we document that inspection access is associated with higher-quality analyst forecasts, which suggests that this change in audit regulation reduces information risk for market participants.     

Auditor benchmarking of client disclosures

Review of Accounting Studies - We examine auditors’ disclosure benchmarking, which we define as auditors’ acquisition of nonclient financial statement information for the purpose of...     

Reframing the Past: Thoughts about Business Leadership and Decision Making under Uncertainty

How do business leaders make decisions in the face of uncertainty?More important, how do business and economic historians writea narrative that links a business problem, its proposed solution,and the outcome of this action without allowing the successor failure of the decision to determine the trajectory of thestory? Counterfactual hypotheses and contextual analysis providetwo tools that can help historians minimize the distortionsof hindsight and recover a sense of the contingency that surroundsall decisions.     

Putting the Corporation in its Place

This article challenges the idea that the corporation is a globallysuperior form of business organization and that the Anglo-Americancommon-law is more conducive to economic development than thecode-based legal systems characteristic of continental Europe.Although the corporation had important advantages over the mainalternative form of organization (partnerships), it also haddisadvantages that limited its appeal to small- and medium-sizedenterprises (SMEs). As a result, when businesses were providedwith an intermediate choice, the private limited liability company(PLLC) that combined the advantages of legal personhood andjoint stock with a flexible internal organizational structure,most chose not to organize as corporations. This article tracksthe changes that occurred in the menu of business organizationalforms in two common-law countries (the United Kingdom and theUnited States) and two countries governed by legal codes (Franceand Germany) and presents data showing the rapidity with whichfirms in each country responded to enabling legislation forPLLCs. We show that the PLLC was introduced first and most easilyin a code country (Germany) and last and with the most difficultyin a common-law country (the United States). Late introductionwas associated with prolonged use of the partnership form, suggestingthat the disadvantages of corporations did indeed weigh heavilyon SMEs.     

Correction to: Auditor benchmarking of client disclosures

Review of Accounting Studies - The original version of this article unfortunately contained mistakes.