The political economy of direct legislation: direct democracy and local decision–making

Local and regional governments account for an important share of total government spending and, given the decentralization trend in OECD nations, this is likely to increase. How should this spending be governed? This article argues that direct democracy is best suited to organize decision–making at the state and local level. To support this, we present the main theoretical arguments on why and how referenda and initiatives affect fiscal policy outcomes. The basic argument concerns voter control. Under representative democracy, citizens only have direct control at election time. With referenda and initiatives, citizens can selectively control their representatives on specific policies whenever they deviate sufficiently from citizens' preferences. As a result, fiscal policy outcomes are likely to more closely reflect voter preferences. We empirically test this on Swiss data since Switzerland provides a 'natural laboratory' for local governance. The governance structures of Swiss cantons and localities with respect to fiscal issues range from classic parliamentary democracy to pure direct democracy, and an important part of spending and taxation is controlled at these levels. Specifically, we estimate an econometric model of fiscal behaviour using data from 1986 to 1997 for the 26 Swiss cantons, and 1990 data on 134 local communities. It is shown that mandatory referenda on fiscal issues at both levels have a dampening effect on expenditure and revenue, and at the local level also on public debt. Combining this with existing empirical evidence leads to a relatively uncontested result, namely that elements of direct democracy are associated with sounder public finances, better economic performance and higher satisfaction of citizens.     

Access Pricing,Quality Degradation,and Foreclosure in the Internet

Access to both a local and a global network is needed in order to get complete connection to the Internet. The purpose of this article is to examine the interplay between those two networks and how it affects the domestic public policy towards a domestic provider of local access. We find that a cost-oriented regulation is detrimental to domestic welfare, because it shifts profit to the foreign provider of global access. The optimal policy is that the regulator commits itself to set an access price above costs, possibly the same price as in an unregulated market economy. A regulation of the global access price has a non-monotonic effect on domestic welfare, and there is a potential conflict between international and domestic regulation policy.     

Investment liberalization — Why a restrictive cross-border merger policy can be counterproductive

Investment liberalizing countries are often concerned that cross-border mergers and acquisitions, in contrast to greenfield investments, might have an adverse effect on domestic firms and consumers. However, given that domestic assets are sufficiently scarce, we identify a preemption effect and an asset complementarity effect, which imply that the acquisition price is substantially higher than the domestic seller's profits. Moreover, we show that for the acquisition to take place, the MNE must be sufficiently efficient when using the domestic assets, otherwise rivals will expand their business, thereby making the acquisition unprofitable. Consequently, restricting cross-border M&As may also hurt consumers.     

Corporate leverage and the collateral channel

We investigate whether and how corporate leverage depends on the structure of corporate assets. Based on a large panel dataset of US firms from 1990 to 2010, we show that property, plant and equipment are important drivers of the collateral channel, while inventories and receivables are less important. The collateral channel is more pronounced for firms that have to rely on banks and trade creditors to raise debt finance, but it has become weaker for these firms after the start of the financial crisis. Our study provides new evidence on the cross-sectional and time-varying importance of the collateral channel for corporate leverage.     

Cause-related marketing persuasion research: an integrated framework and directions for further research

This paper presents an integrative review of the literature on cause-related marketing (CRM) persuasion research (i.e. studies of how CRM influences evaluations of the partner brand). The aim of the study was to review CRM persuasion research and to integrate the findings into a theoretical framework that could direct future research efforts in the area. Drawing on Bergkvist and Taylor's model of Leveraged Marketing Communications (LMC), a dual-path model of CRM persuasion effects was developed. According to the model, CRM affects brand evaluations along two paths: the indirect transfer path which is mediated by attribution of motives and the direct transfer path in which attitude towards the cause is transferred to the brand. The model incorporates results from extant research and provides guidance for future studies.     

ECB Monetary Policy Surprises: Identification Through Cojumps in Interest Rates

This paper proposes a new econometric approach to disentangle two distinct response patterns of the yield curve to monetary policy announcements. Based on cojumps in intraday tick data of short‐ and long‐term interest rate futures, we develop a day‐wise test that detects the occurrence of a significant policy surprise and identifies the market perceived source of the surprise. The new test is applied to 133 policy announcements of the European Central Bank (ECB) in the period from 2001 to 2012. Our main findings indicate a good predictability of ECB policy decisions and remarkably stable perceptions about the ECB's policy preferences. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Strategic Regulation Policy in the Internet

Some countries are importers while others are exporters of global backbone connectivity. At the same time, input components such as local access are non-traded. This paper analyzes a non-cooperative regulatory game between importing and exporting countries, assuming that the prices of both traded and non-traded inputs can be regulated. We show that exporting countries choose a more restrictive regulation of non-traded goods than importing countries do. We further show that a requirement of international non-discrimination may hurt importing countries, and give firms producing traded inputs incentives to invest in quality degradation.     

HOW SHOULD WE MEASURE THE “ECONOMIC” ASPECTS OF WELL‐BEING?

The Human Development Index (HDI) uses GDP per capita to measure “command over resources,” which implicitly makes the strong value judgment that inequality and insecurity do not matter. This paper presents revised estimates of the Index of Economic Well‐Being (IEWB) for the United States, the U.K., Canada, Australia, Germany, Norway and Sweden for the period 1980 to 2001 and demonstrates that replacing an index of the log per capita incomes with our IEWB as the “command over resources” component in the Human Development Index (HDI) affects the level and trend of the HDI, even among affluent nations. Because the IEWB recognizes four dimensions of command over resources (Current effective per capita Consumption flows, Net societal Accumulation of stocks of productive resources, Income Distribution and Economic Security), its use has a particularly large impact where underlying trends in these components diverge (e.g. the U.K. or the United States).