Neuroeconomics: Why Economics Needs Brains

Neuroeconomics uses knowledge about brain mechanisms to inform economic theory. It opens up the “black box” of the brain, much as organizational economics opened up the theory of the firm. Neuroscientists use many tools—including brain imaging, behavior of patients with brain damage, animal behavior and recording single neuron activity. The key insight for economics is that the brain is composed of multiple systems which interact. Controlled systems (“executive function”) interrupt automatic ones. Brain evidence complicates standard assumptions about basic preference, to include homeostasis and other kinds of state‐dependence, and shows emotional activation in ambiguous choice and strategic interaction.     

On recalls, layoffs, variable hours, and labor adjustment costs

The paper analyzes the employment policy of a firm that can vary both hours and the level of employment. The analysis differs from previous work in the adjustment cost literature in that the firm is able to change its employment not only through hires, layoffs, and quits, but also by recalls of employees who were previously laid off. Thus, we introduce the possibility of the firm inventorying the labor input. It is shown that this labor inventory potential is necessary if the firm is to ever lay off workers. Further, it is demonstrated that linear rather than strictly convex adjustment costs are then required if the firm is to always recall employees who were previously laid off prior to hiring new workers.     

Misperceiving the value of information in predicting the performance of others

Economic models typically allow for “free disposal” or “reversibility” of information, which implies non-negative value. Building on previous research on the “curse of knowledge” we explore situations where this might not be so. In three experiments, we document situations in which participants place positive value on information in attempting to predict the performance of uninformed others, even when acquiring that information diminishes their earnings. In the first experiment, a majority of participants choose to hire informed—rather than uninformed—agents, leading to lower earnings. In the second experiment, a significant number of participants pay for information—the solution to a puzzle—that hurts their ability to predict how many others will solve the puzzle. In the third experiment, we find that the effect is reduced with experience and feedback on the actual performance to be predicted. We discuss implications of our results for the role of information and informed decision making in economic situations. Electronic Supplementary Material Supplementary material is available in the online version of this article at http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10683-006-9128-y. JEL Classification C91, D83     

Employee Reload Options: Pricing, Hedging, and Optimal Exercise

Reload options, call options granting new options on exercise,are popularly used in compensation. Although the compound optionfeature may seem complicated, there is a distribution-free dominantpolicy of exercising reload options whenever they are in themoney. The optimal policy implies general formulas for numericalvaluation. Simpler formulas for valuation and hedging followfrom Black–Scholes assumptions with or without continuousdividends. Time vesting affects the optimal policy, but numericalresults indicate that it is nearly optimal to exercise in themoney whenever feasible. The results suggest that reload optionsproduce similar incentives as employee stock options and sharegrants.     

Textbook Treatments of the Financial Market in the IS-LM Model

Intermediate macroeconomics textbooks introduce financial markets into the IS-LM analysis but typically as a beginning-of-period consideration. Here the financial market is introduced in an end-of-period model.     

Hedonic adaptation and the role of decision and experience utility in public policy

Many economists are becoming supportive of ‘soft’ paternalistic interventions that help people to avoid common decision errors without curtailing individual autonomy. To identify when such interventions could be beneficial, and to assess their success, requires a welfare criterion. However, traditional preference or choice-based criteria cannot serve this function because they assume that whatever people choose makes them better off. An alternative criterion that bases welfare on happiness rather than choice avoids this problem but has several of its own drawbacks. Most notably, people often adapt to serious chronic health conditions, and exhibit high levels of happiness, even though both those with and those without the condition agree that it is much preferable to be healthy. After reviewing different lines of research that shed light on the pros and cons of these alternative welfare criteria, we argue that no simple criterion based on either concept can surmount these problems. Instead, evaluations of welfare will inevitably have to be informed by a combination of both approaches, patched together in a fashion that depends on the specific context.     

Analogical Encoding Fosters Ethical Decision Making Because Improved Knowledge of Ethical Principles Increases Moral Awareness

Journal of Business Ethics - The current paper examines whether knowledge of an ethical principle influences moral awareness and ethical decision making. Using hypothetical scenarios (Studies 1 and...     

Resolution of Uncertainty and Asset Prices: Why the Timing of Information Release Might be Relevant After All

The objective of this paper is to reexamine the effects of the timing of information releases on security prices. We extend Ross (1989) by allowing the timing of information releases to affect the martingale probabilities. We show that if the early release of information is expected to resolve part of the uncertainty about the economy wide shock, it will positively affect asset prices in general and, under some conditions, the price of the information generating firm will rise more than the price of other firms. Our results are consistent with puzzling empirical observations documented in both the accounting and financial economics literatures.     

Local martingales, arbitrage, and viability Free snacks and cheap thrills

Summary. We revisit a standard model of security prices as Ito processes, and provide some new economic insights about the role of arbitrage and credit limits within such a model. We show that the standard assumptions of a positive state prices and existence of an equivalent martingale measure exclude prices that are viable models of competitive equilibrium and that are potentially useful for modeling actual financial markets. These models have been dismissed in the past as allowing arbitrage, but in fact an agent who prefers more to less and who has limited access to credit may have an optimum. Received: June 9, 1999; revised version: October 4, 1999