How does managed care do it?

Integrating the health services and insurance industries, as health maintenance organizations (HMOs) do, could lower expenditure by reducing either the quantity of services or unit price or both. We compare the treatment of heart disease in HMOs and traditional insurance plans using two datasets from Massachusetts. The nature of these health problems should minimize selection. HMOs have 30% to 40% lower expenditures than traditional plans. Both actual treatments and health outcomes differ little; virtually all the difference in spending comes from lower unit prices. Managed care may yield substantial increases in measured productivity relative to traditional insurance.     

Hospital Reimbursement Incentives: An Empirical Analysis

Reimbursement systems for health-care providers are very complex, like the production systems that they regulate. This complexity has led to some important misperceptions about the incentive consequences of major reimbursement reforms. One example is the prospective payment system (PPS), developed to provide "high-powered" incentives through fixed prices for hospital admissions for the US elderly. In fact, various features of the DRG system allow reimbursement to vary with actual treatment decisions during an admission, and so are not prospective. This paper develops a general method for measuring actual reimbursement incentives in complex regulated price systems. The method uses regression techniques with variance decompositions to quantify the effects of particular features of the payment system on prospective and retrospective cost sharing, as well as overall generosity of payments. I apply this method to microdata on 20 percent of Medicare hospital admissions in 1987 and 1990 to summarize the incentives created by PPS in practice, and how the incentives are evolving over time. I show that PPS involves limited and decreasing cost sharing with hospitals, most of which is not prospective. The reimbursement incentives vary substantially across diagnoses, demographic groups, and types of intensive treatments, possibly with important implications for hospital behavior and medical expenditure growth. The techniques developed here can be used to analyze a broad range of provider reimbursement mechanisms.     

Medicare reform: fundamental problems, incremental steps.

This paper presents an overview of the Medicare reform debate. I begin by reviewing some of the features of Medicare and then turn to a discussion of reforms, both on the benefits side and on the financing side of the program. The reform proposals raise difficult policy and political issues, and could have important implications for the federal budget, the efficiency of the health sector, and the well-being of the elderly and disabled.     

The effects of hospital ownership on medical productivity

To develop new evidence on how hospital ownership and other aspects of hospital market composition affect health care productivity, we analyze longitudinal data on the medical expenditures and health outcomes of the vast majority of nonrural elderly Medicare beneficiaries hospitalized for new heart attacks over the period 1985-1996. We find that the effects of ownership status are quantitatively important. Areas with a presence of for-profit hospitals have approximately 2.4% lower levels of hospital expenditures, but virtually the same patient health outcomes. We conclude that for-profit hospitals have important spillover benefits for medical productivity.     

Short-term fluctuations in incidental happiness and economic decision-making: experimental evidence from a sports bar

Experimental Economics - We develop a new experimental paradigm to study how emotions affect decision-making. We use it to investigate the impact of short-term fluctuations in incidental happiness...