Learning about Internal Capital Markets from Corporate Spin-offs

We examine the investment behavior of firms before and after being spun off from their parent companies. Their investment after the spin-off is significantly more sensitive to measures of investment opportunities (e.g., industry Tobin's Q or industry investment) than it is before the spin-off. Spin-offs tend to cut investment in low Q industries and increase investment in high Q industries. These changes are observed primarily in spin-offs of firms in industries unrelated to the parents' industries and in spin-offs where the stock market reacts favorably to the spin-off announcement. Our findings suggest that spin-offs may improve the allocation of capital.     

Party alternation,divided government,and fiscal performance within US States

The literature on US state government fiscal performance has examined the role of institutional factors such as budget rules and divided government, but has largely ignored the impact of party alternation. This paper primarily focuses on whether party alternation in the governor’s office affects fiscal performance. Our hypothesis is that frequent party changes create a political environment that impacts fiscal performance. To further assess the impact of party alternation on fiscal performance, we consider our primary hypothesis in conjunction with the degree of division that exists between the governor’s office and the legislature. Using panel data from 37 states between 1971 and 2000 we test the hypothesis that frequent party alternation can be expected to affect fiscal performance and find strong support for the hypothesis. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 2005 Public Choice Society Meetings. The authors would like to thank the conference participants, William Shughart, Charles Register, Jocelyn Evans, John D. Jackson, Amihai Glazer, and two anonymous referees for their comments. We would also like to thank Craig R. Stiller for his help in the collection of data. Any remaining errors remain the responsibility of the authors.     

A Common Pool Resource Game with Sequential Decisions and Experimental Evidence

We describe a common pool resource game in which players choose how much of the stock to extract in a sequential manner. There are two choices and one represents taking a larger proportion of the stock than the other. After a player makes a choice, the remaining stock grows at a constant rate. We consider a game with a finite number of alternating moves. It is shown that changes in the larger proportion of the stock that the players are allowed to take and the growth rate affect equilibrium, but have little effect on behavior in the laboratory. In addition to observing more cooperation than predicted, we observe that parameters that are strategically irrelevant affect behavior. The results of this research might help policy makers in developing adequate policies to prevent overexploitation of some natural renewable resources.     

Una classe di funzioni monotone generalizzate

Si considera la classe delle funzioni realiF(x,y) definite inS×S, conSR ^N , che soddisfano per ognix,yS la condizione di monotoniaF(x,y)+F(y,x)0. Indebolendo la precedente disuguaglianza si introducono classi di funzioni monotone generalizzate e, supponendo soddisfatta una opportuna condizione di omogeneità, si caratterizzano tali funzioni in base alla struttura del segno delle funzioni _{x, v} (t, s) = F(x + tv, x + sv), x S, v R ^N \{0}. Infine dopo aver definite le funzioni F-differenziabili, si introducono classi di funzioni conversse generalizzate, rispetto ad F, e si studiano i collegamenti tra queste classi e la monotonia generalizzata diF.

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Summary We consider the class of real valued functionF(x,y) defined inS×S, withSR ^N , satisfying x,yS the monotone conditionF(x,y)+F(y,x)0. Weakening the previous inequality we introduce the class of quasi-monotone, pseudo-monotone and strictly pseudo-monotone functions. Under a suitable assumption of homogeneity we characterize the generalized monotone functions studying the sign structure of the functions _{x, v} (t, s) = F(x + tv, x + sv), x S, v R ^N \{0}.Finally by means of the notion ofF-differentiability we introduce new classes of generalized convex functions (with respect toF) and we study the relationship between these classes and the generalized monotonicity ofF.

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Questa ricerca è stata parzialmente finanziata dal Ministero per l'Università e la Ricerca Scientifica.     

The Zonal and Seasonal CO2 Marginal Emissions Factors for the Italian Power Market

Environmental and Resource Economics - This paper estimates the seasonal and zonal $${\mathrm{CO}}_{2}$$ marginal emissions factors (MEFs) from electricity production in the Italian electricity...