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Igor?FilatotchevEmail author Salim?Chahine Mike?Wright Mufit?Arberk 《The International Entrepreneurship and Management Journal》2005,1(4):419-439
Using a unique sample of 444 entrepreneurial IPOs in the UK and France this paper examines links between founders' characteristics,
venture capital (VC) syndication and the development of effective boards in entrepreneurial firms. It argues that VC-backed
IPOs suffer from two sets of agency problems which are related to principal-agent and principal-principal relationships between
the founders and members of the VC syndicate. The empirical evidence shows that there is a curvilinear relationship between
the intensity of founders' external ties and VC syndication. Founders' retained share ownership is negatively associated with
VC syndication. We also find that in syndicated IPOs there is a higher involvement of passive private equity firms and “business
angels” investing alongside VC firms, both in terms of their number and equity presence. VC-syndicated IPOs have more independent
boards than IPOs with no VC involvement. Board independence is negatively associated with founders' retained equity. These
results are consistent with the assumption that board independence is used to mitigate agency costs associated with VC involvement
in IPO firms. Our findings also identify significant differences in governance characteristics between the UK and France.
While French IPOs have less independent boards, they involve more VC backing in general and syndicated VC funding in particular,
than UK IPOs. 相似文献
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This paper examines the development of effective boards in venture capital (VC)-backed initial public offerings. It argues
that VC-backed IPOs suffer from two sets of agency costs which are related to principal–agent and principal–principal relationships
between the founders and members of the VC syndicate. Using a unique sample of 293 entrepreneurial IPOs in the UK it shows
that VC syndicates invest in relatively more risky firms. VC-backed IPOs have more independent boards than IPOs with no VC
involvement, with board independence being higher in syndicated VC-backed firms. These results are consistent with assumption
that these governance factors are used to mitigate agency costs associated with VC involvement in IPO firms. We also find
that in syndicated IPOs there is a higher equity presence of passive private equity firms investing alongside VC firms. 相似文献
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