The effect of the establishment of an organized exchange on weak form efficiency: the case of Istanbul Gold Exchange

Evidence is presented from IGE (the Istanbul Gold Exchange) that an institutional regulation such as the establishment of an organized exchange is an important component of informational efficiency that should not be disregarded in the process of financial liberlization.     

Social norms in repeated public good games

The paper explores the relationship between an individual’s preference for cooperation and the establishment of cooperative norms. Our aim is to provide an experimental test of the hypothesis (Fehr and Gachter, 2002) according to which the individuals’ willingness to punish defectors in social dilemma games favours the establishment of a common rule of behaviour leading to increased levels of cooperation. We conduct two experiments in which individuals decide both whether to participate in a common project and the institutional rules determining how the profits of the project were to be shared among the participants in the group. Our main question is to analyse whether high contributors react to free riding behaviour by adopting punitive sanctions. We also interview our subjects in order to elicit their opinions on civic values and free riding behaviour. Our results partly contradict the initial hypothesis; however, with reference to the institutional choices, we find that individual ethics may play an important role.     

A specification test for the propensity score using its distribution conditional on participation

Propensity score matching has become a popular method for the estimation of average treatment effects. In empirical applications, researchers almost always impose a parametric model for the propensity score. This practice raises the possibility that the model for the propensity score is misspecified and therefore the propensity score matching estimator of the average treatment effect may be inconsistent. We show that the common practice of calculating estimates of the densities of the propensity score conditional on the participation decision provides a means for examining whether the propensity score is misspecified. In particular, we derive a restriction between the density of the propensity score among participants and the density among nonparticipants. We show that this restriction between the two conditional densities is equivalent to a particular orthogonality restriction and derive a formal test based upon it. The resulting test is shown via a simulation study to have dramatically greater power than competing tests for many alternatives. The principal disadvantage of this approach is loss of power against some alternatives.     

Replicating the R&D investments and financial structure relationship: evidence from Borsa İstanbul

I revisit the empirical relationship between R&D investments and financial structure by trying to replicate seminal paper of Aghion et al. (J Eur Econ Assoc 2:277–288, 2004). In the widely cited study, Aghion et al. (2004) found evidence of a nonlinear (an inverted U-shape) relationship—firms with positive R&D tend to use more debt than firms with zero R&D, but the use of debt falls with R&D intensity—in a sample of U.K. firms from 1990 to 2002. In order to review their significant findings, I use panel data of 177 Turkish manufacturing firms listed in Borsa ?stanbul from 2007 to 2016. Using Aghion et al.’s (2004) model specifications, I found no evidence of an inverted U-shape relationship or of any effect of R&D intensity on the leverage ratio. The study thus suggests that the effect of R&D investments on the financial structure may vary with the different samples of countries and cannot be universally generalized.     

NATIONAL TREATMENT AT THE WTO: THE ROLES OF PRODUCT AND COUNTRY HETEROGENEITY*

This paper analyzes the World Trade Organization's (WTO's) national treatment (NT) clause in a two‐country model where quality of goods and/or market size are heterogenous across countries. When market size is symmetric across countries, a reciprocal NT agreement (i) benefits the high‐quality country, (ii) hurts the low‐quality country, and (iii) delivers higher aggregate world welfare. However, such an agreement can arise in equilibrium if the high‐quality country's market is relatively bigger and the quality gap between goods is small (i.e., goods are sufficiently alike). The qualitative nature of these results does not change when quality is endogenously determined.     

Attrition bias in the Capitalia panel

The Capitalia survey of manufacturing firms in Italy represents an important source of panel data on Italian firms. Panel attrition, however, represents a potential obstacle to such use of the sample. In this paper, sample entry and exit behaviour are studied, and a test for attrition bias is carried out in order to evaluate the potential for using panels constructed from the Capitalia survey. The analysis reveals the presence of distorting panel attrition effects in simple models of firm performance. In addition, the paper discusses both the implications of attrition bias for estimates and also briefly considers possible solutions. Finally, some suggestions are made as to how to reduce the impact of attrition bias through the provision of additional information on the nature of the attrition process available to the surveying institution at the moment of data collection.     

Industry Concentration and Strategic Trade Policy in Successive Oligopoly

We study a policy game between exporting and importing countries in vertically linked industries. In a successive international Cournot oligopoly, we analyse incentives for using tax instruments strategically to shift rents vertically, between exporting and importing countries, and horizontally, between exporting countries. We show that the equilibrium outcome depends crucially on the relative degree of competitiveness in the upstream and downstream parts of the industry. With respect to national welfare, a more competitive upstream industry may benefit an exporting (upstream) country and harm an importing (downstream) country. On the other hand, a more competitive downstream industry may harm exporting countries.     

Uncovering emotions and insights evoked by paper currency

Despite the pervasiveness of paper currency in market exchanges, consumer research has focused only on its effects based on denomination and physical appearance. Previous work noted that the physical appearance of paper currency elicits emotions such as disgust and pride. However, no other research to date has uncovered additional emotions elicited by bills. The purpose of this study is twofold: (1) to uncover the series of emotions elicited by paper currency and (2) to expose additional insights. Consumer narratives were collected using the critical incident technique. Both elicited emotions and insights were identified and classified according to existing classifications of emotions and money insights in the literature. Our study revealed a unique set of emotions and insights not previously classified in prior research. Implications for practice and directions for future work are noted.