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1.
We formally incorporate the option to gather information into a game and thus endogenize the information structure. We ask whether models with exogenous information structures are robust with respect to this endogenization. Any Nash equilibrium of the game with information acquisition induces a Nash equilibrium in the corresponding game with an exogenous structure. We provide sufficient conditions on the structure of the game for which this remains true when ‘Nash’ is replaced by ‘sequential’. We characterize the (sequential) Nash equilibria of games with exogenous information structures that can arise as a (sequential) Nash equilibrium of games with endogenous information acquisition. 相似文献
2.
A strong equilibrium is a pure Nash equilibrium which is resilient to deviations by coalitions. We define the strong price of anarchy (SPoA) to be the ratio of the worst strong equilibrium to the social optimum. Differently from the Price of Anarchy (defined as the ratio of the worst Nash Equilibrium to the social optimum), it quantifies the loss incurred from the lack of a central designer in settings that allow for coordination.We study the SPoA in two settings, namely job scheduling and network creation. In the job scheduling game we show that for unrelated machines the SPoA can be bounded as a function of the number of machines and the size of the coalition. For the network creation game we show that the SPoA is at most 2. In both cases we show that a strong equilibrium always exists, except for a well defined subset of network creation games. 相似文献
3.
This paper compares a strict inflation target regime to a conservative central bank regime to determine the monetary regime appropriate for a disinflation process. The analysis shows that in a two-period model, in which policymakers face given first-period inflationary expectations, a strict inflation target could be preferred to the appointment of a conservative central banker who has discretion. The result differs from that of Rogoff (1985), who assumed rational expectations and concluded that a conservative central banker is always preferable. The disadvantage of the conservative central banker derives from his tendency to accelerate disinflation relative to rate that maximizes social welfare.JEL Classification:
E52, E58The authors are grateful to Alex Cukierman, Nissan Liviatan, Allan Drazen, Amit Friedman and Yoav Friedmann for their useful suggestions. We also thank the anonymous referees for helpful comments. Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the Tel Aviv University macroeconomic workshop, at the Research Department seminar, Bank of Israel, and at the Bank of Israels conference on Macroeconomic Policy, October 2002. 相似文献
4.
We analyze voluntary private contributions to public goods and the role seed money plays in signaling the public good's quality to potential subsequent contributors. We present a theoretical model and analyze two sets of naturally occurring data from crowdfunding platforms. After developing the theoretical background, we find statistically significant switch points that distinguish between seed contributions and subsequent contributions. A positive change in contribution behavior after the switch suggests an increase in the perceived value of the public good. We find that the signal comprises the number of contributors and the average contribution (as a proportion of the targeted goal). Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
5.
We present a model in which net business formation is endogenously procyclical. Variations in the number of operating firms lead to countercyclical variations in markups that give rise to endogenous procyclical movements in measured total factor productivity (TFP). Based on this result, the paper suggests a simple structural decomposition of variations in TFP into those originating from exogenous shocks and those originating endogenously from the interaction between firms’ entry and exit decisions and the degree of competition. The decomposition suggests that around 40% of the movements in measured TFP can be attributed to this interaction. Moreover, the paper analyzes the effects on (i) the measurement of the volatility of exogenous shocks in the U.S. economy and (ii) the magnification of shocks over the business cycle. 相似文献
6.
Feasible implementation of taxation methods 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
This paper studies implementation of taxation methods in one-commodity environments in which the incomes of the agents are
unknown to the planner. Feasibility out of equilibrium imposes that the mechanism depend on the environment. We present two
mechanisms. The first one, which requires complete information, implements every taxation method in Nash, strong and coalition-proof
equilibrium. The second, where informational requirements are relaxed, implements a large class of consistent and monotone
methods in subgame perfect equilibrium. Neither mechanism employs the off-equilibrium devices used by the general theory.
Under fully private information no method is implementable.
Received: 12 March 1997 / Accepted: 21 July 1998 相似文献
7.
Entrepreneurship in post-socialist economies: A typology and institutional contexts for market entrepreneurship 总被引:1,自引:1,他引:0
Nir Kshetri 《Journal of International Entrepreneurship》2009,7(3):236-259
There is growing recognition among post-socialist (PS) economies that free-market entrepreneurship is essential for ultimately
improving their economic future. The promotion of market entrepreneurship, however, has been a challenging experience for
these economies. This paper examines various forms of entrepreneurship in PS economies. Drawing upon the institutional theory,
we also highlight the clear contexts and attendant mechanisms associated with institutions–entrepreneurship nexus in PS economies’
contexts.
相似文献
Nir KshetriEmail: |
8.
We study a Gale-like matching model in a large exchange economy, in which trade takes place through non-cooperative bargaining in coalitions of finite size. Under essentially the same conditions of core equivalence, we show that the strategic equilibrium outcomes of our model coincide with the Walrasian allocations of the economy. Our method of proof makes use of the theory of the core. With respect to previous work, our positive implementation result applies to a substantially larger class of economies: the model relaxes differentiability and convexity of preferences, and also admits an arbitrary number of divisible and indivisible goods. 相似文献
9.
We model the endogenous formation of nations in a world economy where nations apply redistributive policies. We show that people's preference for stronger redistributive policies may lead to greater inequality in the world's distribution of income as a result of rich individuals tending to form their own nations. By the same token, stable economic integration occurs only when redistributive policies are not too strong. 相似文献
10.
Regulative institutions supporting entrepreneurship in emerging economies: A comparison of China and India 总被引:1,自引:1,他引:0
China and India are touted as new entrepreneurship powerhouses. The two countries’ different institutional history and characteristics
have led to differences in environments related to entrepreneurship. There are some well-founded rationales as well as a number
of misinformed and ill-guided viewpoints about the friendliness of the environment to support entrepreneurship in each country
as well as the China–India differences concerning entrepreneurial environment. This article contributes to this debate by
offering theoretical and empirical evidence regarding the differences in regulative institutions in the two economies. Specifically,
we compare the state’s regulative, participative, and supportive roles from the standpoint of entrepreneurship in the two
countries. 相似文献