Technological regimes and demand structure in the evolution of the pharmaceutical industry

This paper examines how the nature of the technological regime governing innovative activities and the structure of demand interact in determining market structure, with specific reference to the pharmaceutical industry. The key question concerns the observation that—despite high degrees of R&D and marketing-intensity—concentration has been consistently low during the whole evolution of the industry. Standard explanations of this phenomenon refer to the random nature of the innovative process, the patterns of imitation, and the fragmented nature of the market into multiple, independent submarkets. We delve deeper into this issue by using an improved version of our previous “history-friendly” model of the evolution of pharmaceuticals. Thus, we explore the way in which changes in the technological regime and/or in the structure of demand may generate or not substantially higher degrees of concentration. The main results are that, while technological regimes remain fundamental determinants of the patterns of innovation, the demand structure plays a crucial role in preventing the emergence of concentration through a partially endogenous process of discovery of new submarkets. However, it is not simply market fragmentation as such that produces this result, but rather the entity of the “prize” that innovators can gain relative to the overall size of the market. Further, the model shows that emerging industry leaders are innovative early entrants in large submarkets.     

Persistence of innovative activities, sectoral patterns of innovation and international technological specialization

In this paper, we focus on the role of persistence and heterogeneity of innovative activities at the level of the firm in determining the patterns of technological change in different industries and countries. We ask: are persistence and heterogeneity associated with higher degrees of concentration in innovative activities, stability in the ranking of innovators, and lower degrees of entry and exit in the population of innovators? Or, do the patterns of innovation depend on other variables like firm size and industrial concentration? Moreover, what are the relationships between the patterns of innovative activities, their determinants, and the technological specialization of countries? We compute indicators of persistence and heterogeneity using the OTAF-SPRU patent database at the firm level for five European countries over the period 1969–1986 for 33 technological classes. Then, we estimate the relationships between our indicators of the sectoral patterns of innovative activities and international technological specialization on the one hand, and our indicators of persistence, heterogeneity and market structure on the other. Results show that persistence and asymmetries are important (and strongly related) phenomena that affect the patterns of innovative activities across countries and sectors, while the role of market structure variables is less clear. Finally, international technological specialization is associated to a competitive core of persistent innovators.     

Learning,market selection and the evolution of industrial structures

Industrial economics is a rich source of puzzles for economic theory. One of them — certainly the most discussed — regards the co-existence of firms (and plants) of different sizes, displaying rather invariant skewed distributions. Other puzzles, however, concern the sectoral specificities in industrial structures, the persistence of asymmetric corporate performances and the dynamics of entry and exit. The paper reports some preliminary results on evolutionary modeling of the links between the microeconomics of innovation, the patterns of industrial change and some observable invariances in industrial structures.First, the paper reviews a few of these empirical regularities in structures and in the patterns of change. Second, the paper discusses the achievements and limits of interpretations of the evidence based on equilibrium theories. Finally, it presents a model where these regularities are explained as emergent properties deriving from non equilibrium interactions among technologically heterogeneous firms. Moreover, simulation exercises show that also the intersectoral variety in the observed industrial structures and dynamics can be interpreted on the grounds of underlying specificities in the processes of technological learning — which is called technological regimes — and of the processes of market interactions — i.e. market regimes.This research has undertaken within an on going project sponsored by the Italian Research Council (CNR, Progetto strategico,Cambiamento tecnologico e sviluppo economico). Support by the Consortium on Competitiveness and Cooperation Centre for Research in Management, University of California at Berkeley is also gratefully acknowledged.     

Technological Regimes and Schumpeterian Patterns of Innovation

This paper proposes that the specific pattern of innovative activities in an industry can be explained as the outcome of different technological (learning) regimes . A technological regime is defined by the particular combination of technological opportunities, appropriability of innovations, cumulativeness of technical advances and properties of the knowledge base. Building upon the distinction between Schumpeter Mark I and Schumpeter Mark II industries, this paper provides empirical estimates of the relationships between indicators of the Schumpeterian patterns of innovation (concentration of innovative activities, stability in the hierarchy of innovators and importance of new innovators) and indicators of the variables defining technological regimes.     

The (Failed) Development of a Biotechnology Cluster: The Case of Lombardy

This paper discusses the development of the biotechnology industry in an Italian region, Lombardy. It asks why significant innovative activities in biotechnology did not emerge in what might have been considered at the outset a promising area for the growth of this industry and why in very recent years some timid symptoms of dynamism seem to be appearing. After an overview of the patterns of the development of biotechnology in Italy, the specific case of Lombardy, is described. Then, the paper discusses what kind of factors might explain the lagging behind of the Italian (and more generally, European) biotechnology industry vis-à-vis the United States.     

The evolution of the pharmaceutical industry

This article provides an overview of the main traits of the historical development of the pharmaceutical industry, using the lenses of the evolutionary approach to economic and industrial change. After a brief overview of the main evolutionary concepts which guide the subsequent discussion, our presentation identifies four main eras: from the formative stages (from the late 1800s to War World II) to the so-called Golden Age (the 1940s to the mid-1970s), the biotechnology revolution (the 1970s to the new millennium, approximately) and what we label the ‘Winter of Discontent?’ (the first decade of the new century). Within all these epochs, we discuss the main trends in technology, firms' strategies and structures, patterns of competition, demand, regulation and institutional developments. Section 6 concludes the article, briefly discussing some main implications for the present and future of the industry on the one hand and for the relevance of an evolutionary approach to the analysis of corporate and industrial change on the other.     

Demand,innovation, and the dynamics of market structure: The role of experimental users and diverse preferences

The history of a number of industries is marked by a succession of eras, associated with different dominant technologies. Within any era, industry concentration tends to grow. Particular eras are broken by the introduction of a new technology which, while initially inferior to the established one in the prominent uses, has the potential to become competitive. In many case new entrants survive and grow, and the large established firms do not make the transition. In other cases, the established firms are able to switch over effectively, and compete in the new era. This paper explores a model which generates this pattern and has focused on the characteristics of the demand. We argue that the ability of the new firms exploring the new technology to survive long enough to get that technology effectively launched depends on the existence of fringe markets which the old technology does not serve well, or experimental users, or both. Established firms initially have little incentive to adopt the new technology, which initially is inferior to the technology they have mastered. New firms generally cannot survive in head-to-head conflict with established firms on the market well served by the latter. The new firms need to find a market that keeps them alive long enough so that they can develop the new technology to a point where it is competitive on the main market. Niche markets, or experimental users, can provide that space.

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Franco MalerbaEmail: