Controlling Corruption in Hierarchies

We re-examine alternative hierarchical designs for controlling corruption as studied by Bac (J. Comp. Econom.22,2:99–118), since his formulation of the principal's problem was incomplete. In a basic hierarchy, while collusion between a supervisor and his subordinate agent may prevent implementation of high corruption outcomes, the principal would be able to induce relatively low corruption outcomes. In a two-level decentralized supervision chain, internal collusion in the upper part always induces collusion at the bottom but not vice-versa. For nonincreasing returns-to-scale monitoring technologies, the principal prefers a decentralized hierarchy to a centralized hierarchy.J. Comp. Econom.,December 1997,25(3), pp. 322–344. Department of Economics and Accounting, University of Liverpool, Liverpool, L69 3BX, United Kingdom.     

Incentive effects of stock purchase plans

Financial economists are interested in whether alternative compensation plans are adopted primarily for tax, incentive or signaling reasons. As most compensation plans have tax implications, examining for other effects is difficult. In this paper we examine the stock market reaction to employee stock purchase plans which are ‘non-tax advantageous’ and adopted for incentive/signaling reasons. The results suggest that (1) equity-based compensation schemes have a positive effect on shareholder wealth for reasons other than tax reduction, (2) a motive for adopting these plans is to align managerial and shareholder interests, and (3) equity ownership motivates key executives more than subordinate employees.     

Match‐Fixing in a Monopoly Betting Market

A monopolist bookmaker may set betting odds on a fairly even contest to induce match‐fixing by an influential corrupt punter. His loss to the corrupt punter is more than made up for by enticing enough ordinary punters to bet on the losing team. This result is in sharp contrast to competitive bookmaking, where even contests have been shown to be immune to fixing. The analysis also reveals a surprising result that the incidence of match‐fixing can dramatically fall when match‐fixing opportunities rise. This is shown by comparing two scenarios—when only one team is corruptible and when both are corruptible. For both teams corruptible, the bookmaker is uncertain about to which team the influential punter will have access, so carefully maneuvering the odds to induce match‐fixing is too costly.     

Biogeography based optimization for mining rules to assess credit risk

Financial institutions, by and large, rely on the use of machine learning techniques to improve the classic credit risk assessment model for reduction of costs, delivery of faster decisions, guaranteed credit collections, and risk mitigations. As such, several data mining and machine learning approaches have been developed for computation of credit scores over the last few decades. Moreover, the existing rule-based classification algorithms tend to generate a number of rules with a large number of conditions in the antecedent part. However, these algorithms fail to demonstrate high predictive accuracy while balancing coverage and simplicity. Thus, it becomes quite a challenging task for the researchers to generate an optimal rule set with high predictive accuracy. In this paper, we present an effective rule based classification technique for the prediction of credit risk using a novel Biogeography Based Optimization (BBO) method. The novel BBO in the context of rule mining is named as locally and globally tuned biogeography based rule-miner (LGBBO-RuleMiner). This is applied for discovering optimal rule set with high predictive accuracy from the dataset containing both the categorical and continuous attributes. The performance of the proposed algorithm is compared against a variety of rule-miners such as OneR (1R), PART, JRip, Decision Table, Conjunctive Rule, J48, and Random Tree, along with some meta-heuristic based rule mining techniques by considering two credit risk datasets obtained from University of California, Irvine (UCI) repository. It is found from the comparative study that the proposed rule miner in ten independent runs of ten-fold cross validation outperforms all of the aforesaid algorithms in terms of predictive accuracy, coverage, and simplicity.     

Corporate governance and firm performance

How is corporate governance measured? What is the relationship between corporate governance and performance? This paper sheds light on these questions while taking into account the endogeneity of the relationships among corporate governance, corporate performance, corporate capital structure, and corporate ownership structure. We make three additional contributions to the literature:First, we find that better governance as measured by the Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick [Gompers, P.A., Ishii, J.L., and Metrick, A., 2003, Corporate governance and equity prices, Quarterly Journal of Economics 118(1), 107–155.] and Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell [Bebchuk, L., Cohen, A., and Ferrell, A., 2004, What matters in corporate governance?, Working paper, Harvard Law School] indices, stock ownership of board members, and CEO-Chair separation is significantly positively correlated with better contemporaneous and subsequent operating performance.Second, contrary to claims in GIM and BCF, none of the governance measures are correlated with future stock market performance. In several instances inferences regarding the (stock market) performance and governance relationship do depend on whether or not one takes into account the endogenous nature of the relationship between governance and (stock market) performance.Third, given poor firm performance, the probability of disciplinary management turnover is positively correlated with stock ownership of board members, and board independence. However, better governed firms as measured by the GIM and BCF indices are less likely to experience disciplinary management turnover in spite of their poor performance.     

On the performance of the ordinary least squares method under an error component model

Starting from the one-dimensional results by Wang et al (1994) we consider the performance of the ordinary least squares estimator in comparison to the best linear unbiased estimator under an error component model with random effects in units and time. Upper bounds are derived for the first-order approximation to the difference between both estimators and for the spectral norm of the difference between their dispersion matrices.     

More on phantom bidding

Summary. A phantom bidding model is analyzed for a sale auction. The following issues are addressed: the effects of phantom bidding on overall social welfare and buyers' profits. It is shown that social welfare may increase or decrease as the auctioneer switches from the fixed reserve price policy to phantom bidding. The buyers' profits will increase whenever social welfare increases. Received: November 4, 1998; revised version: February 8, 1999     

All-or-nothing verdict as a screening device

An adversarial model of criminal trial is considered with threeverdict choices—innocent, guilty of moderate crime, andguilty of serious crime. Depending on the parties' access toevidence and initial beliefs in the courtroom about the possiblecrimes, the judge may agree to the defendant's request to eliminatethe verdict of moderate crime from jury deliberation if theprosecution brings the charge of serious crime. Though thisall-or-nothing verdict choice confers the defendant some manipulativepower, it is shown that such verdict choice may also screenout an overstated charge of serious crime. Conditions are derivedunder which screening is effective and powerful enough to generate(ex-ante) efficiency gains.     

Do Trademark Infringement Lawsuits Affect Brand Value: A Stock Market Perspective

Many firms find that they can benefit from copying orotherwise misusing the trademarks of their competitors. Firmsthat have maintained a positive brand image are likely to fightany dilution or eventual loss of their trademark by using lawsuitsagainst offending firms. These lawsuits help to staunch any lossesto the brand and leave the potential for the benefits from thetrademark to flow back to the firm. These benefits will be temperedby legal costs, potential infringement by other firms in futureand the need to file lawsuits in response. In contrast, firmsthat have infringed on a trademark are likely to lose if theowner of the trademark challenges them in court. This study relatesthe stock returns of firms to the filing of lawsuits to defendtrademarks. We study the impact of both the filing of the lawsuitand the eventual verdict of the court on the stock market valueof defendant and plaintiff firms. The protection of a trademarkby a plaintiff using a lawsuit resulted in a negative returnto the shareholders of the defendant firm that infringed on thetrademark. The returns to the plaintiff firms were mixed andof marginal magnitude due to offsetting factors although largefirms experienced positive returns.     

Communication and authority with a partially informed expert

A sender‐receiver game a la Crawford‐Sobel is analyzed where the sender has expertise on some but not all the payoff‐relevant factors. This residual uncertainty can either improve (even allow full revelation) or worsen the quality of transmitted information depending on a statistic called the effective bias. For symmetrically distributed residual uncertainty or quadratic loss functions, (i) the quality of information transmission is independent of the riskiness of residual uncertainty, (ii) it may be suboptimal to allocate authority to the informed player, (iii) despite players' preferences being arbitrarily close, it is impossible to assert that the receiver prefers delegation over authority or vice versa.