An Empirical Analysis of Entrant and Incumbent Bidding in Road Construction Auctions

This paper explores differences in the bidding patterns of entrants and incumbents in road construction auctions. We find that entrants bid more aggressively and win auctions with significantly lower bids than incumbents. The differences in their bidding patterns are consistent with a model of auctions in which the distribution of an entrant's costs exhibits greater dispersion than that of an incumbent's and relations of stochastic dominance in the distributions do not persist for the entire range of estimated costs. We also find that more efficient firms bid, on average, more aggressively and firms with greater backlogs bid less aggressively.     

Regional innovation and small high technology firms in peripheral regions

This paper highlights the difficulty of developing HT firms in a peripheral region of Spain. Although the endogenous development of HT firms in these regions is possible, their evolution depends on more central regions. The firm's geographical location and the type of HT production are the most important endogenous factors governing the firm's success.     

应该将扩大消费需求提升到国家战略的高度

消费问题经过几十年的讨论,至今仍没有得到一些人的高度重视。重投资,重GDP的增长,不重视消费拉动的老毛病,一直制约着我国经济的可持续发展。事实上,如果我国消费水平再不上一个新台阶,还将制约我国经济的持续发展。应该将扩大消费需求提升到我国发展的战略高度来认识。一、应     

The endless need for regulation in telecommunication: An explanation

Telecommunication services have existed as a legal monopoly nearly throughout its entire history. In 1998, telecom market liberalisation was achieved across the European Union (EU) through the introduction of competition among telephone services. Asymmetrical obligations were deemed necessary in order to compensate the market power of the former monopolist.As the evolution of asymmetrical regulation in Spain illustrates, obligations and the telecommunications operators subject to them increased with the regulatory framework established in 2002 in the EU. This new regulatory framework may continue to expand through the inclusion of functional separation as another possible asymmetrical obligation. In short, it seems that the regulatory pressure on the telecommunications industry is increasing, despite the lapse in time since the liberalisation of the industry.In this paper, a methodology developed by the Austrian School of Economics is applied in order to explain why the telecommunication market is subject to increasing regulation in Europe, rather than deregulation, after more than 10 years of liberalisation. In particular, Mises's theory of price control is used to explain the evolution of the regulation of local loop unbundling.     

Uncertainty reduction mechanisms in cross-sector alliances in Latin America

The present study explores three uncertainty reduction mechanisms that arise in the context of business alliance formation to assess whether these same mechanisms also operate in the development of alliances between non-profits and businesses. Secondary data from field-based case studies of Latin American cross-sector alliances are the focus of this analysis. The findings show that the same mechanisms operate to reduce uncertainty in cross-sector alliance formation and that alliance experience appears to determine the presence of some mechanisms.     

Stochastic Models of Implied Volatility Surfaces

We propose a market–based approach to the modelling of implied volatility, in which the implied volatility surface is directly used as the state variable to describe the joint evolution of market prices of options and their underlying asset. We model the evolution of an implied volatility surface by representing it as a randomly fluctuating surface driven by a finite number of orthogonal random factors. Our approach is based on a Karhunen–Loeve decomposition of the daily variations of implied volatilities obtained from market data on SP500 and DAX options.
We illustrate how this approach extends and improves the accuracy of the well–known 'sticky moneyness' rule used by option traders for updating implied volatilities. Our approach gives a justification for the use of 'Vegas' for measuring volatility risk and provides a decomposition of volatility risk as a sum of independent contributions from empirically identifiable factors.
(J.E.L.: G130, C14, C31).