Multinationals and changing national business systems in Europe: towards the ‘shareholder value’ model?

This article reviews recent development in employment relations in MNCs, within the context of the varied and changing business systems within Western Europe. Focusing on Germany, France, Sweden and the UK, we analyse both the effects of national corporate governance systems on MNCs, and the extent to which MNCs specifically, and globalisation more widely, have affected the nature of national business and employment systems. While elements of a move towards a more ‘Anglo‐Saxon’, economically liberal model of corporate governance and employment relations can be detected in all four countries, this is far from complete. Cross‐national differences in business systems within Europe therefore continue to exert effects upon MNCs.     

Optimales Vertragsdesign bei moralischem Risiko in der Rückversicherung

This paper addresses the optimal design of risk sharing arrangements in reinsurance contracts with asymmetric information concerning the primary insurer’s behavior. The latter usually has significant unobservable discretions, for instance with respect to risk selection, implying a moral hazard problem. We show that the existence of moral hazard strongly affects the characteristics of the reinsurance indemnification rule, i. e. the connection between the level of losses and the indemnity, which is specified in the contract. For this analysis, a standard model framework from the theory of optimal reinsurance with perfect information is modified by the assumption that the primary insurer has unobservable control of the probability distribution of the extent of losses. In particular, the solution indicates that for this situation, a Pareto-optimal indemnity rule is less steep, and therefore the primary insurer’s share in a marginal increase of the loss is greater, compared to the case of complete information. A deductible, however, turns out not to be a suitable approach in this context.     

Opening the Black Box: Corporate Codes of Ethics in Their Organizational Context

A review of the literature on Corporate Codes of Ethics suggests that whilst there exists an informative body of literature concerning the prevalence of such codes, their design, implementation and promulgation, it is also evident that there is a relative lack of consideration of their impact upon members' everyday organizational behaviour. By drawing upon organizational sociology and psychology this paper constructs a contextualist and interpretive model which seeks to enable an analysis and evaluation of their effects upon individual, group and organizational behaviour.     

An Experimental Bribery Game

Essential characteristics of corruption are (1) reciprocityrelationships between bribers and public officials, (2) negativewelfare effects, and (3) high penalties when discovered. Weseparate the influences of these factors in an experiment. Ina two-player game, reciprocation is economically inefficientthrough negative externalities. A control treatment withoutexternalities is also conducted. In a third, so-called suddendeath treatment, corrupt pairs face a low probability of exclusionfrom the experiment without payment. The results show that reciprocitycan establish bribery relationships, where negative externalitieshave no apparent effect. The penalty threat significantly reducescorruption, although discovery probabilities are typically underestimated.     

Modelling soccer matches using bivariate discrete distributions with general dependence structure

In this paper copulas are used to generate bivariate discrete distributions. These distributions are fitted to soccer data from the English Premier League. An interesting aspect of these data is that the primary variable of interest, the discrete pair shots-for and shots-against, exhibits negative dependence; thus, in particular, we apply bivariate Poisson-related distributions that allow such dependence. The paper focuses on Archimedian copulas, for which the dependence structure is fully determined by a one-dimensional projection that is invariant under marginal transformations. Diagnostic plots for copula fit based on this projection are adapted to deal with discrete variables. Covariates relating to within-match contributions such as numbers of passes and tackles are introduced to explain variability in shot outcomes. The results of this analysis would appear to support the notion that playing the 'beautiful game' is an effective strategy—more passes and crosses contribute to more effective play and more shots on the goal.