Intertemporal market division:: A case of alternating monopoly

In this paper, we report on an equilibrium with market dominance that exists in a simple two-firm model that features neither entry barriers nor sophisticated punishment strategies. This equilibrium induces an intertemporal market division in which the two firms alternate as monopolists - despite the fact that the model also sustains a Cournot duopoly. Even when initially both firms are active in the market, the alternating monopoly reveals itself rather quickly. Moreover, it Pareto dominates the Cournot equilibrium - as it is close to the cartel outcome. Several examples of what well may be such alternating monopolies are presented.     

STRATEGIC ASSET ALLOCATION FOR LONG‐TERM INVESTORS: PARAMETER UNCERTAINTY AND PRIOR INFORMATION

We study the effect of parameter uncertainty on the long‐run risk for three asset classes: stocks, bills and bonds. Using a Bayesian vector autoregression with an uninformative prior we find that parameter uncertainty raises the annualized long‐run volatilities of all three asset classes proportionally with the same factor relative to volatilities that are conditional on maximum likelihood parameter estimates. As a result, the horizon effect in optimal asset allocations is much weaker compared to models in which only equity returns are subject to parameter uncertainty. Results are sensitive to alternative informative priors, but generally the term structure of risk for stocks and bonds is relatively flat for investment horizons up to 15 years. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Nowcasting South African gross domestic product using a suite of statistical models

Given lags in the release of data, a central bank must ‘nowcast’ current gross domestic product (GDP) using available quarterly or higher frequency data to understand the current state of economic activity. This paper uses various statistical modelling techniques to draw on a large number of series to nowcast South African GDP. We also show that GDP volatility has increased markedly over the last 5 years, making GDP forecasting more difficult. We show that all the models developed, as well as the Reserve Bank's official forecasts, have tended to overestimate GDP growth over this period. However, several of the statistical nowcasting models we present in this paper provide competitive nowcasts relative to the official Reserve Bank and market analysts' nowcasts.     

Requests for zoo visitors to undertake pro-wildlife behaviour: How many is too many?

Recognising the potential conservation impact, zoos regularly ask their visitors to undertake pro-wildlife behaviour. This paper presents the results of two studies undertaken to address the question: how often during a visit should visitors be asked? Study 1 sought to a) determine individuals' personal thresholds and b) the point where the number of different behaviours requested began affect visitors' experiences. Study 2 sought the same, but focused on requests for the same behaviour. Results suggest that few respondents' personal thresholds were crossed (2.5% in Study 1 and 9% in Study 2). In neither study did many respondents (2.5% in Study 1 and 2.8% in Study 2) feel that the number of requests negatively affect their overall zoo experience. While there are caveats, we conclude that there appears little cause for concern about asking zoo visitors on multiple occasions to act in support of wildlife. Indeed, such requests may improve experiences.     

Corporate ownership and control structures: An international comparison

This paper analyzes the economic fundamentals of the corporate firm with publicly held shares and the salient characteristics of varying corporate systems, focusing on international differences in ownership and control structures, including alternative disciplinary mechanisms. Those international differences seem to influence economic behavior and corporate performance, including the way in which corporate restructurings take place. Market-oriented corporate systems and network-oriented corporate systems are likely to mutually converge in the future.     

Optimal design of trade institutions

We model an economy with social institutions that facilitate trade and induce three types of costs: establishment costs, access costs, and use costs. Use costs are specific transaction costs related to the use of these trade institutions. We assume that a trade institution is economically completely determined by the costs it imposes and by the effects on the trades it facilitates. We extend the Pareto efficiency concept to include various modes of organization of social institutions: the costs and benefits of these organizations are expressed in the trades they facilitate.Within this setting we discuss a valuation equilibrium concept, in which all agents use a common conjectural price system that assigns to every trade institution the price vector that would prevail under it. This feature of the equilibrium is important in securing the second welfare theorem, and is new to the analysis of economies with costly trade. Since the use costs can be nonlinear, there are non-convexities that prevent the second welfare theorem from obtaining in a finite economy, but we show it for large economies.Received: 3 April 2002, Accepted: 30 April 2003, JEL Classification: D59, D70, H49Robert P. Gilles: donewhile visiting the Center for Economic Research, Tilburg University, Tilburg, The Netherlands. Financial support from the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO), grant B46-390, is gratefully acknowledged.Dimitrios Diamantaras: Part of this research wasSupport from Temple University via a Fuller research fellowship is gratefully acknowledged.The authors would like to thank Suzanne Scotchmer, Andreu Mas-Colell, Marcus Berliant, Shlomo Weber, Hans Haller, Dhanajay Gokhale, Julian Manning, and two anonymous referees for their valuable comments and discussions of previous drafts of this paper. A previous version of this paper was circulated as Equilibria of economies with costly trade.     

Transaction cost economics and the roles of national culture: a test of hypotheses based on Inglehart and Hofstede

Transaction cost economics (TCE) is probably the most widely accepted theory on how firms can gain competitive advantage through efficient organization of their economic transactions. However, by focusing on the competitive environment in which companies operate, it abstracts from the cultural context in which governance decisions are made. We study the cultural boundedness of TCE using two seminal cultural theories: the political science/sociology framework of Inglehart and the management science framework of Hofstede. We use these theories to develop (main-effect) hypotheses about the cultural contexts in which TCE has higher predictive power as well as (interaction) hypotheses regarding particular cultural contexts that may inherently be more inclined than others to adopt certain non-market governance modes if the market “fails.” Hypotheses are tested using a meta-analysis on data collected from 128 studies from 12 countries on 3 continents, representing governance decisions of 60,926 companies. We find that TCE is a universal theory across all cultural contexts. This being said, we find that in societies low on power distance and in societies characterized by a strong emphasis on secular-rational and self-expression values, companies are more strongly guided in their governance decisions by economic, transaction-cost considerations than companies in societies high on power distance and in countries that are characterized by traditional and survival values. Further, TCE’s power to predict the specific type of non-market governance employed by the firm is systematically moderated by the national culture in which the firm operates. The power of TCE for predicting hierarchical governance is higher in countries that rate high on secular-rational values and on uncertainty avoidance and low on long-term orientation, whereas TCE is more diagnostic for predicting relational governance in countries high on self-expression values and low on power distance and on uncertainty avoidance. In sum, our meta-analysis provides support for our thesis that to fully understand governance choices made by firms, we need to integrate TCE and cultural theory. While managers around the world are guided by economic considerations, the cultural context in which they operate exerts a substantial—and predictable—contingent effect on their governance choices.     

FINANCIAL CHARACTERISTICS RELATED TO MANAGEMENTS'STOCK SPLIT AND STOCK DIVIDEND DECISIONS

Several studies have made inquiries of corporate managers concerning their motivations for undertaking stock splits and stock dividends. This paper investigates whether the factors identified by these studies are in fact associated with the actual stock distribution decisions of managers. The results are consistent with the view that managements issue large stock distributions (25 per cent or greater) in order to keep the per share price in an optimal range and to signal optimistic expectations to the market. Firms with relatively low per share prices were inclined to issue small stock distributions (less than 25 per cent); the signaling motivation also played a role here.     

On dynamic selection of households for direct marketing based on Markov chain models with memory

A simple, dynamic selection procedure is proposed, based on conditional, expected profits using Markov chain models with memory. The method is easy to apply, only frequencies and mean values have to be calculated or estimated. The method is empirically illustrated using a data set from a charitable foundation. The results reveal some interesting features with respect to the time-dependent behavior of certain subsets of households, whereas the profitability increases by about 9% by using the method compared to a benchmark of sending a mailing to all households.     

Decline and variability in brand loyalty

In this paper, we examine the over-time behavior of brand loyalty for a large set of brands drawn from 21 consumer packaged goods categories. Using the brand-loyalty operationalization of Colombo and Morrison (1989), the following conclusions are obtained. First, little support is found for the often-heard contention that brand loyalty is gradually declining over time. Second, while the short-run variability around a brand's mean loyalty level is not negligible, no evidence is found that this variability has systematically increased over time, and it can be reduced considerably through a simple smoothing procedure. Finally, the brand-loyalty pattern for market-share leaders is found to be more stable than for other brands. The study findings were robust to variation in the time interval used to construct the switching matrices, and to different treatments of multiple purchases.