Who's in charge here? Co‐CEOs,power gaps,and firm performance

At the pinnacles of organizations, comparative tests of unity of command and shared command are nearly impossible because only one individual sits atop most organizations. In organizations led by co‐CEOs, however, such a test is possible because co‐CEOs can truly share power. But do they? Our research pits the unity‐of‐command principle against the shared‐command principle and finds overall support for the former, even within the co‐CEO context. Our sample of 71 co‐CEO pairs at publicly traded U.S. firms shows that increasing power gaps between co‐CEOs are positively associated with firm performance. This positive association wanes and turns negative, however, as power gaps become very large. We conclude that whatever benefits the co‐CEO structure might offer likely lie outside the shared command paradigm. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Value creation through stakeholder synergy

Our “stakeholder synergy” perspective identifies new value creation opportunities that are especially effective strategically because a single strategic action (1) increases different types of value for two or more essential stakeholder groups simultaneously, and (2) does not reduce the value already received by any other essential stakeholder group. This result is obtainable because multiple potential sources of value creation exist for each essential stakeholder group. Actions that meet these criteria increase the size of the value “pie” available for essential stakeholder groups, and thereby serve to attract exceptional stakeholders and obtain their increasing effort and commitment. The stakeholder synergy perspective extends stakeholder theory further into the strategy realm, and offers insights for realizing broader value creation that is more likely to produce sustainable competitive advantage. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Syndication of European Buyouts and its Effects on Target‐Firm Performance

Using a unique dataset of 859 leveraged buyouts in Europe during the period 1999–2009, the authors' recent study reports that buyout financiers syndicate their transactions to other buyers to achieve benefits that include diversification of different types of target risk, the combination of complementary investor information and skillsets, and an increase in future deal flow. The authors also report that lead financiers structure their syndicates in ways designed to minimize syndication costs, in particular potential information and incentive problems with co‐investors in the syndicate, while also aiming to maximize the syndication benefits mentioned above. For example, through effective management of conflicts of interest with co‐investors within their syndicates, lead financiers are likely to acquire a reputation for looking out for the interests of their co‐investors that ends up increasing their own deal flow. As additional evidence in support of this claim, the authors also report finding that the post‐buyout profitability and growth of the target companies are higher when buyouts are syndicated (even after adjusting for the “endogeneity” of such decisions) and when the syndicates are structured to limit inter‐investor conflicts of interest within the syndicate. And as the authors point out, this finding, when viewed with the other main findings cited above, provides a more positive view of European buyout syndicates than the one projected by studies of Anglo‐American syndicates to date, whose findings have emphasized the potential for collusion among the buyout financiers.     

Is there a “Dark Side” to Monitoring? Board and Shareholder Monitoring Effects on M&A Performance Extremeness

Research summary: W e investigate the effects of monitoring by boards of directors and institutional shareholders on merger and acquisition (M&A ) performance extremeness using a sample of M&A deals from 1997 to 2006. Both governance research and legal reforms generally have espoused a “raise all boats” view of monitoring. We instead investigate whether monitoring may serve as a double‐edged sword that limits CEO discretion to undertake both value‐destroying M&A deals and value‐creating ones. Our findings indicate that the relationship between monitoring and M&A performance is more complex than previously believed. Rather than “raising all boats” in a shift towards better M&A outcomes, monitoring instead is associated with lower M&A losses, but also with lower M&A gains . Managerial summary: M ergers and acquisitions (M&A s) are a quintessential corporate activity. There were $3.8 trillion worth of M&A deals in 2015, despite scholars and practitioners reporting that M&A s often perform poorly. We question the widespread belief that more vigilant monitoring by boards of directors and large shareholders will raise M&A performance, overall. Put differently, does monitoring constrain CEO s' discretion to pursue bad deals, while simultaneously encouraging them to pursue good ones? We find that monitoring limits both large M&A losses and large M&A gains. Contrary to widely held beliefs, our results indicate that constraining executives' ability to pursue value‐destroying M&A deals does not simultaneously encourage or enable CEO s to pursue value‐creating deals . Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Chief executive scanning emphases,environmental dynamism,and manufacturing firm performance

Chief executives must allocate their scarce time for scanning efforts among relevant domains of their firms' external environment and their firms' internal circumstances. We argue that high‐performing CEOs vary their relative scanning emphases on different domains according to the level of dynamism they perceive in their external environments. The concepts of dominant logic and sector importance were used to develop predictions about which external domains and which internal domains should receive relatively more or less scanning emphasis in external environments that, overall, are more dynamic or more stable. A field survey of 105 single‐business manufacturing firms evaluated CEOs' scanning emphases and firm performance. Results indicated that, for dynamic external environments, relatively more CEO attention to the task sectors of the external environment and to innovation‐related internal functions was associated with high performance. In stable external environments, however, simultaneously increased scanning of the general sectors in the external environment and efficiency‐related internal functions produced higher performance. These relationships were strongest between relative scanning emphases among domains and sales growth. We discuss the implications of these results for researchers and practitioners. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Consensus-Performance Research: Theoretical and Empirical Extensions*

Research on the consensus-performance relationship has typically used correlational data to examine the simple, bivariate relationship between top management team consensus and firm performance. the results of this research are equivocal. Recent theoretical work, however, suggests a number of ‘third variables’ that may provide additional insight into the consensus-performance relationship through the ‘process of elaboration’. This paper presents theoretical models, based on recent theory building, that may be appropriate for incorporating these additional variables in future research.     

Moral Judgment and Values in a Developed and a Developing Nation: a Comparative Analysis

This comparative field study evaluated the moral reasoning used by U.S. and Belizean business students in resolving business-related moral dilemmas. The Belizeans, citizens of a less-developed country with Western heritage and a values-based education system, revolved the dilemmas using higher stages of moral judgment than did the U.S. business students.