Marketing Channels and the Durable Goods Monopolist: Renting versus Selling Reconsidered

Research on durable goods has shown that because of a time inconsistency problem, a monopolist manufacturer prefers to rent rather than sell its product. We reexamine the relative profitability of renting versus selling from a marketing perspective. In particular, using a simple linear demand formulation, we assume a durable goods monopolist has to use downstream intermediaries to market its product. In contrast to the case of an integrated monopolist, we find that when the monopolist has to rely on intermediaries, then it prefers to go through an intermediary that sells rather than one that rents its product. Similarly, the intermediary that sells the product is more profitable than the intermediary that rents the product. However, if the monopolist can commit to a set of prices, then the intermediary that rents is more profitable than the intermediary that sells.     

Playing the role of buyer and seller: The mental accounting of trade-ins

This paper examines the role of trade-ins in consumers' purchases of new durable goods. We argue that even if the net price paid by consumers who trade in an old product remains the same, varying the offer on the trade-in substantially affects consumers' satisfaction with the transaction. In particular, because the product is a part of their endowment, consumers' valuation of their used product can be more than the market's valuation. While the endowment effect is a well-documented phenomenon, its implications for trade-ins have yet to be studied. We use the notion of mental accounting and endowment effects to develop a model of trade-ins. We show that even if two deals are financially equivalent, the preferred option for consumers is often the one in which the consumer is overpaid on the trade-in. In addition, we find that consumers who are overpaid (relative to a market price) on their trade-in are willing to pay a higher net price than are consumers who are underpaid on their trade-in.     

EFFICIENCY OF THE HEALTH CARE SYSTEM: A SUB‐STATE LEVEL ANALYSIS FOR WEST BENGAL (INDIA)

This paper attempts a sub‐state level analysis of health system efficiency, focusing on West Bengal, a low income Indian state. Using a stochastic frontier model, it provides an idealized yardstick for evaluation. Our results suggest that overall efficiency of the public health delivery system remains low due to considerable disparities across districts. This is owing to differentials in availability and utilization of inputs such as the per capita availability of hospitals, beds, and manpower, and adversely affects life expectancy. Overcoming these factoral disparities may help the deficient districts to improve life expectancy. It may require a considerable increase in medical and public health expenditure in rural areas in the state and especially calls for resource mobilization to improve infrastructure facilities and maintain essential supplies at primary health centers. This could be attempted partly through funds from the National Rural Health Mission (NRHM) and by improving rural sanitation in poorer districts.     

A reflection on analytical work in marketing: Three points of consensus

This article presents three points of consensus about game-theoretic work in marketing: First, equilibrium analysis is necessary for studying situations that have strategic interactions. In many cases, empirical examination of these strategic scenarios is difficult or impossible, at least without the guidance of an equilibrium model. Second, more general models are not necessarily ??better,?? because institutional details matter. Thus, the appropriate compromise between generality and specificity depends on the scope of the research question. Finally, there should be a two-way road between theory and empirics??theory is necessary to interpret empirical results, while empirical findings should guide theoretical modeling choices.     

Strategic Decentralization and Channel Coordination

In this paper, we show that under certain conditions, strategic decentralization through the addition of a retailer in the distribution channel can increase a manufacturer's profits. The specific case on which we focus is the quantity coordination (double marginalization) problem for a manufacturer selling durable goods in a two-period setting. We show that the standard solution that coordinates a channel for non-durables does not coordinate the channel for durables. In particular, even though a manufacturer can achieve channel coordination by offering per-period, two-part fees, the equilibrium wholesale price in the first period is strictly above the manufacturer's marginal cost. This is in stark contrast to the two-part solution for non-durables where the equilibrium wholesale price is equal to marginal cost. We also identify a strategy that solves both the channel coordination and the Coase problem associated with durable goods. In this strategy, at the beginning of period 1, the manufacturer writes a contract with the retailer specifying a fixed fee and wholesale prices covering both periods. We show that by adding a retailer and using this contract, the manufacturer makes higher profits than it could if it were to sell directly to consumers.