Another Look at the Cross-section of Expected Stock Returns

Our examination of the cross-section of expected returns reveals economically and statistically significant compensation (about 6 to 9 percent per annum) for beta risk when betas are estimated from time-series regressions of annual portfolio returns on the annual return on the equally weighted market index. The relation between book-to-market equity and returns is weaker and less consistent than that in Fama and French (1992). We conjecture that past book-to-market results using COMPUS-TAT data are affected by a selection bias and provide indirect evidence.     

Predicting the Monthly and Annual Current Account Balance from Provisional Data*

This paper uses provisional monthly data to predict the one-month-ahead and one-year-ahead current account balance. Single-equation methods are compared to an eight-equation VAR model that utilizes the Box-Tiao (1977) modifications. It is found that the single-equation model of the current account out-performs the system method for the short- term but the positions are reversed for the annual forecast     

Distinctive characteristics of entities with an internal audit department and the association of the quality of such departments with errors*

Abstract. This research identifies those characteristics that could potentially influence a choice to create an internal audit department and tests via discriminant analysis to evaluate whether such attributes significantly distinguish between companies with and without an internal audit department. In addition, qualitative characteristics of such departments are described, as is the association of such traits with errors and the overall control environment. A sample of 260 companies is examined. Companies with internal audit departments are observed to be significantly larger, more highly regulated, more competitive, more profitable, more liquid, more conservative in accounting policies, more competent in their management and accounting personnel, and subject to better management controls. Key discriminant variables are the degree of regulation, decentralization, size, the duration of association with present auditors, the existence of an audit committee, EDP control, and pressures by external parties on management to achieve budgetary goals. Qualitative attributes of internal audit are systematically associated with the overall quality of the control environment, as well as errors. The most important attribute appears to be the independence of internal audit in terms of the propriety of the reporting level. An advantage of internal auditing is that external auditors report a 10 percent reduction in the number of hours incurred and greater flexibility appears to exist in the proportion of work performed in off-peak periods. Résumé. Les auteurs dressent l'inventaire des caractéristiques susceptibles d'influer sur le choix de créer un service de vérification interne et soumettent ces attributs à des tests, par voie d'analyse discriminante, afin de déterminer s'ils permettent d'établir une distinction claire entre les entreprises ayant et n'ayant pas de service de vérification interne. De plus, ils décrivent les caractéristiques qualitatives de ces services, de même que l'association de ces carctéristiques aux erreurs et au contexte global du contrôle. Les auteurs procèdent à l'examen d'un échantillon de 260 entreprises. L'étude révèle que les entreprises possédant des services de vérification interne sont beaucoup plus souvent des entreprises de grande taille, faisant l'objet d'une réglementation plus rigoureuse, plus concurrentielles, plus rentables, ayant davantage de liquidités, plus prudentes dans leurs conventions compatables, possédant une équipe de gestion et un personnel comptable plus compétents et soumises à de meilleurs contrôles de gestion. Les principales variables discriminantes sont le degré de réglementation, la décentralisation, la taille, la durée de l'association avec les vérificateurs actuels, l'existence d'un comité de vérification, le contrôle dans un cadre informatique et les pressions exercées par les tiers sur la direction pour l'atteinte des objectifs budgétaires. Les attributs qualitatifs de la vérification interne sont systématiquement asociés à la qualité globale du cadre de contrôle, de même qu'aux erreurs. L'attribut le plus important semble être le degré d'autonomie du service de vérification interne, c'est-à-dire le caractère approprié de ses liens hiérarchiques. La vérification interne comporte un avantage: les vérificateurs externes font état d'une réduction de 10 pour cent dans le nombre d'heures consacrées à la vérification, et il semble exister une plus grande souplesse dans la proportion du travail de vérification effectué en dehors des périodes de pointe.     

LBOs,Reversions and Implicit Contracts

The conventional view of going-private transactions is that they are designed to enhance the efficiency of the firm (for example, Jensen (1986) ). A starkly different view is that these and other control transactions are motivated to effect transfers from other stakeholders in the firm to equity holders ( Shleifer and Summers (1988) ). This study exploits data describing pension terminations as a way to test these theories. We conclude that the efficiency theory can plausibly explain a substantial number of LBO-related terminations, but not enough to undermine the transfer theory. More specific predictions from the efflciency theory are needed to structure more exacting tests.     

Optimum Taxation of Each Year's Income

In this paper, a two‐type, two‐period model of optimum income taxation is investigated. I assume full commitment and that current income determines the agents' tax burden in each period. It is shown that such a tax system does not allow one to implement the optimal long‐term tax contract and that it implies positive marginal tax rates at the upper end of the income distribution.     

OWNERSHIP VERSUS TIMING OF THE GAME

This study examines the impact of timing of the game on the welfare gains of privatisation in the presence of strategic trade policy. We argue that only if the public enterprise acts as a Cournot player will it generate an additional distortion that could outweigh the distortion caused by the oligopolistic behaviour of private firms. But with a first-mover advantage it can serve as an effective regulatory device comparable with a production subsidy. We further show that, in the presence of strategic trade policy, Cournot assumptions are inconsistent with the firms' preferences over the timing of the game. As public Stackelberg leadership is a subgame Nash equilibrium of the extended game with endogenous order of moves, we conclude that it is the timing of the game rather than firms' ownership structure which is responsible for the inefficiency of an international mixed market found by earlier studies.     

CURRENCY SUBSTITUTION, U.S. MONEY DEMAND, AND INTERNATIONAL INTERDEPENDENCE

A number of writers have argued in recent years that massive international currency substitution has been a major cause of exchange rate volatility and monetary instability in the United States and other major countries. Such analysis is frequently coupled with recommendations for a return to pegged exchange rates. This paper critically examines the evidence presented for this currency substitution view. It argues that the weight of latest research suggests that direct international currency substitution has not been of major quantitative importance for the U.S. However, empirical evidence supports traditional views that international capital mobility can generate substantial short-run monetary interdependence even under flexible exchange rates. Thus, even though international currency substitution is of little importance to U.S. monetary conditions, a broader range of international considerations may be of considerable importance for the U.S. economy.