Entry regulation as a barrier to entrepreneurship

Using a comprehensive database of European firms, we study the effect of market entry regulations on the creation of new limited-liability firms, the average size of entrants, and the growth of incumbent firms. We find that costly regulations hamper the creation of new firms, especially in industries that should naturally have high entry. These regulations also force new entrants to be larger and cause incumbent firms in naturally high-entry industries to grow more slowly. Our results hold even when we correct for the availability of financing, the degree of protection of intellectual property, and labor regulations.     

Aid, Dutch disease, and manufacturing growth

We examine the effects of aid on the growth of manufacturing, using a methodology that exploits the variation within countries and across manufacturing sectors, and corrects for possible reverse causality. We find that aid inflows have systematic adverse effects on a country's competitiveness, as reflected in the lower relative growth rate of exportable industries. We provide some evidence suggesting that the channel for these effects is the real exchange rate appreciation caused by aid inflows. We conjecture that this may explain, in part, why it is hard to find robust evidence that foreign aid helps countries grow.     

WHICH CAPITALISM? LESSONS FORM THE EAST ASIAN CRISIS

As a result of the Asian crisis, relationship-based economic systems are now under attack for corruption and inefficiency. Yet, until recently, they were held up as an alternative (and in some respects superior) form of capitalism to the arm's-length, market-based, Anglo-Saxon systems of the U.S. and the U.K. What went wrong? This paper suggests that relationship-based systems work well when contracts are poorly enforced and capital is scarce. Power relationships substitute for contracts, and can achieve better outcomes than a primitive contractual system. But a relationship-based system suppresses the price system and the signals it provides. As a result, relationship-based systems are likely to misallocate capital when presented with large external capital inflows. Since the external capital comes from arm's length investors who typically have few contractual rights or little power in a relationship system, and since these investors are aware of the potential for misallocation, they rationally choose to maintain control over borrowers by keeping their claims short term. Thus, the contact between the two systems creates a fragile hybrid that, while mutually beneficial to relationship borrowers and arm's length investors in normal times, is excessively prone to shocks. Where do we go from here? The authors suggest that while there may be some short-term benefits for emerging economies from reverting to the pure relationship-based system, in the long run such economies will be held back unless they develop the greater disclosure, contract enforcement, and competition of the arm's-length system. The current Asian crisis may be the most opportune moment for these economies to effect the transition between systems.     

债务减免与经济增长——怎样设计一个最优的债务减免方案

在许多发达国家中，对低收入国家的债务减免已成为一个重要的政治话题。摇滚明星和政治家都不约而同地谈到：贫穷国家在承受着沉重的负担，这些国家不得不把国家收入的大部分用于偿还贷款。糟糕的是，他们指出，许多负债都是“令人讨厌的”，是由过去腐败的独裁者造成的，这些人把钱转移到了自身的瑞士银行账户上。此外，高负债国家倾向于低增长的证据表明债务减免有助于穷国的经济增长。     

Leveraging Information Across Categories

Companies are collecting increasing amounts of information about their customers. This effort is based on the assumption that more information is better and that this information can be leveraged to predict customers' behavior in a variety of situations and product categories. For example, information about a customer's purchase behavior in one category can be helpful in predicting his potential behavior in a related category, which in turn could help a firm in its cross-selling efforts. In this paper, we present a model to better understand and predict a consumer's purchases and preferences when we may have limited or no information about him in one or more product categories. Conceptually this involves leveraging information from purchases of other consumers in multiple categories as well as partial information (e.g., purchase in one of the categories) of the target consumer. Our approach builds on the pioneering work of (Rossi et al. (1996)) who demonstrate the value of purchase information in the context of a single product category. We present results from an extensive simulation as well as an application on scanner panel data. Our simulation shows many interesting and somewhat surprising results. Specifically, we find that compared to a single-category analysis, a cross-category analysis does not lead to any significant improvement in data likelihood in most cases. Therefore, the single-category analysis of (Rossi et al. (1996)) is even more powerful than previously thought. However, we also find that a cross-category analysis does improve parameter recovery in many situations as compared to a single-category analysis. It is in these conditions that retailers can use cross-category information to better implement micro marketing programs. We demonstrate the transfer of information across categories in an application of two grocery products—Breakfast Foods and Table Syrup. In spite of a reasonable correlation (0.21) in the price parameter across these two categories, our simulation guidelines predict very little benefit of cross-category analysis over single-category analysis. Our empirical results confirm this prediction.     

WHY BANKS HAVE A FUTURE: TOWARD A NEW THEORY OF COMMERCIAL BANKING

According to some observers, the commercial bank–an institution that conducts the twin activities of accepting deposits payable on demand and originating loans–has outlived its usefulness and is in a state of terminal decline. The broad statistical evidence for this contention, however, is somewhat mixed. While some studies suggest that the role of banks in the United States is declining, others suggest that banks are simply using new vehicles to offer their services and that their role has not diminished at all. This article takes a different approach to analyzing the future of banks by examining the economic rationale for their past existence and exploring the extent to which this rationale can be expected to hold up in the future. The author begins by explaining why the two core banking activities–taking in deposits payable on demand and originating non-marketable loans–are performed by the same institutions. The explanation turns on the recognition that both activities essentially require the institution to come up with cash on short notice–that is, to provide liquidity. Scale economies in providing liquidity explain why both activities are provided by the same entity. Deregulation and innovation have increased competition in the financial services industry, which has forced banks to concentrate on the essentials of liquidity provision. This is why the outward nature of banks' activities has changed (for example, banks today often sell instead of holding loans, and provide back-up lines for commercial paper instead of originating loans), though not their underlying economic rationale (particularly the credit evaluation and monitoring involved in “relationship” banking). Beneath the surface reality of dramatic changes in financial products and services, the fundamental banking business of liquidity provision is alive and well. Moreover, in the course of performing their traditional activities, banks have acquired competencies that enable them to perform a variety of other financial and nonfinancial activities that deregulation and innovation have opened up to them. As part of their evaluation of these nontraditional activities, bankers must ensure that their organizational structures, controls, and compensation policies are appropriate for the new environment of deregulation and technological change.     

The Contributions of Stewart Myers to the Theory and Practice of Corporate Finance*

In a 40‐plus year career notable for path‐breaking work on capital structure and innovations in capital budgeting and valuation, MIT finance professor Stewart Myers has had a remarkable influence on both the theory and practice of corporate finance. In this article, two of his former students, a colleague, and a co‐author offer a brief survey of Professor Myers's accomplishments, along with an assessment of their relevance for the current financial environment. These contributions are seen as falling into three main categories:

• ? Work on “debt overhang” and the financial “pecking order” that not only provided plausible explanations for much corporate financing behavior, but can also be used to shed light on recent developments, including the reluctance of highly leveraged U.S. financial institutions to raise equity and the recent “mandatory” infusions of capital by the U.S. Treasury.
• ? Contributions to capital budgeting that complement and reinforce his research on capital structure. By providing a simple and intuitive way to capture the tax benefits of debt when capital structure changes over time, his adjusted present value (or APV) approach has not only become the standard in LBO and venture capital firms, but accomplishes in practice what theorists like M&M had urged finance practitioners to do some 30 years earlier: separate the real operating profitability of a company or project from the “second‐order” effects of financing. And his real options valuation method, by recognizing the “option‐like” character of many corporate assets, has provided not only a new way of valuing “growth” assets, but a method and, indeed, a language for bringing together the disciplines of corporate strategy and finance.
• ? Starting with work on estimating fair rates of return for public utilities, he has gone on to develop a cost‐of‐capital and capital allocation framework for insurance companies, as well as a persuasive explanation for why the rate‐setting process for railroads in the U.S. and U.K. has created problems for those industries.

     

The Financial Crisis and the Death (or Hegemony) of Development Economics

Development economics was the study of how to create the plumbing that would allow developing economies to become developed. The financial crisis leads us to question whether industrialized countries have the plumbing problem solved and thus leads us to question whether we need a development economics that is separate from macroeconomics. Indeed, it even leads us to question whether development economics should take as its goal the creation of the institutional plumbing that industrialized countries currently have. The consequence will be a blending of concerns that have been central in developing economies with the standard macro models. The blending can be seen as either the death of development economics or the hegemony of development economics.     

The Squam Lake Report: Fixing the Financial System*

In these excerpts from The Squam Lake Report, fifteen distinguished economists analyze where the global financial system failed, and how such failures might be prevented (or at least their damage better contained) in the future. Although there were many contributing factors to the crisis—including “agency” problems throughout the financial system and a bankruptcy code poorly suited for reorganizing financial firms—at the core of the problem is a potential conflict between the risk-taking proclivity of financial institutions and the interests of the economy at large that must be managed at least in part through more effective regulation. The Squam Lake Report provides a nonpartisan plan to transform the regulation of financial markets in ways designed to limit systemic risk while preserving—to the extent possible and prudent—the economies of scale and scope that justify the existence of today's large financial institutions. To reduce the risks that large banks will fail, the authors call for higher capital requirements based on more effective assessments of the risks of bank assets and liabilities, as well as a new systemic regulator that should be part of the central bank. To reduce the costs of failure when it occurs, the authors propose that banks be required to create “living wills” laying out their plan to sell assets or shut down operations in the event of financial trouble. As part of that plan, regulators are urged to “aggressively encourage” banks to issue “contingent” debt capital securities that convert into equity.