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排序方式: 共有803条查询结果,搜索用时 15 毫秒
1.
Abstract. We investigate the nature of trading and sorting induced by the dynamic price mechanism in a competitive durable good market with adverse selection and exogenous entry of traders over time. The model is a dynamic version of Akerlof (1970) . Identical cohorts of durable goods, whose quality is known only to potential sellers, enter the market over time. We show that there exists a cyclical equilibrium where all goods are traded within a finite number of periods after entry. Market failure is reflected in the length of waiting time before trade. The model also provides an explanation of market fluctuations. JEL classification: D82 A propos des marchés de biens durables quand il y a entrée de nouveaux commerçants et sélection adverse. Les auteurs analysent la nature du commerce et du triage engendrés par le mécanisme dynamique des prix dans un marché concurrentiel de biens durables quand il y a sélection adverse et entrée exogène de nouveaux commerçants dans le temps. Ce modèle est une version dynamique du modèle d’ Akerlof (1970) . Des cohortes identiques de biens durables, dont la qualité est connue seulement des vendeurs potentiels, arrivent sur le marché dans le temps. Il semble qu’il y ait plus de commerce actif que ce qui est prévu par un modèle statique. En particulier, on montre qu’il existe un équilibre cyclique où tous les biens sont transigés à l’intérieur d’un nombre fini de périodes après leur arrivage et que, à chaque phase du cycle, l’éventail de qualité des biens transigés s’accroît. Les commerçants qui transigent des produits de plus haute qualité attendent plus longtemps et l’imperfection du marché se traduit par la longueur de temps d’attente avant la transaction. Le modèle fournit aussi une explication des fluctuations du marché. 相似文献
2.
Entrepreneurship and Unemployment in the UK 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Roy Thurik 《Scottish journal of political economy》2003,50(3):264-290
The influence of industrial structure, more specifically of entrepreneurship, is investigated on the level of unemployment in the UK. The question is to what extent entrepreneurship, i.e., business ownership can reduce the level of unemployment. The alleged differences between the managed and the entrepreneurial economy will be discussed as well as the links between entrepreneurship and unemployment. It will be concluded that the UK is a relative outlier when using a simple model of the relationship between unemployment and the rate of business ownership. The model is calibrated using recent data of some 23 OECD countries. It underestimates the decrease in unemployment in the UK in the period 1982–1990. Some arguments are brought forward why this might be the case. 相似文献
3.
We model a two-period pure exchange economy where a risk averse manager, who has private information regarding future earnings, is required to issue an earnings report to investors at the end of each period. While the manager is prohibited from directly disclosing her private information, she is allowed to bias reported earnings in the first period, subject to GAAP rules that require that a specified proportion of the bias be reversed subsequently. We show there is a minimum threshold of reversal, such that, when the proportion of required reversal is above this threshold, the manager smooths income and communicates her private information through reported earnings. Consequently, the market attaches greater weight to reported earnings than under a regime that allows no discretion. When the required reversal is below the minimum threshold, the manager increases reported earnings without limit and the equilibrium degenerates. When the manager is not endowed with any private information, the market unravels the "true" earnings and price is unaffected by earnings management. Our results underscore the importance of both allowing and restricting reporting discretion through formal mechanisms. 相似文献
4.
The ability to forecast market share remains a challenge for many managers especially in dynamic markets, such as the telecommunications sector. In order to accommodate the unique dynamic characteristics of the telecommunications market, we use a multi-component model, called MSHARE. Our method involves a two-phase process. The first phase consists of three components: a projection method, a ring down survey methodology and a purchase intentions survey. The predictions from these components are combined to forecast category sales for the wireless subscribers market. In the second phase, market shares for the various brands are generated using the forecast of the number of subscribers that are obtained in Phase 1 and the share predictions from the ring down methodology. The proposed methodology produces the minimum Relative Absolute Error for each market as compared to the forecasts from each individual component in the first phase. The value of the proposed model is illustrated by its application to a real world scenario. The managerial implications of the proposed model are also discussed. 相似文献
5.
6.
The quality and effectiveness of marketing strategy: Effects of functional and dysfunctional conflict in intraorganizational relationships 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Anil Menon Sundar G. Bharadwaj Roy Howell 《Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science》1996,24(4):299-313
By examining only dysfunctional conflict and ignoring functional conflict, empirical research in marketing has presented only
part of the story. This research offers the first systematic look at the antecedents and consequences of both functionaland dysfunctional conflict in intraorganiational relationships. The authors develop and empirically test a causal model for key
organizational antecedents of new product strategy quality and market performance. They find that dysfunctional conflict in
the decision-making process has deleterious consequences for quality of strategy and market performance, whereas functional
conflict improves both quality of strategy and performance. Specifically, organizational design characteristics such as formalization,
interdepartmental interconnectedness, low communication barriers, and team spirit improve new product performance by enhancing
functional conflict, whereas centralization and high communication barriers lower new product performance by increasing dysfunctional
conflict. A post hoc test for common method bias or variance suggests that bias or variance alone cannot explain these findings.
His general research interests focus on strategic issues relating to internal relationships, market learning, and organizational
context of marketing strategy. His research has been published in theJournal of Marketing, Journal of Business Research, Journal of Advertising Research, Journal of Advertising, andJournal of Services Marketing, among others.
His general research interests focus on strategic issues relating to relationship marketing, firm performance, sustainable
competitive advantage, timing of market entry, and information technology. His past research has been published in theJournal of Marketing, Journal of Business Research, Journal of Services Marketing, andMarketing Education Review, among others.
His research interests are in the areas of marketing research methods, structural equations modeling, cellular automata theories
and methods, and Taoist methodologies for marketing strategy. His research has been published in theJournal of Marketing, Journal of Marketing Research, andJournal of the Academy of Marketing Science, among others. 相似文献
7.
8.
This paper is an expository introduction to several topics of current research in the general equilibrium theory of rational expectations. More specifically, we discuss the existence of exact and approximate rational expectations equilibria, the implementation of equilibria, the behavior of learning and smoothing processes by which traders construct expectations from repeated observations of the market, and the lagged use of the information revealed by prices in an intertemporal sequence of markets. The purpose of this discussion is to introduce papers on these topics appearing in the Journal of Economic Theory Symposium on Rational Expectations in Microeconomic Models. 相似文献
9.
Abstract . An empirical analysis of the property crimes, robbery, burglary and larceny, is presented for all 120 counties in Kentucky. While this analysis is based on an economic model of crime, certain sociological and legal variables are included as well in the system of equations. Overall, the empirical results support prior studies’findings with the exception that a quadratic relationship is found to exist between urbanization and each of the property crimes. Furthermore, neither the economic nor the non economic influences measured appear more important for affecting crime rates. Specifically, results indicate that the level of poverty, the degree of tourism, the presence of police, the unemployment rate and the apprehension rate all affect property crimes. In contrast, the length of sentence, the degree of industrialization, the level of public assistance payments and the proportion of youth in the county have no affect on property crime rates in these areas. 相似文献
10.
Prabal Roy Chowdhury 《Economic Theory》2002,19(4):811-822
Summary. We consider a Bertrand duopoly model with increasing returns to scale where one of the firms have a cost advantage and prices
vary over a grid. We find that typically more than one equilibria exist. However, there are only two perfect equilibria. Moreover,
as the size of the grid becomes small, both these equilibria converge to the limit-pricing outcome.
Received: February 25, 2000; revised version: January 9, 2001 相似文献