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1.
Behavioral conformity in games with many players 总被引:3,自引:1,他引:2
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Gottfried Haber Reinhard Neck Warwick J. McKibbin 《International Advances in Economic Research》2006,12(1):1-15
In this paper, we analyze the reactions of European economies to a fiscal policy strategy aiming at diminishing the public sector. Within the framework of the MSG3 model, a macroeconomic model of the world economy, we perform several simulation experiments to explore the effects of reducing government expenditures permanently in different phases of the business cycle. For this purpose, we combine the fiscal contraction with negative and positive, Euro Area-wide and global, supply and demand shocks. It turns out that adverse Keynesian effects on output and employment tend to be mostly weak and short-lived, whereas long-run effects on output and employment are favorable. Due to these long-run effects, the fiscal contraction policy raises welfare as measured by an asymmetric quadratic objective function. The size of these welfare effects depends on the initial situation in a non-trivial manner. 相似文献
4.
Ass. Dr. Reinhard Neck 《Journal of Economics》1976,36(1-2):121-151
Ohne ZusammenfassungFür Anregungen und Unterstützung danke ich besonders den Herren Professoren Abele (Universität Freiburg/Schweiz), Tintner (TU Wien), Aoki (Universität Urbana/Illinois, USA) und Ferschl (Universität Wien); für allenfalls verbleibende Irrtümer bleibe ich selbst verantwortlich. 相似文献
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We develop a dynamic game model of a two-country monetary union to study strategic interactions between macroeconomic policy
makers, namely the central bank and governments. In this union, the governments of participating countries pursue national
goals when deciding on fiscal policies, whereas the common central bank’s monetary policy aims at union-wide objective variables.
The union considered is asymmetric, consisting of a core, with lower initial public debt, and a periphery, with higher initial
public debt. For a symmetric demand shock, we derive numerical solutions of the dynamic game between the governments and the
central bank using the OPTGAME algorithm. We show that mildly active cooperative countercyclical policies dominate noncooperative
solutions and a scenario of no policy intervention. Optimal policies call for a brief expansionary action to bolster the effects
on output and a return to a small fiscal primary surplus as soon as the crisis is over until the targeted level of public
debt is reached. 相似文献
7.
In this paper, we study different and, in particular, “optimal” reactions of fiscal (and to some extent monetary) policies
to the financial and economic crisis of 2007–2009 in Slovenia, a small open economy that is part of the Economic and Monetary
Union (EMU). Using an econometric model of the Slovenian economy, we simulate the effects of the global crisis under the assumption
of no-policy reactions, i.e. assuming that macroeconomic policies are conducted without attempting to deal with the effects
of the crisis. Next, we study the possibilities of fiscal policy reducing or even annihilating the effects of the crisis.
We also investigate the optimal reaction of fiscal policies based on the assumption that Slovenian policy-makers behave as
though they were optimizing an objective function. We show that optimal policies call for only a very modestly active countercyclical
role of fiscal policies. There are strong trade-offs between countercyclical fiscal policies and the requirements of fiscal
solvency. 相似文献
8.
Robin Pope Reinhard Selten Johannes Kaiser Sebastian Kube Jürgen von Hagen 《International Economics and Economic Policy》2012,9(1):13-51
Economists’ faith that variable exchange rates benevolently equilibrate has been empirically disconfirmed. That faith is here tackled at its theoretical core with an exchange rate model that although ultra abstract, includes the undeniable fundamentals of market power and differential goals of central bankers and large-scale private players. It permits a game theoretic analysis under the assumption that all agents maximize their payoffs. The paper then relaxes
the assumption of maximising agents, allowing for a more complex and thus realistic second version of the model that is interpretable
within SKAT, the Stages of Knowledge Ahead Theory of risk and uncertainty. In an experimental setting, this second version
of the model points to: a) the inability of agents in central banks, governments and the private real and financial sectors
to operate in maximising ways; b) destructive central bank conflict; and c) the widely discrepant outcomes arising from the
dynamics of individual personality differences. The paper’s theoretical and empirical findings thus both point to the merits
of a single world currency. 相似文献
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