Confounding and collinearity in regression analysis: a cautionary tale and an alternative procedure,illustrated by studies of British voting behaviour

Quality & Quantity - Many ecological- and individual-level analyses of voting behaviour use multiple regressions with a considerable number of independent variables but few discussions of their...     

Capital gains lock-in and governance choices

Differences in accrued gains and investors’ tax-sensitivity induce variation in a capital gains lock-in effect across mutual funds even for the same stock at the same time. Exploiting this variation, we show this effect influences funds’ governance decisions: higher capital gains decrease the likelihood a fund exits prior to contentious votes and increase the likelihood a fund votes against management. Consistent with tax motivation, these findings are concentrated among funds with tax-sensitive investors. Further, high aggregate capital gains across funds holding a stock predict a higher likelihood management loses a vote and a lower likelihood a contentious vote is proposed.     

Risk-Adjusted Discount Rates and Projects of Unequal Lives

When evaluating mutually exclusive projects of unequal lives and with differing risk, standard approaches such as the constant chain of replacement, lowest common multiple and equivalent annual value techniques are usually applied. In using these techniques to rank projects, a critical issue is the manner in which uncertainty in the cashflows is resolved through time. We explore the applicability of net present value techniques to the problem of valuing assets with unequal lives, emphasising the use of equivalent annual value and lowest common multiple methods, and the correct choice of discount rate. Our results have direct application to practical capital budgeting problems such as choosing the optimum lifespan for a single asset, choosing between assets with different lifespans, and deciding whether to "run an asset for another year".     

Love or Money? The Effects of Owner Motivation in the California Wine Industry

Models that assume only consumer tastes determine the characteristics of supply are restrictive; producers can gain utility from aspects of production and pay for deviating from demand by accepting lower financial returns. We model and measure motivations of California winery owners, and analyze their effects on quality and price. We find utility–maximizers are more likely to produce high quality and set higher quality–adjusted prices. Profit–oriented owners are less likely to produce high quality wines. These results suggest that the presence of hobbyists who enjoy producing high quality may lower financial returns in the segment and discourage profit–maximizers from locating there.     

Are the Best Small Companies the Best Investments?

Previous research finds that large companies previously judged to be excellent growth companies have subsequently been poor investments. We examine small companies selected by Business Week on the basis of multiple criteria used in annual articles featuring highly rated growth companies. We study the investment performance over the three years before eleven annual Business Week publications and the three years after publication. We find positive excess returns in the pre‐publication period, but negative excess returns in the post‐publication period. This reversal in investment performance appears to be due to a mean‐reversion tendency in operating performance, in which the earnings and the past rates of return on capital of such companies subsequently decrease significantly.     

The Incredible Economics of Geoengineering

The focus of climate policy so far has been on reducing the accumulation of greenhouse gases. That approach, however, requires broad international cooperation and, being expensive, has been hindered by free riding; so far, little action has been taken. An alternative approach is to counteract climate change by reducing the amount of solar radiation that strikes the Earth—“geoengineering.” In contrast to emission reductions, this approach is inexpensive and can be undertaken by a single country, unilaterally. But geoengineering also has worrying consequences: it may harm some countries; it would not address ocean acidification; it would pose new risks. The fundamental challenge posed by this new technology is not free riding but governance: who should decide if and under what circumstances geoengineering should be used?     

Technological innovation and real investment booms and busts

We investigate why new, high-risk technologies can attract excessive and often unprofitable investment. We develop an equilibrium model in which rational, risk-averse agents overinvest in a risky technology, possibly to the point that its expected return is negative. Overinvestment results from relative wealth concerns which arise endogenously from the imperfect tradability of future endowments. Competition over future consumption leads to an indirect utility for wealth with “keeping up with the Joneses” properties that can induce herding. Because overinvestment increases with the risk of the technology, our model can explain why new, risky technological innovations may promote investment bubbles.     

Managing Price Risk in the Pakistan Wheat Market

The government intervenes in the wheat market in Pakistan toensure food security for consumers and to provide adequate andstable incomes for producers. The cost of this interventionis high, and its impact on the performance of agriculture hasbeen significantly negative. The World Bank is urging policychanges such as removing agricultural trade restrictions, pricesupports, and subsidies. However, policymakers often resistsuch reforms, fearing that they will expose the domestic marketto fluctuating international commodity prices. This article assesses the risk management needs of the sectorand evaluates whether using financial instruments—suchas commodity hedging using futures, options, or swaps—wouldimprove risk management. Simulations based on monthly data for1994 show that market-based methods of risk management couldreduce the impact of international price volatility on the domesticmarket without incurring high government cost or distortingprice signals.