OBSERVABLE MANAGERIAL INCENTIVES AND SPATIAL COMPETITION

In this paper we investigate the relationship between product market competition and managerial incentives within a circular city model with observable agency contracts. With respect to the case of unobservability studied by Raith (2003 ), we find that optimal managerial contracts provide lower incentives, and that equilibrium expected prices and profits are higher. Changes in competition fundamentals have ambiguous effects, but observable contracts alleviate their impact on incentives. Finally, observability involves three major implications: managerial incentives are higher under price regulation than under competition; prices may increase with the number of firms; consumer welfare may diminish when competition increases.     

Firms' efficiency and global value chains: An empirical investigation on Italian industry

This paper investigates the effect of participation in global value chains (GVCs) on firms' efficiency and explores heterogeneity in this impact across different firms, according to GVC governance, positioning in the chain and time length of participation. Our analysis takes advantage of survey data providing information on involvement in GVCs for a large set of Italian industrial SMEs between 2008 and 2012. We employ Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) to retrieve a measure of firms' technical efficiency (i.e., DEA efficiency scores) and estimate the impact of involvement in GVCs on firms' efficiency through propensity-score matching techniques and truncated regression. Our results show that participation in GVCs induces significant efficiency premia, especially for suppliers, with stronger effects in the case of relational modes of participation.     

Is green the new gold? Venture capital and green entrepreneurship

Small Business Economics - We test whether born-to-be-green represents a signal toward potential venture capital (VC) investors on a sample of Italian, independent, unlisted, high-tech...     

Does skilled migration reduce investment in human capital? An investigation on educational choices in Italian regions (2001–2016)

This paper investigates the effects of prospective migration on students’ investment in tertiary education. A simple theoretical model is presented in which individual educational choices, different across potential students because of heterogeneity in migration costs, are driven by expected returns and costs of tertiary education. In this framework, a larger probability of after-graduation migration is shown to affect educational choices by both reducing the rate of enrollment at home and favoring pre-graduation migration (i.e., enrollment at universities outside the residence region). The theoretical predictions are confirmed by the empirical investigation carried out on Italian interregional graduate migration in 2001–2016. In the lagging regions of Southern Italy, out-migration of students and graduates, and weak incentives to acquire tertiary education turn out to bring about depletion of local human capital.     

Optimal consumption and the environment Choosing between ‘clean’ and ‘dirty’ goods

In this paper, a model with heterogeneous consumption goods is presented. Consumers are assumed to choose between two different consumption goods, characterized by a different impact on the environment. This implies that, in a decentralized economy, government can sustain the social optimum by setting two Pigouvian taxes: one on production as a whole and the other on dirty consumption acting as an incentive in favour of clean consumption. In accordance with the previous literature, a trade-off between a clean environment and economic activity evolves. However, this trade-off is now mitigated by the additional taxation on polluting consumption which allows the control of pollution stock evolution through the substitution between clean and dirty commodities.     

Investigating the Influence of Technology Inflows on Technology Outflows in Open Innovation Processes: A Longitudinal Analysis

The open innovation (OI) paradigm emphasizes the importance of integrating inbound and outbound flows of technology to increase a firm's innovation performance. While the synergies between technology inflows and outflows have been discussed in conceptual OI articles, the majority of empirical studies have typically focused on either the inward or the outward dimension of OI. According to recent reviews of OI literature, there is a need for further research that takes an integrated perspective on this topic and studies the combination of the inbound and outbound dimensions of OI. This paper follows these calls by focusing on technology licensing as the main contractual form for OI, and by investigating the relationship between technology in‐licensing and out‐licensing activities at the firm level of analysis. In particular, this paper argues that technology in‐licensing positively influences the volume of technology out‐licensing through two mechanisms. The first—resource‐based—occurs because in‐licensing investments expand and enrich the firm's technology base, thus increasing its value and, as a result, creating more opportunities for out‐licensing. The second—capabilities‐based—occurs because, due to commonalities between technology in‐licensing and out‐licensing in terms of performed tasks and required skills, repeated execution of in‐licensing transactions contributes to the development of higher out‐licensing capabilities and, as a result, increase out‐licensing volume. These arguments are tested using a panel dataset of 837 Spanish manufacturing firms over the period 1998–2007. Consistent with the predictions, the empirical analysis shows that higher investments in in‐licensing and more extensive in‐licensing experience lead to superior volumes of technology out‐licensing. These results contribute to research on OI and licensing, by empirically showing the existence of positive interactions between technology inflows and outflows and of synergies in the development of absorptive and desorptive capacities.