COVID-19 and business renewal: Lessons and insights from the global airline industry

The emergence of the COVID-19 pandemic has adversely affected the fortunes of multiple companies around the globe. Accordingly, questions are increasingly being asked about how organizations can revitalize during and after a crisis. Yet, we have limited understanding of how organizations renew themselves during crises over time. We explore this question through the lens and examination of two South-Asian airlines: Pakistan International Airlines and Sri Lankan Airlines. The cases offer important insights into the reasons behind underperformance of state-controlled enterprises and renewal activities. We shed light on strategic renewal (SR) in the wake of increasing liberalization and deregulations in the global airline industry. To this end, we propose a four-stage approach towards renewing such underperforming organizations to respond effectively to black swan events and external shocks.     

The Price of Options Illiquidity

The purpose of this paper is to examine the effect of illiquidity on the value of currency options. We use a unique dataset that allows us to explore this issue in special circumstances where options are issued by a central bank and are not traded prior to maturity. The value of these options is compared to similar options traded on the exchange. We find that the nontradable options are priced about 21 percent less than the exchange-traded options. This gap cannot be arbitraged away due to transactions costs and the risk that the exchange rate will change during the bidding process.     

On the topological social choice model

The main goal of this paper is to show that if a finite connected CW complex admits a continuous, symmetric, and unanimous choice function for some number n>1 of agents, then the choice space is contractible. On the other hand, if one removes the finiteness, we give a complete characterization of the possible spaces; in particular, noncontractible spaces are indeed possible. These results extend earlier well-known results of Chichilnisky and Heal.     

Competition in taxes and performance requirements for foreign direct investment

Tax incentives offered to attract firms engaged in foreign direct investment are often tied to performance requirements such as domestic content restrictions or adherence to environmental standards. The tax competition literature has repeatedly shown that competition between municipalities for mobile firms tends to drive taxes to low levels. One would expect a comparable result for burdensome performance requirements. Despite this, the evidence suggests that while taxes have indeed been driven down, performance requirements are as popular as ever. We explain this seeming conundrum by showing that in the presence of spillovers, binding performance requirements can act as a coordination device for firms. In equilibrium, municipalities choose performance requirements, which maximize joint surplus from investment. Competition between municipalities then transfers this surplus to firms via tax subsidies.     

Strategic restraint in contests

Economic policy is modelled as the outcome of a (political) game between two interest groups. The possible ex-post (realized) outcomes in the game correspond to the proposed policies. In the literature policy proposals are exogenous. We extend such games by allowing the endogenous determination of the proposed policies. In a first stage the groups decide which policy to lobby for and then, in a second stage, engage in a contest over the proposed policies. Our main result is that competition over endogenously determined policies induces strategic restraint that reduces polarization and, in turn, wasteful lobbying activities.     

The Borda rule,Condorcet consistency and Condorcet stability

Summary. The Borda rule is known to be the least vulnerable scoring rule to Condorcet inconsistency, Saari (2000). Such inconsistency occurs when the Condorcet winner (the alternative which is preferred to any other alternative by a simple majority) is not selected by the Borda rule. This note exposes the relationship between the Borda rule and the Condorcet q-majority principle as well as the Condorcet q-majority voting rule. The main result establishes that the Borda rule is Condorcet q-majority consistent when where k is the number of alternatives. The second result establishes that is the minimal degree of majority decisiveness corresponding to the Borda rule under sincere voting. The same majority is required to ensure decisiveness under the Borda rule and to ensure that a q-rule (the generalized q-majority Condorcet rule) is a voting rule. Received: April 8, 2002; revised version: July 17, 2002 Correspondence to:S. Nitzan     

Diverse approaches to managing diversity

Against a backdrop of philosophical and political debate, this article reviews the emerging pitfalls of new corporate diversity programs. Three pioneering corporate programs are examined closely, and a discussion of the purpose, the process, and the impact of these programs is offered. Original survey data reported here suggest that exposure to diversity issues affects workplace attitudes. Lessons are drawn that address the role of top leadership, participant mix, instructor quality, and corporate culture.     

Two-settlement Systems for Electricity Markets under Network Uncertainty and Market Power

We analyze welfare and distributional properties of a two-settlement system consisting of a spot market over a two-node network and a single energy forward contract. We formulate and analyze several models which simulate joint dispatch of energy and transmission resources coordinated by a system operator. The spot market is subject to network uncertainty, which we model as a random capacity derating of an important transmission line. Using a duopoly model, we show that even for small probabilities of congestion (derating), forward trading may be substantially reduced, and the market power mitigating effect of forward markets (as shown in Allaz and Vila 1993) may be nullified to a great extent. There is a spot transmission charge reflecting transportation costs from location of generation to a designated hub whose price is the underlying for the forward contract. This alleviates some of the incentive problems associated with the forward market in which spot-market trading is residual. We find that the reduction in forward trading is due to the segregation of the markets in the constrained state, and the absence of natural incentives for generators to commit to more aggressive behavior in the spot market (the strategic substitutes effect). In our analysis, we find that the standard assumption of no-arbitrage across forward and spot markets leads to very little contract coverage, even for the case with no congestion. We present an alternative view of the market where limited intertemporal arbitrage enables temporal price discrimination by competing duopolists. In this framework, we assume that all of the demand shows up in the forward market (or that the market is cleared against an accurate forecast of the demand), and the forward price is determined using a market clearing condition.     

Priority Network Access Pricing for Electric Power

We propose a priority-pricing scheme for zonal access to the electric power grid that is uniform across all buses in a zone. The independent system operator (ISO) charges bulk power traders a per unit ex ante transmission access fee. The zonal access fee serves as an access insurance premium that entitles a bulk power trader to either physical injection of one unit of energy or a compensation payment. The access fee per MWh depends on the injection zone and a self-selected strike price that serves as an insurance deductible that determines the scheduling priority of the insured transaction and the compensation level in case of curtailment. Inter-zonal transactions are charged (or credited) with an additional ex post congestion fee equal to the differences in zonal spot prices. The compensation for curtailed transactions equals the difference between the realized zonal spot price and the selected strike price (deductible level). The ISO manages congestion so as to minimize net compensation payments and thus, curtailment probabilities increase with strike price and for any particular strike price may vary from bus to bus. We calculate the rational expectations equilibrium for three-, four- and six-node systems and demonstrate that the efficiency losses of the proposed second best scheme relative to the efficient dispatch solutions are modest.