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Pedestrian and cyclist injuries are significant public health issues, together accounting for 11-30% of road deaths in highly motorised countries. Children are particularly at risk. In Australia in 2009 11.4% of pedestrian deaths and 6.4% of cyclist deaths comprised children aged 0-16 years. Parental attitudes and level of supervision are important to children's road safety. Results from a telephone survey with parents of children 5-9 years (N?=?147) are reported. Questions addressed beliefs about preventability of injury, appropriate ages for children to cross the road or cycle independently and the frequency of holding 5-9 year old children's hands while crossing the road. Results suggest that parents believe most injuries are preventable and that they personally can act to improve their own safety in the home, on the road, at work, as well as in or on the water. Most parents (68%) indicated children should be 10 years or older before crossing the road or cycling independently. Parents were more likely to report holding younger children's hands (5-6 years) when crossing the road and less likely to do so for 7- to 9-year olds. There was a small effect of child gender, with parents more likely to hold a boy's hand than that of a girl.  相似文献   
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The role of risk in contract choice   总被引:3,自引:0,他引:3  
Structuring contracts to share risk in light of incentive problemsis the central premise of contract theory, yet the risk-sharingimplications have rarely been thoroughly tested using micro-levelcontract data. In this article we test the major implicationsof a principal-agent model of contracts using detailed dataon more than 4000 individual contracts from modern North Americanagriculture. On a case-by-case basis, our evidence fails tosupport the standard principal-agent model with risk aversionas an explanation of contract choice in modern North Americanfarming. At the same time, we find some support for models thatassume risk-neutral contracting parties and stress multiplemargins for moral hazard and enforcement costs.  相似文献   
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