Overreaction to Fearsome Risks

When risks threaten, cognitive mechanisms bias people toward action or inaction. Fearsome risks are highly available. The availability bias tells us that this leads people to overestimate their frequency. Therefore, they also overreact to curtail the likelihood or consequences of such risks. More generally, fear can paralyze efforts to think clearly about risks. We draw on a range of environmental risks to show the following: (1) Fear leads us to neglect probability of occurrence; (2) As fearsome environmental risks are usually imposed by others (as externalities), indignation stirs excess reaction; (3) We often misperceive or miscalculate such risks. Two experiments demonstrate probability neglect when fearsome risks arise: (a) willingness-to-pay to eliminate the cancer risk from arsenic in water (described in vivid terms) did not vary despite a 10-fold variation in risk; (b) the willingness-to-accept price for a painful but non dangerous electric shock did not vary between a 1 and 100% chance. Possible explanations relate to the role of the amygdala in impairing cognitive brain function. Government and the law, both made by mortals and both responding to public pressures, similarly neglect probabilities for fearsome risks. Examples relating to shark attacks, Love Canal, alar and terrorism are discussed.     

Constitutionalism,prosperity, democracy: Transition in Eastern Europe

Eastern Europe is now undergoing three distinct transitions: to markets, to democracy, and to constitutionalism. Under current conditions, the transition to constitutionalism is a logical precondition for the transitions to markets and democracy. To protect both of these, it is especially necessary to develop an “economic bill of rights” for inclusion in the new constitutions. This bill of rights should include the rule of law, protection of private property, freedom of contract, occupational liberty, the right to travel within and without the nation, and a prohibition on government monopolies; other similar provisions should be considered as well. The new constitutions should not include general aspirations, duties, or positive rights. The eventual development of an economic bill of rights—a precommitment strategy designed to promote prosperity and democracy—could constitute a new and important contribution to the theory and practice of constitutionalism. In light of the rapid changes in Eastern European constitutional affairs it should be noted that the final draft of this paper dates from August 1991. Karl N. Llewellyn Professor of Jurisprudence, Law School and Department of Political Science, University of Chicago; Co-Director, Center on Constitutionalism in Eastern Europe, University of Chicago. I am grateful to Jon Elster and Stephen Holmes for valuable discussion, and to Richard A. Epstein and Stephen Holmes for helpful comments on a previous draft.     

“Better off,as judged by themselves”: a comment on evaluating nudges

Many nudges are designed to make people better off, as judged by themselves. This criterion, meant to ensure that nudges will increase people’s welfare, contains some ambiguity. It is useful to distinguish among three categories of cases: (1) those in which choosers have clear antecedent preferences, and nudges help them to satisfy those preferences (often by increasing “navigability”); (2) those in which choosers face a self-control problem, and nudges help them to overcome that problem; and (3) those in which choosers would be content with the outcomes produced by two or more nudges, or in which ex post preferences are endogenous to nudges, so that without additional clarification or work, the “as judged by themselves” criterion does not identify a unique solution for choice architects. Category (1) is self-evidently large. Because many people agree that they suffer self-control problems, category (2) is large as well. Cases that fall in category (3) create special challenges, which may lead us to make direct inquiries into welfare or to explore what informed, active choosers typically select.     

Correction to: Nudging: a very short guide

Business Economics - The author would like to add the following acknowledgement to his article: an earlier version of this essay was originally published in the Journal of Consumer Policy, 37...     

Nudging: a very short guide

Business Economics - This brief essay offers a general introduction to the idea of nudging, along with a list of ten of the most important “nudges.” It also provides a short discussion...     

Nudging: A Very Short Guide

This brief essay offers a general introduction to the idea of nudging, along with a list of 10 of the most important “nudges.” It also provides a short discussion of the question whether to create some kind of separate “behavioral insights unit,” capable of conducting its own research, or instead to rely on existing institutions.