A MODEL OF BUREAUCRACY AND CORRUPTION*

We analyze bureaucracy and corruption in a market with decentralized exchange and “lemons.” Exchange is modeled as a sequence of bilateral, random matches. Agents have private information about the quality of goods they produce and can supplement trade with socially inefficient bribes. Bureaucracy is modeled as a group of agents who enjoy centralized production and consumption. Transaction patterns between the bureaucracy and the private sector are fully endogenous. Centralized production and consumption in the bureaucracy give rise to low power incentives for the individual bureaucrats. As a result, private agents might bribe bureaucrats, whereas they do not bribe each other. An equilibrium with corruption and an equilibrium without corruption can coexist. We discuss some welfare implications of the model.     

LIQUIDITY,MONEY CREATION AND DESTRUCTION,AND THE RETURNS TO BANKING*

We build on our earlier model of money in which bank liabilities circulate as a medium of exchange. We investigate optimal bank behavior and the resulting provision of liquidity under a range of central bank regulations. In our model, banks issue inside money under fractional reserves, facing the possibility of excess redemptions. Banks consider the float resulting from money creation and make reserve‐management decisions that affect aggregate liquidity conditions. Numerical examples demonstrate positive bank failure rates when returns to banking are low. Central bank interventions may improve banks' returns and welfare through a reduction in bank failure.     

Capitalization versus Expensing: Evidence on the Uncertainty of Future Earnings from Capital Expenditures versus R&D Outlays

We propose and implement a new method to estimate the relation between R&D investments and the uncertainty of future benefits from those investments. The empirical analysis compares the relative contributions of current investments in R&D and PP&E to future earnings variability using a sample of roughly 50,000 firm-year observations from 1972–1997. Evidence is strongly consistent with the hypothesis that R&D investments generate future benefits that are far more uncertain than benefits from investments in PP&E. Our results should help the current discussion on accounting for R&D and the methodology might be helpful in standard setting in other contexts as well.     

The Effect of the Hedge Horizon on Optimal Hedge Size and Effectiveness When Prices are Cointegrated

This study compares two alternative regression specifications for sizing hedge positions and measuring hedge effectiveness: a simple regression on price changes and an error correction model (ECM). We show that, when the prices of the hedged item and the hedging instrument are cointegrated, both specifications yield similar results which depend on the hedge horizon (i.e., the time frame for measuring price changes). In particular, the estimated hedge ratio and regression R² will both be small when price changes are measured over short intervals, but as the hedge horizon is lengthened both measures will converge toward one. These results imply that, when prices are cointegrated, a longer hedge horizon will yield an optimal hedge ratio closer to one, while at the same time enhancing the ability to qualify for hedge accounting. © 2011 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Jrl Fut Mark 32:837–876, 2012     

Overcoming Contemporary Mythology: An Essay

Over the last 35 years, a free market, laissez faire program has increasingly dominated perceptions as to what constitutes correct economic theory and policy. Most adherents of this program trace its origins to Adam Smith, and claim that its dominant position is the result of superior theory.

The argument here is that Adam Smith is not the theoretical ancestor of modern laissez faire economics, and that there are fundamental differences between Smith’s position on laissez faire and that of conventional neoclassical theory. A difference between “soft” and “hard” laissez faire is made, where Smith represents the former position; neoclassical theory the latter. Further, and more important, it is argued that the current laissez faire program is an outgrowth of a political program instituted in the 1930’s and financially supported in the present era by conservative foundations to promote an ideological framework that permits the development of specific governmental (and non-governmental) actions.     

Airline hubs in the Single European Market: A benchmark analysis

‘Liberalization’ of European air markets could allow the formation of airline hubs to obtain the associated economies of scope and scale. This study simulates the formation of these hubs. A model of U.S. hub location, estimated as a function of demographic and economic characteristics, is applied to European cities to identify likely hub locations. The results provide a benchmark for evaluating future airline competition in the Single European Market. However, the study is only an approximate prediction of hub location because political and structural constraints will keep the European air market from developing the competitive atmosphere found in the U.S..     

Government Deposit Insurance and the Diamond-Dybvig Model

The apparent banking market failure modeled by Diamond and Dybvig [1983] rests on their inconsistently applying their sequential servicing constraint to private banks but not to their government deposit insurance agency. Without this inconsistency, banks can provide optimal risk-sharing without tax-based deposit insurance, even when the number of type 1 agents is stochastic, by employing a contingent bonus contract. The threat of disintermediation noted by Jacklin [1987] in the nonstochastic case is still present but can be blocked by contractual trading restrictions. This article complements Wallace [1988], who considers an alternative resolution of this inconsistency.