Spatial Models in Marketing

Marketing science models typically assume that responses of one entity (firm or consumer) are unrelated to responses of other entities. In contrast, models constructed using tools from spatial statistics allow for cross-sectional and longitudinal correlations among responses to be explicitly modeled by locating entities on some type of map. By generalizing the notion of a map to include demographic and psychometric representations, spatial models can capture a variety of effects (spatial lags, spatial autocorrelation, and spatial drift) that impact firm or consumer decision behavior. Marketing science applications of spatial models and important research opportunities are discussed. This paper is based upon the discussions of the Spatial Models in Marketing seminar at the Sixth Invitational Choice Symposium, June 2004. Eric T. Bradlow, Bart Bronnenberg and Gary J. Russell served as co-chairs of the session.     

Discrete choice models of firms’ strategic decisions

This paper outlines the methods and applications related to the nascent area of empirical discrete games in marketing. Many key strategic decisions firms make involve discrete choices such as deciding the location of a new store, determining where in product space to position a product, or what options to offer in a service contract. These decisions are fairly complex and typically involve the consideration of a number of demand, cost, and competitive factors. What makes these discrete choices particularly interesting (and challenging to analyze) is that they are interrelated with the choices of other firms because firms take into account the actions of their competitors when making their own decisions. We describe the basic problem of dealing with interrelated discrete choices in a game-theoretic framework and present the various estimation methods available. A discussion of the existing applications and future research opportunities concludes the article.     

Memory and Anticipation

The introduction of memory imperfections into models of economic decision making creates a natural role for anticipatory emotions. Their combination has striking behavioural implications. The paper first shows that agents can rationally select apparently dominated strategies. We consider Newcomb's Paradox and the Prisoners' Dilemma. We provide a resolution for Newcomb's Paradox and argue it requires the decision maker to ascribe only a tiny weight to anticipatory emotions. For some ranges of parameters, it is possible to obtain cooperation in the Prisoners' Dilemma with probability arbitrarily close to unity. The second half of the paper provides a theory of reminders.     

A reflection on analytical work in marketing: Three points of consensus

This article presents three points of consensus about game-theoretic work in marketing: First, equilibrium analysis is necessary for studying situations that have strategic interactions. In many cases, empirical examination of these strategic scenarios is difficult or impossible, at least without the guidance of an equilibrium model. Second, more general models are not necessarily ??better,?? because institutional details matter. Thus, the appropriate compromise between generality and specificity depends on the scope of the research question. Finally, there should be a two-way road between theory and empirics??theory is necessary to interpret empirical results, while empirical findings should guide theoretical modeling choices.     

Structural Applications of the Discrete Choice Model

A growing body of empirical literature uses structurally-derived economic models to study the nature of competition and to measure explicitly the economic impact of strategic policies. While several approaches have been proposed, the discrete choice demand system has experienced wide usage. The heterogeneous, or mixed, logit in particular has been widely applied due to its parsimonious structure and its ability to capture flexibly substitution patterns for a large number of differentiated products.We outline the derivation of the heterogeneous logit demand system. We then present a number of applications of such models to various data sources. Finally, we conclude with a discussion of directions for future research in this area.     

Competition and price discrimination in the market for mailing lists

This paper examines whether mailing list sellers, when faced with additional competitors, are more likely to try to segment consumers by offering additional choices at different prices (second-degree price discrimination) and/or offering different prices to readily identifiable groups of consumers (third-degree price discrimination). We utilize a dataset that includes information about all consumer response lists derived from mail order buyers (i.e. lists derived from catalogs) available for rental in 1997 and 2002. Our results indicate that increased competition leads to an increased propensity to price discriminate along each of the dimensions we investigate. These results hold for both second-degree and third-degree price discrimination. Further, list owners offer menus with more choices in more competitive markets. These results, taken together with results from other empirical studies, suggest that the connection between competition and increased price discrimination is a result that applies broadly.