媒介预算涌向电视的秘密

最近几年，媒体代理机构从客户那里得到的项目佣金已下降到2％～3％，媒体代理机构生存困难。集团化成为媒体代理机构应对困境的方式之一。因为规模大的公司购买力更大，可以同媒体业主谈判降低成本，进而可以用更为低廉的广告价格吸引广告主，从而得到更多的业务。     

Migration Intermediaries and Codes of Conduct: Temporary Migrant Workers in Australian Horticulture

Over recent decades, developments in network governance have seen governments around the world cede considerable authority and responsibility to commercial migration intermediaries for recruiting and managing temporary migrant labour. Correspondingly, a by-product of network governance has been the emergence of soft employment regulation in which voluntary codes of conduct supplement hard (enforceable) legal employment standards. This paper explores these developments in the context of temporary migrant workers employed in Australian horticulture. First the paper analyses the growing use of temporary migrant labour in this industry. It then describes how different types of intermediaries interact with this workforce. The paper then outlines both hard and soft employment regulations, and contrasts them with actual employment conditions, questioning how a network governance approach has affected this vulnerable workforce. The paper concludes that changes in network governance of migration and employment relations have emasculated formal legal regulation, leaving market forces to operate without effective or ethical constraints at the expense of the public good.     

The changing state–market condominium in East Asia: rethinking the political underpinnings of development

This article addresses the effects of inequality on the globalisation process. It is argued that the recent financial and economic crisis is a manifestation of a tendency of the aggregate demand to fall relatively to aggregate supply, generated by an asymmetric income distribution, which in turn both increases, and is reinforced by, the mobility of goods, capital and labour, in a process of cumulative causation. This process has not become manifest earlier due to counteracting tendencies generated by the financial system, that were disrupted during the crisis. It is also argued that mainstream economics does not have the adequate framework for explaining the crisis, and actually contributed to the crisis through its theories and policies. Hence an alternative economic framework is suggested for addressing the crisis, drawing upon the contributions of several heterodox economic traditions, especially post-Keynesianism.     

“不要忘了记住我!”广告说的越多,传递的信息可能会更少

人的记忆是有限的,而就是这样一个简单的事实却被很多广告主在制作广告时常常甩在脑后。他们把广告当成了货运集装箱,认为能够装载大量的信息,认为广告内容越多得到的投资回报就越多,而事实恰恰相反。     

电视广告到达的计划与测量

媒体计划机构运用电视收视率来确定该购买哪种插播广告,从而使广告能够影响到x%的群体。这就是所谓的媒体“到达”,又称之为某一时段或某个电视节目的广告能见机率(OTS)。这一方法是媒体计划者用于预测某广告影响程度的最佳方法,但这并不一定意味着广告能够对观众产生影响,因为     

Industry differences in the neoliberal transformation of Australian industrial relations

This article argues that our theoretical understanding of neoliberalism and empirical understanding of the transformation of industrial relations in Australia since the early 1990s can be improved by disaggregating analysis from national to industry level, and by focusing on the dual neoliberal objectives of decollectivisation and individualisation.     

连续性跟踪测试中创新的数据采集方法:处理市场研究准则与市场实况之间的必然冲突

跟踪测试的“3C”：一致性，一致性，和一致性 跟踪测试是指在多于一个时间点上，在相同的抽样人群内收集同类信息的市场研究项目。跟踪测试所得到的数据可用于评估市场的变化，这对于那些快速变化的事物尤显重要——例如厂告宣传——又或是那些微小变化都会影响业务表现的领域——例如客户满意度。为了确保跟踪测试提取出了市场上发生的真实变化，理论上每次测试都需按照相同的方式执行。例如，每次都问相同的题目。按照相同的顺序提问，访问同类型的被访，由同一组访问员进行数据采集等等。其中至关重要的是测试所使用的访问方法。通常在开始一个跟踪测试的时候有很多方法可供选择——电话访问、面访、入户访问（这个方法在中国仍被很普遍地使用）或定点访问等。     

通过“冲击力”看广告

当看到一个厂告时．你会有眼前一亮的感觉吗，还是觉得平淡无奇?很多时候，你的答案可能是后。如今，太多的厂告都被淹没了，广告播出或刊出之后，它们可能被很快的遗忘，或根本就没有被记起过。这样的厂告无法吸引消费的注意力。当然也就无法达到既定的目的。人们已经厌倦了厂告的海洋，平淡无奇的厂告不会被记起，所以现在最为重要的是．让厂告浮出“水面”，也即赋予厂告以冲击力。     

The Political Economy of Basle II: The Costs for Poor Countries

The financial crises of the 1990s triggered many changes to the design of the international financial system. We use the formulation of the new Basle capital accord for banks (B‐II) to illustrate that, while much affected, developing countries have had very little influence on this so‐called new international financial architecture. We argue that B‐II has been formulated largely to serve the interests of powerful market players, with developing countries being left out. At the same time, we demonstrate that B‐II is likely to raise the costs and reduce the supply of external financing for developing countries in particular. Furthermore, and importantly, B‐II may well increase the pro‐cyclicality of external financing, an unfortunate outcome given that developing countries already face much volatility in terms of capital flows. Overall, while B‐II may indeed compensate for a range of weaknesses of Basle I, the exclusionary policy process and costs which B‐II imposes on developing countries require a re‐think of the way in which crucial elements of financial governance, such as the Basle capital accords, are developed and implemented.