Give Macroeconomic Stability and Growth in Russia a Chance

This paper identifies and investigates conceptual and empirical links among Russia's disappointing growth performance of the mid-1990s, its costly and eventually unsuccessful stabilization, the macroeconomic meltdown of 1998 and the spectacular rise of non-payments. Non-payments developed into a system that flourished in an atmosphere of fundamental inconsistency between a macroeconomic policy geared at sharp disinflation and a microeconomic policy of bailing-out enterprises through soft budget constraints. It embodies a large volume of untargeted, implicit subsidies in the order of 7–10 per cent of GDP, which has stifled growth, contributed to the 1998 meltdown through its impact on public debt and made at best a questionable contribution to equity. The overwhelming priority at this point is to dismantle this system, thereby promoting enterprise restructuring and growth (by hardening budget constraints) and medium-term macroeconomic stability (by reducing the size of the subsidies).     

A review of bank performance during transition in central Europe

This study, based on panel data from 189 industrial enterprises in 1992‐96, shows that privatisation 'on average' produces little improvement in performance of Russian enterprises. However, disaggregating the process, we reveal that methods of privatisation do influence performance but the impact is not always positive. The state seems to be a passive shareholder. At the same time, our results suggest that majority state ownership is preferable to a state minority stockholding, possibly because the absence of a monitoring shareholder in the latter case does not permit managers to achieve their own objectives at the expense of other shareholders.     

Valuing Mortgage Insurance Contracts in Emerging Market Economies

We develop a new option-based method for the valuation of mortgage insurance contracts in closed form in an economy where agents are risk neutral. While the proposed valuation method is general and can be used in any market, it may be particularly useful in emerging market economies where other existing methods may be either inappropriate or are too difficult to implement because of the lack of relevant data. As an application, we price a typical Serbian government-backed mortgage insurance contract.     

Inflation in New EU Member States: A Domestically or Externally Driven Phenomenon?

This article empirically analyzes the domestic and external inflation determinants for eight non-eurozone new EU member states (NMS), using a structural vector autoregression model. Results indicate that foreign shocks are a major factor in explaining inflation dynamics in the medium run, while the short-run inflation dynamics are mainly influenced by domestic shocks. Moreover, the importance of the foreign inflation component has had a rising trend in the precrisis period in all NMS and mostly coincided with their accession to the EU. This trend ended with the onset of the global financial crisis. The study implicates the need to augment the classical Taylor rule with foreign factors in the case of small open economies.     

Institutional ownership,analyst following,and share prices

We study the mutual relationships between institutional ownership, analyst following and share prices. We show that the pressure on firms to set lower share prices to attract analysts is attenuated by institutional monitoring. Our theory refutes the assumed causal relation between share price and institutional ownership, attributed to the share price–liquidity relation, and we show empirically that share prices and institutional ownership are positively related after controlling for liquidity. Our study provides a rationale for why better firms generally maintain higher share price levels, and offers new insights into the puzzling empirical linkages observed between nominal share price levels and firm fundamentals.     

Cagan’s paradox and money demand in hyperinflation: Revisited at daily frequency

Using daily data the Cagan money demand is estimated and accepted for the most severe portion of Serbia’s 1992–1993 hyperinflation, i.e. its last 6 months. An implication is that the public adjusted daily throughout this extreme period. Moreover, the obtained semi-elasticity estimates are by far lower than those previously found using monthly data sets. Consequently, the daily estimates reject the longstanding Cagan’s paradox, based on monthly studies, by showing that the economy has been on the correct, increasing side of the Laffer curve almost through the end of hyperinflation. This strongly supports the view that hyperinflation is triggered and driven all way through its end by the government’s hunt for non-decreasing seigniorage. Daily adjustments of public in hyperinflation can account for the difference between the results obtained at daily and monthly frequencies, calling into question the latter. Some evidence is offered that the findings of this paper may hold for other hyperinflations.