Abuse of Ministerial Authority,Systemic Perjury,and Obstruction of Justice: Corruption in the Shadows of Organizational Practice

Organizational corruption has recently attracted considerable scholarly attention, especially since its devastating effects following recent major corporate scandals, the worldwide economic crisis of 2009, and the current European Union monetary crisis. This paper is based on the analysis of three distinct, yet contextually related, case studies in a European Union member state: (a) an incident of corruption by a minister in an adjudicative role, (b) widespread financial misreporting and perjury within an organization, and (c) abuse of due process and obstruction of justice by civil servants within a ministry. These cases serve to illustrate, for the first time, Aguilera and Vadera’s (in J Bus Ethics 77:431–449, 2008) framework of organizational corruption, which relates distinct types of a corrupter’s opportunity, motivation, and justification with the type of corruption present in the organization. Furthermore, the data suggest how the framework may be extended and reveal conceptual issues that require reconciliation. This study attempts such reconciliations and offers some suggestions on how the findings may be utilized by policy reformers or corruption controllers.     

Going Down the Slippery Slope of Legitimacy Lies in Early-Stage Ventures: The Role of Moral Disengagement

Journal of Business Ethics - Aristotle’s philosophical insights into ethics, wisdom and practice have drawn the attention of scholars. In the current professional context where ethics are...     

Arbitrage, strategic inefficiency and self-regulation

This paper develops a multi-period strategic market game in two different settings, one of a finite-period finance economy, and its extension to infinite periods but with overlapping term of traders. Under these two different contexts, we address the possibility of strategies that Pareto improve the outcome of the game. In this effort, both the introduction of a regulation scheme and the innovative role of provision of traders with incentives to self-police these designated strategies play an important role.     

Monetary policy with linear information costs

The paper adresses the problem of a monetary economy with costs of information, imposed in linear form. In particular, we make use of a strategic market game with money where equilibria are standardly non-Walrasian, permitting an active role to monetary policy. The imposition of information costs alters the demand of real balances since traders demand extra money for gathering and processing the necessary information. As a result, money injections could be proved welfare improving only when the induced information costs do not offset the resulted gains to trade.     

Strategic market games quantal response equilibria

Summary. The paper explores a model of boundedly rational traders who act strategically. The general framework of analysis is the sell all model of Shapley and Shubik [6] whereas the behavioral rule of traders is related to the bounded rationality of McKelvey and Palfrey [5] and the subsequent of Chen Friedman and Thisse [1]. A new equilibrium concept is introduced appropriate to integrate in the basic model market participants that may choose an inferior action with positive probability. Further, assuming that these market participants are engaged in an infinite repeated game and making them able to learn playing rationally, we demonstrate that in the limit the original equilibrium of Shapley and Shubik is attained and basically emerges as a special case of our equilibrium concept.Received: 20 September 2003, Revised: 11 December 2004, I am indebted to Yanis Varoufakis and especially to Dimitrios P. Tsomocos for their helpful comments.