Inefficient Investment,Information Asymmetry,and Competition for Managers

We investigate the possible inefficiency of investment when the manager has better information than the principal. We assume that projects can be grouped into two categories based on their information characteristics of soft and hard information. We consider a case in which the manager faces competition for appointment at the end of term. We consider several cases in which the competitor's ability is known, or proxied by the performance of other managers, or is uncertain. We find that hard information projects are preferred to soft information projects and that the efficiency in project selection critically depends on the competitor's ability. Interestingly, information asymmetry may be socially beneficial, because it can provide the manager with incentives to select high‐quality hard‐information projects. Welfare improvement can be made by a budget change that is in the opposite direction to the optimum. Several empirical implications of the theory are discussed.     

Health Shocks,Out‐of‐Pocket Medical Expenses and Consumer Debt Among Middle‐Aged and Older Americans

We examine two important issues related to health and financial burden in middle‐aged and older Americans: (1) whether or not new health events affect a consumer's unsecured debt, and (2) to what extent the associated out‐of‐pocket medical expenses (OOP) contribute to unsecured debt. We use six biennial waves (1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006 and 2008) from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS). We estimated fixed effects models and conducted mediation analyses. We find that new health events affect the accumulation of unsecured debt. Our estimates suggest that new health events increase unsecured debt by 6.3% ($230) to 9.3 % ($339); approximately 20% of the increase in unsecured consumer debt comes from OOP when experiencing new health events. New severe health events increase debt for the 50–64 age group, but do not increase it for the 65+ group.